Summary of "Is war inevitable?"

Is war inevitable?

Overview

A Doha Debates panel, moderated by Soraya Salam, brought together historians, social scientists and a legal scholar to debate whether violence is innate, how war has changed over time, who pays its costs, and whether institutions, norms or technology make future large-scale war more or less likely.

Main positions

Brian Ferguson (professor of anthropology, Rutgers University–Newark)
- Argues war is not inevitable.
- Violence is learned through culture and leadership.
- Points to pre-state societies that show alternatives and to complex societies that have existed without interstate war.
- Emphasizes the importance of definitions (distinguishing war from violent death) and contends contemporary choices can reduce violence.
Ian Morris (author and professor of history, Stanford University)
- Argues war is not inevitable.
- Emphasizes long-term cultural evolution, state-building and deterrence (including nuclear weapons) in reducing violent death.
- States pacify internal violence while increasing the destructiveness of interstate war, but long-term trends point away from routine large-scale violence.
Charli Carpenter (professor of political science, University of Massachusetts Amherst)
- Sees conflict as inevitable but violent conflict as avoidable.
- Highlights the role of international law (UN Charter, Geneva Conventions) and norms since 1945 in narrowing when and how states go to war.
- Notes decline in great-power interstate wars while civil wars and internationalized intrastate wars remain serious problems.
Noha Aboueldahab (assistant professor of international law, Georgetown University in Qatar)
- Argues war is inevitable to an extent (notably self-defence) and critiques the dominant “progress” narrative as Eurocentric.
- Emphasizes the disproportionate burden on the Global South from colonial legacies, sanctions, proxy conflicts and internationalized civil wars.
- Urges inclusion of indirect deaths and long-term harms in assessments.

Key evidence, disputed facts and examples

Definitions matter: outcomes depend on how “war,” “violent death,” and indirect deaths (disease, starvation, collapsed services) are defined and counted.
Archaeology debate: Ian Morris cited estimates of high Stone Age violent-death rates (15–25%); others counter that original sources suggest much lower prehistoric violent-death rates (~2%), which affects claims about innate violence.
Costs of recent conflicts: The Watson Institute “Costs of War” tally (post‑9/11 wars) was cited — roughly ~1 million direct deaths and 4–5 million indirect deaths — to illustrate long-term harm.
Trends: Several panelists argued great-power interstate wars have declined (about 80 years without world war), aided by multilateral institutions, norms and nuclear deterrence. Civil wars peaked in the early 1990s; many have persisted or become internationalized (e.g., Yemen, Syria, Libya).
Examples used to interrogate progress: Gaza, Sudan, Ukraine, Yemen, Rwanda, Iraq (sanctions and 2003 invasion), Afghanistan, and South America (noting few interstate wars since the Chaco War) were discussed to show uneven distribution of suffering and the role of external powers.

Central themes and contested points

Who benefits: Leaders, military institutions and the military‑industrial complex often have incentives that favor or perpetuate conflict.
Uneven progress: Global averages can mask regional, racial and socioeconomic inequalities. The “rules-based order” and multilateral norms have improved some outcomes but are criticized for hypocrisy and uneven enforcement.
Technology and AI: New technologies (drones, algorithms, AI) are destabilizing. Concerns included delegation of targeting to algorithms, loss of human judgment, and algorithmic amplification of biases or misinformation. A leaked report about automated “kill lists” was cited as alarming.
Institutions and norms: Peacekeeping, humanitarian law and global treaties (e.g., Geneva Conventions, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons) are seen as important guardrails; panelists differed on how robust these are given geopolitical shifts and retrenchment in funding and political will.
Innovation argument: While war spurs certain technologies, panelists argued this is a poor justification because war distorts innovation priorities and diverts resources from public goods.

Paths forward and sources of hope

Improve definitions, measurement and interdisciplinary study of violence.
Strengthen and defend international norms, humanitarian law and peacekeeping; hold leaders accountable and expose interests behind war rationales.
Build alternative collective projects and civic narratives (public goods, climate response, health systems) to create solidarity without violence.
Increase public scrutiny, education and cultural change to reduce dehumanization and question leaders’ war rationales.