Summary of "Cash for Kim: North Korean Forced Laborers in Poland"

Overview

This investigative report documents how North Korean state‑organized forced labour has operated inside the EU — specifically in Polish shipyards and construction sites — and how Polish companies, officials and EU funds have enabled it.

Main findings and evidence

Fatal workplace accident
- A 41‑year‑old North Korean welder working on the Norwegian ship Polar Empress suffered catastrophic burns at a Gdańsk shipyard, died in a Polish hospital, and his body was repatriated to North Korea along with €637 sent to his family.
Employer network
- North Korean workers were employed through Polish firms (Armex, Alson, Crist, Nauta, J.P. Construct and contractors linked to Atal) and by North Korean agencies (Rungrado General Trading / Rungrado Trading).
- Rungrado is a state‑owned, Workers’ Party company whose profits benefit the regime.
Corporate links and opacity
- Cecylia Kowalska is identified as managing director of Armex and Alson and a partner in Wonye (with North Korean associates).
- Companies declined interviews; pay stubs suggest centralized handling of signatures and wages. Some workers reported receiving pay from different companies than those that officially employed them.
State involvement and profits
- UN estimates about 50,000 North Koreans working abroad generate up to $2 billion for the regime.
- The report finds most wages are diverted to the North Korean state; individual workers reportedly keep only about $80–$160 per month if they are “lucky.”
Working and living conditions matching forced labour
- Inspections and testimony documented 12‑hour shifts (often >60 hours/week), long unpaid or under‑paid overtime, isolation from Polish society (minders accompanying movements), restricted contact with family, and deprivation of wages.
- These conditions align with International Labour Organization definitions of forced labour.
Legal and administrative failures
- Polish authorities issued nearly 1,972 work visas to North Koreans over five years but could not state how many remain working in Poland.
- Poland (and Malta) were noted as the only EU countries allowing North Koreans to work legally.
- Inspectors found multiple workplaces with North Korean labourers from 2013–2015.
Suspected illicit activity
- Rungrado’s brochure claims benign trade, yet UN reports suspect involvement in smuggling missile components.
- A high‑ranking North Korean (Kang Hung Gu / Kang Hong Gu), allegedly a former brigade commander, appears in Polish registers as a business partner for Wonye.
Asylum and defections
- At least one North Korean worker who fled in Poland was granted asylum.
- The report explains why defections are rare: tight control, minders, and threats.
EU funding paradox
- Over €70 million in EU development funds flowed into shipyards (Crist and Nauta) where North Korean workers were employed, effectively subsidizing sites that used forced labour.
Official silence or denial
- The Polish Ministry of Labour, the North Korean embassy and the European Commission largely failed to provide substantive responses.
- Some companies declined comment or asserted legality as ethical cover.

Conclusions drawn

The investigation argues that North Korea functions as a global “illegal job agency,” exporting coerced labour to generate hard currency.
Polish companies and a permissive regulatory and funding environment have enabled North Korean forced labour to persist in EU territory, channeling money back to the DPRK regime and implicating parts of Europe’s economy and public financing.
The pattern meets international definitions of forced labour and raises legal, ethical and security concerns (including possible links to sanctioned activities).

“North Korea functions as a global ‘illegal job agency,’ exporting coerced labour to generate hard currency.”

Presenters and contributors (named or identifiable in the report)

Cecylia Kowalska — managing director / president of Armex; involved with Alson and Wonye
Kang Hung Gu (also spelled Kang Hong Gu) — identified North Korean business partner (alleged former brigade commander)
Rungrado General Trading / Rungrado Trading — North Korean state trading company
Armex, Alson, Wonye, Crist, Nauta, J.P. Construct, Atal — Polish companies implicated
Labour inspector(s) / National Labour Inspector (PIP) — investigators who inspected sites (unnamed)
Deputy director of the regional government office responsible for work permits (unnamed)
Polish Border Patrol — quoted regarding isolation and minders
Ahn Myung Chul — former guard of a North Korean political prison camp, now an activist
Kim Seung Cheol — North Korean defector who fled while working abroad
Unnamed North Korean labourers — interviewed or observed (including the deceased welder)
Polish Ministry of Labour, North Korean embassy, European Commission — institutions contacted (representatives did not provide substantive comment in the investigation)

Methodology and notes

The report is produced by investigative journalists; specific reporter names were not provided in the subtitles.
Institutions contacted for comment included the Polish Ministry of Labour, the North Korean embassy and the European Commission; substantive responses were not provided in the investigation.