Summary of "Law Prof: Law Schools Still 'Inaccurate' On Employment Numbers"

Concise summary

The conversation critiques law school marketing, reporting, and underlying business models. Professor Benjamin (Ben) Trackenberg argues many schools present misleading employment and salary statistics — for example, using averages that overstate typical graduate outcomes or counting very short‑term or school‑arranged gigs as “employed.” This creates reputational and regulatory risk. High‑profile individual misconduct (admissions officers and deans falsifying statistics) has led to bar discipline, and regulators (state attorneys general, the ABA, and state bars) are increasingly scrutinizing education providers.

Separately, President Obama’s endorsement of a two‑year JD is framed as a product/market innovation with significant operational and financial implications for law schools.

Frameworks, processes, and playbooks

Disclosure and audit framework
- The ABA could set stricter disclosure standards and perform random audits of law school employment and salary statistics.
Marketing ethics / professional‑conduct framework
- Legal marketing should be subject to professional conduct rules that prohibit dishonesty, fraud, misrepresentation, and deceit.
Consumer‑protection enforcement playbook
- State attorneys general can use settlements and public enforcement (as in for‑profit education cases, e.g., Trump University) to police misleading claims.
Product innovation / licensing experiment model
- Pilot or opt‑in experiments: state bars could allow schools to pilot two‑year JD tracks to test market demand and cost savings.
Comparative benchmarking
- Move from misleading averages to more usable metrics (median and distribution) similar to better consumer disclosure standards.

Key metrics, KPIs, and reporting items

Employment rate at nine months post‑graduation (commonly surveyed metric)
Average salary versus median salary of recent graduates (average can be misleading)
Incoming class credentials: undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores (used in ranking manipulation cases)
Institutional measures implied: applicant volume, matriculation counts, tuition revenue, faculty load (assumptions tied to the three‑year model)
Regulatory outcomes: disciplinary sanctions (example: ~3‑year suspension), monetary settlements (example cited: roughly $10M in a for‑profit settlement)

Concrete examples and case studies

Mark Sergeant (Villanova law school dean)
- Falsified incoming 1L GPA/LSAT data submitted to the ABA and rankings; disciplined by the Massachusetts bar (suspension of roughly three years).
Paul Ples (University of Illinois admissions)
- Reprimanded by the Washington bar for similar admissions‑data issues.
State‑level enforcement
- New York AG actions against for‑profit educators (including Trump University) are cited as precedent for scrutinizing educational claims. Former NY AG Eric Schneiderman criticized counting very short‑term or institution‑arranged short jobs as “employment.”
Sector behavior analogy
- Comparison to K–12 test‑score fudging under No Child Left Behind: isolated wrongdoers vs. systemic incentives to present rosier metrics.

Business, operational, and strategic implications

Reputation and regulatory risk
- Misleading marketing and statistic disclosure can trigger bar discipline, state AG actions, and damage public trust — risks are concentrated for schools that rely heavily on competitive rankings.
Incentives differ by organizational form
- For‑profit institutions may face stronger incentives to exaggerate outcomes (shareholder pressure); nonprofits may rely on reputational deference but still face scrutiny.
Product redesign opportunity: two‑year JD
- A two‑year JD is positioned as a potential cost‑saving product (one fewer year of tuition, lower total cost). Market interest exists, but implementation disrupts current financial models:
  - Revenue impact: loss of one year of tuition per student (≈33% reduction in per‑student tuition intake).
  - Cost/operational impact: faculty staffing models, curriculum redesign, and accreditation/licensure alignment will be required.
  - Competitive positioning: schools could market a lower total cost and attract price‑sensitive candidates, but only if state bars permit alternative licensure pathways.
Enrollment pressure
- Declining applicant and matriculant volumes at some schools increase pressure to innovate or reduce costs, complicating a transition to alternative program lengths.

Actionable recommendations

For regulators and accreditors (ABA, state bars)

Create clearer disclosure standards for employment and salary reporting.
Implement random audits of reported statistics.
Clarify when misleading aggregate statistics constitute misrepresentation under professional conduct rules.

For law schools (operations and marketing)

Shift to more transparent outcome reporting: use median, distributions, and clear definitions of “employed.”
Avoid counting transient or institution‑created short‑term gigs as meaningful employment.
Pilot shorter degree tracks only after rigorous financial and operational modeling and dialogue with state bars.

For prospective students (market intelligence)

Ask for granular employment definitions and distributions rather than relying on headline averages.

Regulatory and enforcement signals to watch

Increased ABA attention to auditing and disclosure standards (no fixed timeline given).
State attorneys general may replicate consumer‑protection enforcement seen in for‑profit education cases.
Bars could expand use of professional conduct rules to sanction misleading institutional marketing — even when there is no outright falsification.
Potential slow, experimental rollout of two‑year JD tracks contingent on state bar policy changes.