Summary of "❗️СЦЕНАРИЙ 2026: о чем МОЛЧАТ Кремль и глобалисты"

Summary of main arguments / commentary

War end not in sight; escalation likely. The speaker cites General Baluevsky’s view that Russia’s “special military operation” has no clear end and that Russia’s involvement will likely expand. While agreeing that the conflict will be prolonged, the speaker argues that “leadership can’t be strong,” and therefore cannot achieve victory over Russia’s main enemies.
Core claim: power must change to prevent collapse. The speaker’s central thesis is that Russia cannot survive and develop under the current ruling model. A change of power is presented as the key necessity to stop a trajectory toward “collapse/disintegration.” The speaker also claims the leadership fully implements a “global agenda.”
Third World War framing and stages. The speaker proposes that a “Third World War” is already under way, or has effectively begun, emphasizing a historical pattern: major wars were “organized” through manufactured causes and blamed on others. They argue the conflict is moving toward later stages:
- Stage 1: a protracted war with Russia as a key participant.
- Stage 2: confrontation between NATO and Russia, framed as serving U.S./globalist/Zionist interests.
- Stage 3: Russia reduced to a proxy force against China, regardless of who “wins.”
Domestic demographic and EU/energy dependency used as evidence. The speaker cites Russia’s demographic decline as a strategic disadvantage. They also argue Russia lacks a sovereignty-focused economic plan and remains dependent on export markets and energy pricing (oil/gas), using this to claim the state is not moving toward an independent national model.
Elite behavior interpreted as internal succession/clan struggle. Rather than expecting public upheaval, the speaker describes a behind-the-scenes power-management process:
- The security apparatus is said to be “embedded” in financial/business networks and therefore unable to reform independently.
- Ideological “wave” shifts (e.g., “traditional values”) are described as rhetoric masking continued subordination to global structures.
- The speaker claims that conflict in the information space reflects clan competition, not anti-corruption reform.
Two competing succession “lines,” both framed as risky.
- Line A (liberal/financial group): the speaker argues a “liberal bench” controls finance, central institutions, and information, and could push a successor aligned with continued global-agenda integration.
- Line B (“family”/Putin-connected candidates): they describe an alternative cluster of relatives/close figures positioned as “less worst” options for stability.

Individuals mentioned include Kiriyenko and Medvedev, with Yuri (Boris) Kovalchuk emphasized as tied to key oversight institutions (Accounts Chamber) and promotion dynamics. Ekaterina Tikhonova is also described as part of the “family” line.

Manipulation of elections and “managed” public agitation. With upcoming elections mentioned as in ~5 months, the speaker claims the Kremlin wants them “boring,” with no new serious players. They argue that “new” projects and bloggers (example: “Bonya”) are used to channel or confuse “lower-class” support—describing an “Ochlos” segment as susceptible to illusions and utilitarian incentives.
Proposed solution: build non-political unifying civic platforms. The speaker criticizes fragmentation among popular-patriotic activists and argues it’s hard to scale grassroots resistance because groups don’t unite. They propose using platforms like Bastion and Barteron as relatively apolitical commercial/independent spaces to coordinate projects and grow resources—while warning about risks from censorship and provocation.
Analogy to 1917 and argument for “forming a national subject of power.” The speaker draws an extended comparison to:
- Liberal coup dynamics (1917)
- Bolshevik rise via organizational maneuvering (congresses, mobilization of rural committees)

They argue that today, despite censorship, it’s necessary to construct collective political capacity—creating a real, cohesive force rather than fragmented “for oneself” activity.

Freedom of speech and censorship as part of the struggle. The speaker reports that content has been taken down (including on Rutube) and that Telegram/Rutube access is disrupted or unstable, interpreting this as propaganda suppression of opponents. They recommend organizing around accessible channels (VPN noted as relevant).
Turn toward “concrete projects.” The speaker argues that even if open rescue is impossible to explain, people should translate protest (including against the digital ruble and censorship) into organizing efforts. They mention planning meetings involving veterans/officers and attracting supporters from among participants associated with the SVO environment—framed as ways to “make authorities shudder.”