3 Singapore Property Areas I Would Avoid

Summary (finance-style focus on risks, “numbers,” and buyer/exits)

The speaker argues that three Singapore property areas/project types could disappoint buyers due to:

• Oversupply vs. demand
• Buyer pool constraints
• Entry price vs. exit price requirements not aligning

The core message: even “good locations” can underperform when pricing, tenure, and expected resale buyers don’t match.

A recurring framework is implied: check supply/competition, tenure (leasehold vs freehold), surrounding comparable resale performance, and compute what resale price is needed to “make decent profit.”

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Key methodology / framework mentioned (implied step-by-step)

1. Compare entry/new-launch pricing with surrounding projects—especially:

   • Leasehold vs. freehold
   • Even nearby freehold landed options

2. Estimate the required exit price to make “decent profit.”

   • The speaker suggests “good” new-launch pricing should allow at least +300 to +400 per sq ft of upside.
   • Example cited (illustrative math): if entry is around $3,000 psf, exit would need to be around ~$3,007 psf to make “decent profits” (the numeric consistency is unclear, but the intent is that exit must exceed entry by a meaningful margin).

3. Assess the buyer pool / future demand

   • In the CBD, the speaker says the buyer pool can be smaller than expected.
   • Many units are described as rental rather than owner-occupied.
   • Foreign demand is highlighted as a risk factor via ABSD: 60%.

4. Look at resale transaction outcomes for the “same-area comparable”

   • The speaker uses a nearby resale project (Bijou) to illustrate how often holders are profitable vs not, and the magnitude of gains/losses.

5. Don’t rely on marketing discounts without checking whether price behavior already signals a problem

   • Examples of red flags implied: discounts recurring over time, project age, and holding period effects.

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Extracted assets / instruments / sectors

Public-market instruments

• None mentioned (no tickers/ETFs/bonds/crypto).

Property segments mentioned

• Singapore residential property (new launch condos; leasehold vs freehold condos)
• Freehold landed (e.g., semi-D and one-story landed examples)
• CBD properties
• East Coast
• Pasir Panjang / city fringe

Policy instrument mentioned

• ABSD: 60% (used to explain foreign buyer retreat)

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Area 1: East Coast (example: “Vietnam Novela Bay” / “Novela Bay”)

Risks and explicit numbers

• The project is described as launched April 2026.

• Price references:

  • Buyers allegedly starting around ~$3,000 per sq ft
  • Mentioned price point: ~$5.8 million for a unit (context described as “3,000 psf, 5.8 million”)

• Profit-threshold logic:

  • The speaker says a “good new launch” should allow at least $300–$400 psf upside for decent profit.
  • They claim buyers at $3,000 psf would need to sell around ~$3,007 psf to make “decent profits” (numerical consistency appears off vs the earlier stated $300–$400 range, but the intent remains: required exit must be meaningfully above entry).

• Tenure warning:

  • The project is leasehold.
  • The speaker questions whether buyers should accept leasehold at that price versus surrounding freehold alternatives (including nearby freehold landed).

Recommendation / caution

Not that “nobody should buy,” but buyers should be extra careful because the entry price may be too high relative to future resale buyer willingness, especially versus freehold alternatives.

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Area 2: CBD (general CBD condo demand + one investor example)

Risks and explicit policy context

• The speaker says the buyer pool is much smaller than many assume.

• Observations from their clients:

  • Some owners “don’t receive any offers”
  • Or offers are described as “ridiculously low and disgusting”

• Rental vs owner-occupied mix:

  • “A lot of rental units” but “not a lot of owner-occupied units.”

• Foreign demand constraint:

  • Cites 60% ABSD as a reason foreign demand “ran away.”

• Historical/exception cited:

  • Some buyers bought multiple units at CanningHill Piers (used to imply demand exists in certain trophy/exception cases).

Recommendation / caution

• The speaker states: “confirm I will not even think about buying into CBD”

• They acknowledge CBD pricing can look “okay” due to promotions, but argue it can still fail due to:

  • future resale demand
  • tenure/market liquidity dynamics

• Exit requirement logic:

  • They assert that if buyers pay “this kind of per sq ft” for a leasehold condo, they need to sell around ~$500 per sq ft more to make “decent profits” (i.e., insufficient upside relative to the price paid).

Assets / locations mentioned

• CanningHill Piers

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Area 3: Pasir Panjang (city fringe) — Example: “Terra Hill”

Risks and explicit numbers

• Agent/seller behavior cited:
  • Discounts
  • Balance units with promotional prices

• Discount claim:

  • up to $300,000 depending on unit type

• Timeline / holding period risk:

  • Terra Hill launched Feb 2023
  • Speaker states a 3-year holding period, implying resale activity should begin to appear around the time of the talk.

• Entry price vs required exit:

  • Entry cited: ~$2,009 psf, ~$5.5 million
  • Speaker claim: to exit with “healthy profit,” sellers need to sell at at least ~$4,500 psf more, which “works out to about $3,003–$3,004 psf” (the statement is numerically unclear, but clearly conveys large required appreciation).

• Performance evidence via nearby comparable resale:

  • Comparable project: Bijou
    • Freehold
    • Completed 2018
    • 120 units
  • Transaction outcomes (speaker’s counts):
    • 2 profitable
    • 5 unprofitable
    • Out of 7 transactions
  • Even the profitable ones are described as limited.

  • A “best time” purchase is said to still lose about $1,008 (speaker wording suggests $1,008 psf or a similarly measured loss, but the phrasing is ambiguous).

  • For the better-hold cases (described loosely):

    • ~5 years: still loss (“lose a thumb”)
    • ~6 years: “lose no more legs already” / near break-even narrative
    • 12 years: “lose entire you”

  • One profit example:

    • + $156,000 after ~6 years holding (described as a “legend” profit case)

Recommendation / caution

The speaker implies Terra Hill price action doesn’t match resale reality, and that marketing discounts may be offsetting weak exit prospects because of:

• Developer timeline / urgency (described as “fire-sale” context by the agent)
• Leasehold vs freehold landed alternatives
• Limited buyer willingness to pay for the leasehold product at those levels

Alternative investment examples (freehold landed)

The speaker compares Terra Hill budget users to freehold landed purchases made around the same month Terra Hill launched (Feb 2023).

Example 1 (landed: one-story)

• Sold in Feb 2023: ~$3.0 million
• Rebuilt construction cost estimated: ~$1.5–$1.7 million
• Recently sold (May): ~$6.4 million
• Estimated gross profit after land/build: ~$3.4 million
• Estimated net after subtracting costs: “at least $1.2–$1.3 million”

Example 2 (landed: semi-D)

• Sold in Feb 2023: ~$5.28 million
• Recently sold near: ~$6.8 million
• Adjusted comparison suggests ~$6.5 million for same size
• Implied profit: ~$1.2 million

Conclusion (as presented): freehold landed is framed as having better appreciation potential and more room due to land/building area.

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Disclosures / disclaimers

• No explicit “not financial advice” disclaimer text is captured in the provided subtitles.
• The tone is advisory/persuasive (e.g., “worries me,” “confirm I will not even think,” “be extra careful”), but no formal disclaimer is quoted.

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Presenters / sources mentioned

• No named presenter is given.
• Named examples/locations/projects mentioned:
  • Terra Hill
  • Bijou (freehold resale comparable)
  • CanningHill Piers
  • Novela Bay / “Vietnam Novela Bay” (East Coast project name as transcribed)