Larry Johnson: Saudi Air Strikes Fail to Change the Battlefield in Yemen

Overview

Larry Johnson discusses the Yemen battlefield and argues that recent Saudi airstrikes have not meaningfully altered ground operations.

• Although reports suggest the number of strikes has increased sharply (from the mid-teens to roughly 60), Johnson says it’s unclear what was actually hit in Sana’a.
• He implies the strikes are likely ineffective relative to Ansar Allah’s (Houthis’) ballistic-missile capability.
• Johnson notes there is no evidence that the airstrikes are being used as close air support aimed at directly engaging opposing forces in exchanges of fire.

Ground Campaign and Strategic Movement

Johnson emphasizes that Ansar Allah appears to be advancing “gradually but steadily,” using ground gains to surround Taiz.

He argues the Saudis are likely constrained by manpower as well:

• They cannot defend multiple key areas simultaneously.
• They must choose which locations to protect.

In this framework, Johnson presents a strategic view that Ansar Allah may focus on:

1. Capturing Taiz first
2. Then moving toward Aden
3. Eventually targeting additional strategic regions to isolate and restrict access to Aden from the coast

Intent, Timing, and Offensive Claims

On strategic intent and timing, Johnson compares current claims of a large Saudi/Pakistani-led offensive (including reports of mobilizing 100,000 troops) with historical surprise operations in World War II, such as:

• Operation Uranus
• Bagration
• D-Day

His view is that announcing major offensives in advance often functions as public relations or propaganda, rather than reliably indicating imminent or effective military execution.

Marib as a Decisive Step

A major portion of the analysis centers on Marib as a likely decisive objective.

Johnson argues that taking Marib would strengthen Ansar Allah by:

• Securing what is portrayed as the heart of Yemen’s economy and energy production, especially oil
• Gaining revenue and leverage
• Increasing political influence over other tribes

He also suggests that once Marib is secured, Ansar Allah could:

• Tighten control over energy resources
• Apply increased pressure on external stakeholders such as the United States and Europe
• Reduce outside maneuvering options

Aden and Potential Local Accommodation

Johnson also notes signs of possible local accommodation efforts in Aden, including reports that tribes are communicating with Ansar Allah to avoid fighting—potentially reducing resistance as Ansar Allah advances.

Conclusion

Johnson concludes that Ansar Allah has demonstrated effective battlefield coordination and capable leadership. He repeatedly returns to the argument that Saudi air power, as currently employed, has not produced the desired strategic effects on the ground.

Presenter / Contributor

• Larry Johnson