Why China Still Believes in Meritocracy While the West Calls It “Tyranny” | Professor Yang Yao

Summary of Key Arguments (Professor Yang Yao on Meritocracy in China vs. the West)

Western critiques of meritocracy

Professor Yang addresses arguments common in Western scholarship and politics—especially books like Michael Sandel’s The Tyranny of Meritocracy and Daniel Markovits’s The Meritocracy Trap. These critiques argue that meritocratic systems in the U.S. produce a deeply bifurcated society of “winners” and “losers.”

• “Winners” are portrayed as still suffering, because success depends on relentless competition.
• Elites are often described as ethically dismissive of people below them.
• “Losers,” having fewer paths upward, are argued to be more likely to support populism (including movements like MAGA).

Meritocracy isn’t uniquely Chinese—and there’s no clear alternative

Yang argues that every surviving culture must honor some form of merit or virtue; otherwise, people would not work hard and the culture would decay.

He also notes that critics frequently do not offer a convincing replacement system, leaving the debate with an unresolved “theoretical” gap.

Historical claim: China institutionalized meritocratic governance early

Yang argues that meritocracy is not solely a Chinese invention. He points to ancient and classical ideas (including Plato’s Republic) and governance by capable or virtuous rulers.

However, he claims China is distinctive because it institutionalized merit-based selection of officials over 2,000 years ago:

• Western Han period: officials selected through merit and virtue, drawing on Confucian and other philosophies (he mentions Mozi alongside Confucianism).
• Tang era development: selection through examinations, enabling upward mobility via civil exams—contrasted with hereditary feudal systems.

Chinese political meritocracy as “strong state” stability

Yang interprets China’s “strong state” tradition not primarily as “authoritarian” in the Western sense, but as a model aimed at stability through virtue-based administration.

In his framing, emperors influence local governance through an educated gentry class of morally credentialed officials who administer justice and manage grassroots society.

U.S. meritocratic elements also exist (though modern dynamics differ)

To counter the idea that the U.S. has no meritocratic structure, Yang points to:

• the U.S. Constitution
• the Federalist Papers

He argues that the founding emphasized capability and virtue in officeholding. He also describes the electoral college as reflecting reliance on locally respected elites rather than pure popular voting.

Modern China: meritocracy in bureaucracy and measurable promotion incentives

Yang claims contemporary China—specifically the Communist Party’s personnel system—continues the meritocratic tradition:

• The CCP selects officials based on ability (while virtue is harder to observe).
• Drawing on his own/empirical research using data from 1994–2022 (updated every five years), he reports that capable mayors are significantly more likely to be promoted.
  • Example: capable mayors are about 30% more likely to reach provincial-level offices.
• Yang argues that the anti-corruption campaign is not only about removing corruption, but also purifying and educating the bureaucracy—aligning promotion pathways with desired virtues and conduct.

Meritocracy as a reason China’s economic transition was smoother

Yang argues China’s shift from a planning economy to market mechanisms was smoother than transitions in places such as Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union because Chinese society values effort and earned rewards. He links this to respect for entrepreneurship and suggests that many Chinese people view wealth as more earned than in some other contexts.

Reconciling inequality with the meritocracy debate

Yang contends that Western social division is not caused by meritocracy alone. Instead, he argues that globalization-era U.S. policy failures produced unequal outcomes. He suggests that if inequality is addressed, Western societies may again emphasize meritocratic principles.

Control of “capitalistic excess” (corruption and elite capture)

In response to questions, Yang argues that many governments fail because they become captured by business interests.

He claims China’s anti-corruption efforts also aim to break business–party alliances, limiting the ability of large firms to dominate political access and thereby making politics more merit-aligned.

He adds that this encourages younger generations to hold a more nuanced view of markets: accepting them while remaining cautious about monopoly and big-business influence.

Future risk: will rapid change erode virtue and merit?

Yang addresses whether China’s fast technological and social change could erode Confucian beliefs in hard work, virtue, and meritocracy. He offers a cyclical view of history:

• The U.S. is not simply “declining,” but turning inward and becoming more conservative.
• China is in a different cycle, becoming more confident and outward-looking.
• He emphasizes that younger Chinese people may be less willing to adopt Western critiques uncritically and may rely more on confidence in their own system—suggesting continuity rather than erosion (though outcomes remain uncertain).

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Presenters / Contributors

• Professor Yang Yao (main speaker)
• Russell Young (moderator/interviewer; referred to as “Professor Young” in the transcript)