Testing North Korea's illegal smartphones

Overview

The video showcases two extremely rare North Korean “smuggled” smartphones—a budget model (Heyan 701) and a flagship model (Samtaesong 8)—to illustrate how North Korea controls information flow and shapes citizens’ beliefs. It argues this is achieved through heavily modified software, restricted wording, and a largely disabled internet.

Core claims and findings

1) Extreme, real-time censorship via the keyboard/autocorrect

The video claims the devices enforce content rules even at the typing stage:

• Typing “South Korea” triggers forced autocorrections, such as replacing terms like “Namhan” with “puppet state.”
• Some references are blocked or obscured, e.g., “Republic of Korea” becomes asterisks.
• The naming system becomes more restrictive over time, comparing the older and newer devices:
  • The older phone allegedly allows “North Korea,” while the newer one restricts or renames it.
• Slang is policed as well:
  • Typing “oppa” is reportedly replaced with “comrade” and generates a warning about permitted usage.

2) Internet access is essentially non-existent; a curated intranet replaces it

The video describes the internet experience as heavily controlled and constrained:

• The phones display Wi‑Fi-like interface elements, but actual Wi‑Fi connections fail or are unavailable.
• A service called “Miray” reportedly requires extensive identification, including:
  • a government ID
  • an authenticated physical SIM
  • (implying strong traceability)
• Even with this, users reportedly cannot reach the global internet—only a highly curated North Korean intranet featuring:
  • approved media
  • propaganda
  • restricted apps
• The intranet’s stated speeds (2–33 Mbps) are presented as far below South Korea’s, reinforcing limited access and control.

3) Phones appear dated and may involve copied designs or foreign components

The video claims the hardware looks older and may be manufactured or assembled using foreign parts:

• The Samtaesong 8 (released in 2023) is said to resemble a mid-range Huawei phone from around 2021, including similarities in:
  • camera layout
  • body/curves
  • button styling
• Proposed scenarios include:
  • Huawei secretly supplying hardware, or
  • North Korea copying Huawei designs and then adding North Korean software
• Camera issues are described as poor or buggy:
  • The Hyang phone reportedly produces grainy images and lacks useful features (e.g., no ultrawide/zoom, only macro/depth).
  • The Samtaesong 8 camera allegedly malfunctions and includes a watermark referencing contacting “Hainetron”, a China-based parts maker—suggesting outsourced components or licensing ties.

How the broader ecosystem reinforces state ideology

App ecosystem is heavily governed

The video claims the apps and media environment is engineered to align with regime priorities:

• Many apps/icons appear copied or re-skinned, resembling recognizable branding styles (e.g., Microsoft-like suites, Huawei/Google-like iconography).
• “Internet” media is described as redistributed from international sources but adjusted to be North Korea compliant (e.g., shows reportedly labeled as derived from Amazon Prime titles).
• Content reportedly reflects political alignment, such as:
  • Russian movies dominating (aligned with a political ally)
  • some Indian films appearing (framed as culturally “exotic” and less threatening than Western content)
• Apps include overtly ideological categories, such as:
  • biographies of rulers
  • guidance/law-learning framed as “common sense,” intended to standardize belief and limit individuality

Apps can require in-person authorization

The video claims the app system is not purely self-serve:

• Even with an app store, downloading usable apps reportedly requires visiting a physical authorized store for activation and backend provisioning.
• Apps reportedly expire, functioning like paid subscriptions—described as especially burdensome given North Korea’s low-income environment.

Surveillance software (“Red Flag”) and blocking of developer/unsafe behavior

The video alleges multiple layers of monitoring and restriction:

• A deep surveillance layer (“Red Flag”) is claimed to be built into Android at low levels, making it hard to evade.
• Developer settings are reportedly blocked, limiting user ability to inspect system behavior.
• The system is described as using digital signatures to ensure only approved software/files run; foreign-origin files are allegedly deleted automatically.
• A further feature is described as the phones taking periodic screenshots that the user cannot view, open, delete, or manage—apparently creating evidence for ongoing monitoring.

Overall conclusion

The video argues that across every layer—what words can be typed, what the intranet can show, how apps are installed, and how surveillance is enforced—these devices are engineered to maintain a single narrative: North Korea’s superiority, foreign danger, and constant monitoring.

It also frames the phones’ poor performance/dating and lack of global connectivity as intentional, suggesting the design makes them easier to control, harder to update, and less likely to expose citizens to uncensored information.

Presenters / contributors

• Mark (channel host / main presenter)
• Daily NK News (credited for securing phones and investigating software)
• Martin Williams and Nicklaus Schiess (credited for an earlier report referenced in the video)