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Is India Ready for Modern War? Tejas, AMCA & Drone Warfare Explained | IAS Sanjeev Kumar | EP 416

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India’s Defense Production Secretary Sanjeev Kumar argues that recent conflicts—such as the Ukraine war and the West Asia crisis—are pushing India to view modern war planning as long-duration and technology-driven, with missiles and drones at the center.

While India has capacity through DRDO, DPSUs, and a growing private sector, he says the system still faces structural gaps that require action through policy, industrial scaling, and greater design/technology control.

1) War lessons: preparedness must be sustained, not short-term

  • Kumar emphasizes that conflicts once viewed as “short wars” are turning out prolonged, so India must ensure sustained ammunition and missile production at scale.
  • He notes shortages even among major powers (example: the US needing redeployments), suggesting India should rethink production timelines and scale-up plans.

2) Missiles and drones as the key weapon systems

  • Missiles: Kumar says missile technology efforts are driven by DRDO and production agencies, with capability to support both offense and defense.
  • Drones: He highlights India’s base of civilian drone manufacturers and defense-focused startups, enabling faster scaling and iteration. He argues the private sector is structurally better suited for rapid, incremental production.

3) India’s “Atmanirbhar” approach: control supply chains via friendly redundancy and design capability

Kumar rejects the idea that every component must be built within India’s geography, calling fully self-contained supply chains “almost impossible.”

Instead, he defines self-reliance as:

  • Keeping supply chains under control, including via production or sourcing in friendly countries
  • Building redundancy (e.g., if supplier A fails, supplier B can replace it)
  • Strengthening design capabilities, so India can modify components quickly and maintain advantage through indigenous intellectual control

4) Addressing ammunition shortages via war-reserve planning and dual-use conversion

  • Kumar describes war reserve as dynamic, determined by armed forces based on strategy and expected war duration.
  • Where gaps exist, the approach is to replenish stock to acceptable levels.
  • For longer-term resilience, he argues for enabling dual-use factories that can switch during wartime by planning dual-use components already at the weapon design stage.
  • He uses the COVID-era model (civilian industries shifting quickly to produce ventilators/masks) as an analogy for future defense scaling.

5) Drones/manufacturing strategy includes private-sector acceleration

  • Kumar says government policy encourages private-sector participation because private firms are faster and more agile, which suits drones’ needs for rapid manufacturing and upgrade cycles.
  • He notes DPSUs are not heavily involved in most drone categories (except some high-end areas), while private firms dominate broader segments.

6) Export growth and why wars help—but trust and capability matter more

  • He claims defense exports rose sharply (from about ₹680 crore in 2013–14 to ₹38,000 crore in 2025–26).
  • He acknowledges that wars in Europe and West Asia increased demand, but he argues exports also grow due to:
    • India becoming a trusted supply chain partner
    • Domestic industry building certifications and integration capability for foreign OEMs
  • He frames self-reliance as also improving credibility in exports, because deliveries can fail if critical subsystems (e.g., engines/radars) depend on disrupted supply chains.

7) Indigenization policy mechanics: creating demand + building supply capacity

Kumar attributes progress to policy-driven market shifts:

  • Government signaled that a significant share of capital acquisitions would come from domestic sources (figures cited: ~55% initially, later ~75% on paper and ~80–85% in practice).
  • He credits DRDO technology support and programs like IDEX for pulling startups/innovators into defense problem-solving.
  • He describes practical initiatives:
    • Listing imported components on a portal (Srijan) and pushing MSMEs to indigenize them (45,000 components listed; ~15,000 indigenized).
    • “Positive indigenization lists” with timelines (after 2028–29, more items won’t be imported if indigenized).

8) Fighter aircraft and engine delays: hand-holding without “long rope”

Regarding LCA Tejas / Tejas Mark 1A and related airframe timelines:

  • Kumar argues “hand-holding” is needed only insofar as it helps integration and troubleshooting—not indefinite leniency.
  • He acknowledges delays and says future programs should reduce bottlenecks by diagnosing delay causes.
  • On engine supply disruption (e.g., GE-404 engine commitments and fewer deliveries than scheduled), he cites COVID-era effects, broader disruptions in the GE supply chain, and added stress on civil aviation engine production.

9) AMCA approach: competition among consortiums, PSU presence not decisive

  • On AMCA, Kumar supports the consortium-competition model even if HAL is not part of shortlisted teams.
  • The objective remains a Swadeshi (indigenous) platform designed and manufactured in India, regardless of which consortium leads.
  • He also says the indigenous engine program is planned to run in parallel so AMCA production can adopt the domestically developed engine later.

10) R&D investment: moving from reliance to broader industry innovation

Responding to criticism that Indian defense firms spend less on R&D than global averages:

  • He argues many firms now recognize the need to invest in R&D to compete because technology evolves continuously.
  • For DPSUs under his department, he cites a five-year R&D plan targeting about ₹35,000 crore over five years.
  • On procurement structure: open tenders may create uncertainty for R&D-heavy investment, and he suggests that over time the ecosystem could consolidate toward fewer dominant players (he compares this to conditions that enable Boeing-like dominance in the US system, while noting India’s procurement differs).

11) Talent and ecosystem building

  • Kumar says engineering talent exists, but the defense-industry ecosystem is not yet fully developed.
  • He argues it must be expanded through:
    • Skill-gap identification
    • Collaboration with universities/technical institutes/ITI-style pipelines
    • Scaling partnerships with startups and innovators
  • He notes rising interest from IIT-educated and startup-minded youth, including via IDEX challenges.

12) Shipbuilding scale vs China: size, orders, and supply-chain maturity

On naval shipbuilding performance relative to China:

  • He highlights structural factors:
    • China’s scale (larger yards and more ships ordered per design) allows faster learning and steadier supply chains after initial deliveries.
    • India’s shipyards are smaller, and designs have fewer orders, making learning speed and economies of scale harder.
  • He says India is exploring shipyard consolidation/synergies to improve scale.

13) Russia and other partners: cooperation plus keeping production resilience

  • Kumar calls Russia a “good partner” for defense production, describing transparency and negotiated timelines.
  • He distinguishes between purchasing systems and producing in India—he notes forces can judge operational performance, but production cooperation is generally strong where agreements exist.

14) AI in warfare: India actively integrating AI into understanding and weapon systems

  • Kumar notes global AI use for target location and precision attacks.
  • He says India’s defense ecosystem understands AI’s potential and is working to integrate AI into situational understanding and weapon-system development.

Presenters / Contributors

  • Smita Prakash — Host / ANI podcast anchor
  • Ajit Dube — National Security Affairs Editor, ANI
  • Secretary of Defense Production Sanjeev Kumar — Guest

Original video