Fern Got NATO vs Russia Wrong

Ryan McBeth’s Critique of Fern’s Baltic States Scenario

Ryan McBeth argues that Fern’s video about a possible Russian attack on the Baltic states presents a misleadingly simple scenario and omits factors that, in his view, would make such an attack difficult.

Threat and Timeline

McBeth says Fern highlights reporting about a possible Russian move to test NATO but leaves out its timeframe and more limited examples, such as cyberattacks or a small incursion. He objects to the leap from that reporting to a rapid Russian seizure of Baltic territory.

Troop Requirements and Warning Time

McBeth estimates that Baltic forces, reservists, and NATO units already stationed in the region amount to roughly 136,700 troops. He argues that Russia would need around 200,000 troops for the scenario Fern describes. Assembling that force—especially if the war in Ukraine continued—would take time and would likely alert NATO. He also says the scenario does not explain where the Russian troops would come from.

NATO’s Potential Response

McBeth argues that NATO would not simply rush to reinforce the Baltics while Russia operated unimpeded. He expects NATO airpower, cruise missiles, and drones to strike Russian command centers, airfields, fuel supplies, and supply lines. In his view, Fern gives too little attention to this potential counterattack.

The RAND Study

Fern’s scenario draws on a RAND wargame conducted in 2014–15 and published in 2016. McBeth says the study predates Russia’s losses and performance in Ukraine and should not be presented as a current picture of Russian capability. He notes that Fern showed the report’s date in small text but argues that the source is still outdated.

Reinforcements and Equipment

McBeth criticizes Fern’s depiction of US troops shipping vehicles across the Atlantic. He says it overlooks American prepositioned equipment and ammunition in Europe, which could allow troops to fly in and use stored gear.

Russian Submarines

McBeth says Fern’s headline figure of 64 Russian submarines conflates different types and does not indicate how many could deploy. He estimates that only a fraction would be operational at a given time and distinguishes attack submarines from boats with other missions.

Drones and Railway Sabotage

McBeth says Fern focuses on Russian drones without considering NATO’s own drones and airstrikes. He accepts the basic railway-sabotage scenario but disputes the claim that a signal failure would automatically halt trains, citing German railway procedures that can allow trains to proceed under authorization.

The Suwałki Corridor and Kaliningrad

McBeth rejects the suggestion that NATO would leave Kaliningrad untouched while it supported attacks. He argues that Poland and NATO could strike the Russian enclave, which he describes as vulnerable to isolation and air attack.

Gotland

McBeth questions the idea of using Sweden’s Gotland as a forward aircraft base. In his view, the island’s airport could be vulnerable to early Russian strikes, making it safer to base aircraft farther west. He considers highway operations a separate possibility that would require further assessment.

Conclusion

McBeth concludes that Fern’s account leaves out Russian force-generation constraints, NATO preparations, stored US equipment, and the likely scale of NATO retaliation. He characterizes the video as at least poorly researched and possibly misleading, while acknowledging that Fern has produced good work in the past.

Presenter: Ryan McBeth