Изменился ли режим после выборов? Разговор с Юлией Таратутой

Main arguments / analyses from the discussion

• After the elections, repression intensified rather than eased. The guest argues that the period that was supposed to be “quiet and beautiful” around elections quickly turned into repression afterward—especially within the security apparatus and related “counter-elite” measures.

• The arrest/torture case of political scientist Alexander Kynev is presented as emblematic.

  • Kynev was allegedly beaten during detention and then tortured with a stun gun to extract testimony.
  • The discussion emphasizes that the information became public later through medical authorities, since Kynev was taken to a pre-trial medical facility immediately after his arrest.
  • Broader takeaway: in Russia’s current governance, violence and torture are treated as normal tools. The “breaking of red lines” is dangerous not only for the uninformed, but also for those who understand how the system works—because even experienced people can misjudge when norms collapse.

• FSB dominance over domestic political life is increasing.

  • The guest claims the FSB has expanded its role, including in internet control (e.g., shutdowns, Telegram blocking) and in regaining/strengthening control over pre-trial detention and prisoner transport.
  • She cites (in general terms) documents indicating the FSB can detain people to prevent the goals of the “special military operation” without court orders, and can hold detainees in special places.
  • In elections, she argues the FSB increasingly acts as an organizer/arbiter over who can run and who cannot—contributing to “spasmodic” decisions (registering then refusing, or restoring candidacies).

• Elections and electronic voting are framed as a system for forced loyalty, not genuine choice.

  • The discussion stresses that remote electronic voting (DEG) is controlled by the FSB as a technical operator, meaning results can be manipulated.
  • The guest contrasts turnout and result patterns between electronic platforms/systems (e.g., Moscow vs federal). She argues these differences resemble signaled falsification rather than natural variation.
  • She describes different “degrees” of falsification:
    • “Stuffing” ballots
    • Protocol rewriting (including “inversion” of votes between candidates)
    • Situations where results are effectively fabricated
  • A key point: the system is used to secure turnout and loyalty of public-sector workers, while the secrecy of the ballot is portrayed as effectively compromised under pressure.

• Why “smart voting” may matter but cannot be assessed as “effective” in authoritarian elections.

  • The host asks whether “smart voting” tactics remained effective after the election.
  • The guest argues that effectiveness is hard to define in an authoritarian system where outcomes are predetermined. However, tactical voting can still be rational for reducing the Kremlin’s intended narrative.

• Unpublished or delayed results are treated as evidence of last-minute adjustments.

  • She notes that in some regions (including the Leningrad region), results by precinct/polling station were not published as expected, while early published electronic totals placed parties in specific rankings.
  • The broader inference is that late rewrites occurred—potentially affecting which parties crossed thresholds for seats.

• Possible maneuvering around party thresholds (A Just Russia).

  • The discussion includes a “gossipy” theory that A Just Russia briefly hovered just under the 5% threshold and then crossed it after ballots “appeared,” or after emergency adjustments.
  • The guest says the exact explanation cannot be confirmed. Still, the pattern of delayed finalization and missing granular reporting suggests “manual” corrections.

Comment on internal elite health/visibility theory (protocol footage)

The guest discusses a theory (previously raised by another commentator) that certain officials connected to election/party management may be ill, based on who appears (or does not appear) in protocol filming and subsequent scheduled events. She treats this as inferential (“you can track by protocol appearances”) and avoids firm conclusions about what the illness is or whether it indicates serious problems.

Overall conclusion of the conversation

The election period is portrayed not as a stability reset but as a continuation—and intensification—of security-led political control, with violence, administrative pressure, and election engineering (especially via electronic voting) functioning as core tools.

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Presenters / contributors

• Host (implicitly): Юлия Таратутой (Yulia Taratuta), as indicated by the video title
• Guest: Екатерина Шульман (Ekaterina Shulman)
• Mentioned/third parties (not as guests):
  • Александр Кынев (Alexander Kynev)
  • Вячеслав Володин (Vyacheslav Volodin)
  • Сергеeй Кириенко (Kiriyenko)
  • ФСБ (FSB)
  • Дмитрий Колисев (Dmitry Kolizev)
  • Саша Плющев (Sasha Plyushchev)
  • Сергей Миронов (Sergei Mironov)
  • президента / президентская администрация / УКПВ (mentioned indirectly)
  • ЦИК (Central Election Commission)