Russia Calculated How This War Ends—Putin Won’t Like the Answer

Overview

The video discusses a purported leaked Russian planning document (from the Russian state-owned bank Sberbank) that outlines eight scenarios for how Russia’s war against Ukraine could end, each assigned a probability. The presenter argues the document likely “spins rosy” numbers for Russia—so exact percentages may be wrong—but maintains that the scenario set can still help reason about which outcomes are most plausible.

Core Claims and Scenario Analysis

1) Russia likely won’t stop soon

The presenter argues Russia likely aims to gain leverage through continued fighting, not to end the war soon. This is supported by citing Russia’s official posture—for example, Dmitry Peskov responding to the idea of Russia “losing” the conflict—and framing Russia’s approach as grinding: inflicting heavy costs to force negotiation on unfavorable terms.

2) The “eight scenarios” (used as logic, not trusted probabilities)

The presenter focuses on the likelihood and internal logic of each scenario rather than treating the percentages as reliable.

1. Decisive Russian military advantage (~7%) Russia takes full control of some or all officially annexed regions and forces Ukraine to negotiate from a position of dominance. The presenter notes this scenario does not include pushing to major further objectives (e.g., reaching Kyiv or a Hungary-area border).

2. Exhaustion of the West (~32%, top probability in the document) Ukraine loses Western political/financial backing if multiple conditions align (U.S. support declines, Europe faces an energy crisis, and Ukraine experiences domestic instability). The presenter finds this unlikely, arguing the timing and political constraints are difficult to achieve.

3. Trump-brokered freezing of the war around/ before the 2026 election (~32%) Pressure is applied to both sides to freeze without a treaty, paired with sanctions and changes tied to NATO. The presenter doubts it will happen, distinguishing between “liking” an outcome and making it real—especially given trust issues and domestic politics.

4. Korean-style stalemate / no decisive breakthrough (~22%) The front stabilizes, fighting fades without a formal deal, and the drone war continues. The presenter calls this plausible and notes it could last for years.

5. Protracted war (~15%) A continuation for 2–3 more years with persistent high casualties. The presenter argues Russia faces economic strain (including falling births and skilled labor flight) and that Russia may find the long grind as painful or more than expected.

6. Compromise peace (~5%) A formal treaty with mutual concessions. Russia keeps parts of Donbas, while Ukraine receives security guarantees, though EU/NATO prospects remain distant. The presenter suggests the odds could be higher than 5%, but still limited.

7. Peace on Ukraine/Europe’s terms (~2%) Russia withdraws to 1991 borders, pays reparations, and Ukraine joins NATO; Crimea is returned or renegotiated. The presenter argues this may be more likely than 2% over the long run, because prolonged war increases chances of regime or economic shocks.

8. Wild-card shocks / unpredictable events (implicit) The presenter emphasizes that unpredictable factors could reorder outcomes. Tactical nuclear use is described as unlikely, but other shocks could matter, such as:

   • escalation and attacks on nuclear facilities (e.g., Zaporizhzhia)
   • direct NATO/Russia clashes
   • regime change in Moscow or Kyiv
   • new large regional wars
   • breakthroughs in AI/drone/cyber capabilities

Supporting Commentary: Why the Conflict May Continue

Escalation signals and mobilization

The presenter points to recruitment for military contracts and drone operator training—including at many top universities—as evidence Russia may have no near-term intention to stop.

Nuclear escalation concerns (real, but deemed unlikely)

The presenter notes reports that some Russian officials fear Putin could use tactical nuclear weapons, but also highlights warnings from India and China against such escalation.

Long-war precedent as an analogy

Turning points are compared to the Korean War, such as the Incheon landing shifting momentum. The argument is that unexpected technological or battlefield shifts could rapidly change outcomes.

Presenter’s Overall View

• The presenter repeatedly challenges the leaked document’s probabilities, especially the framing of “peace via Western exhaustion” and the likelihood of near-term negotiations.
• Most likely path (presenter’s emphasis): continued conflict with a stalemate/protraction dynamic that eventually forces a different settlement due to economic and political pressure—potentially intensified by shocks and constraints.
• Process and uncertainty: the video ends by urging humility—“any prediction is charlatanism”—while arguing Russia “acts systematically,” so Ukraine (and partners) should respond systematically: “move first and force Russia to respond,” implying reliance on future weapons and defenses (e.g., ballistic missiles and missile defenses).

“Any prediction is charlatanism.” (Paraphrased from the video’s ending emphasis)

Presenters or Contributors Mentioned

• Anton Hovas (Hovv) — PhD senior fellow at CEU; cited as an analyst who flagged the leaked information; author of books on Russia and Western far-right/warfare.
• Jason J. Smart — mentioned as discussing the leaked memo.
• CIA Director John Rackcliffe — mentioned as visiting Moscow.
• Dmitri Peskov — cited (as Putin’s spokesperson) regarding “losing the conflict.”
• Keith Kellogg — quoted about Putin’s willingness to keep extending objectives.
• Donald Trump — discussed as a potential factor in any “freeze” scenario.
• Volodymyr (Zelensky) — “Zelusni” in subtitles — referenced for comments about humility in prediction and systemic response.
• Evgeny (Gertis / Professor Gertis) — main channel/presenter running daily updates (name appears in audience messages).
• Joe Horrenty — Patreon supporter thanked by the presenter.