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Global Arts MBA 2027 Cohort | T1.FT2.S3 Applied Economics | 2026-10-22

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1. Externalities: Effects That Markets May Leave Out

Richard introduces externalities as costs or benefits created by someone’s actions that affect other people but are not fully reflected in the market price.

  • Positive externalities benefit others without compensation. The lecture uses James Meade’s example of apple growers and beekeepers: bees benefit from apple blossoms, while the beekeeper sells the honey. The broader point is that a producer may not be rewarded for all the social value their activity creates.
  • Richard connects this idea to the arts. Arts and cultural institutions may benefit people who do not attend by contributing to cultural knowledge, public discussion, and a sense of living in a culturally active community. If these benefits are not recognized or funded, the arts may be underprovided.
  • Negative externalities impose costs on others that the decision-maker does not fully bear. Smoking is the lecture’s main example: it may affect people nearby, workers in bars, public spaces, and health-care costs. If smokers consider only their own costs and benefits, they may smoke more than is socially desirable.

A participant notes that the apple-and-bee example can also involve benefits to the apple grower, since bees pollinate trees. Richard accepts the concern and clarifies that the example is meant to illustrate spillovers in general, not to claim that the relationship is entirely one-way.

2. Efficiency Is Different from Fairness

Richard distinguishes two common criticisms of markets:

  • Inefficiency means resources are wasted or mutually beneficial trades do not happen. Examples include unsold theater seats that could have been used, or food that exists but does not reach people who need it.
  • Unfairness concerns who receives the benefits. A market could sell every theater ticket and still be unfair if only the wealthiest people can afford them.

The First Welfare Theorem is presented as a result about competitive markets: under appropriate conditions, a competitive equilibrium is efficient in the sense that there is no way to make someone better off without making someone else worse off. It does not mean that the outcome is equal or ethically fair.

The lecture notes that the theorem’s assumptions can fail, including when there are externalities, incomplete markets, limited information, irrational behavior, or insufficient competition.

3. How to Analyze an Externality

Richard presents a cost–benefit diagram as a way to reason about the gap between private decisions and social outcomes:

  • Put the amount of an activity on the horizontal axis and costs and benefits on the vertical axis.
  • Compare the decision-maker’s private costs and benefits with the full costs or benefits to society.
  • A person choosing only according to private costs and benefits may select a different level of activity from the socially desirable level.
  • With a negative externality, private decision-makers ignore some costs imposed on others, so the activity tends to be excessive.
  • With a positive externality, private decision-makers do not receive all the benefits their activity creates, so the activity tends to be insufficient.

The lecture identifies several possible responses:

  • Quantity restrictions: Set a hard limit on the activity. One risk is that people may evade the limit or create illicit markets if they still have strong incentives to do more.
  • Pigouvian taxes (sometimes called “sin taxes”): Add a tax to activities such as smoking, alcohol consumption, gambling, or sugar consumption. The aim is both to raise revenue and to make decision-makers face more of the costs their choices impose on others.
  • Subsidies or other support for positive externalities: By analogy, public support could help increase activities—such as arts provision—that generate wider social benefits.
  • Property rights and Coasean approaches: Assign rights or otherwise make parties account for the costs of their actions, so private incentives better reflect social costs and benefits.
  • Information and public campaigns: A participant asks about anti-smoking campaigns. Richard explains that these can try to change people’s own assessment of an activity by making its costs more apparent. This differs from directly changing prices through taxation.

4. Public Goods and the Role of the State

The lecture turns to the question of which goods markets may fail to provide adequately.

Richard cites Adam Smith’s argument that some institutions and public works can benefit society substantially while being unable to generate enough profit to repay an individual provider’s costs. This connects the discussion to public provision and to the arts, such as a new opera house.

The lecture also highlights that cultural investment varies across countries and that public-benefit projects are not always built by governments. Examples discussed include a park and town associated with India’s Tata Steel company, a city project in Japan built by Toyota, and Saltaire in northern England, developed by industrialist Titus Salt. These examples illustrate private and philanthropic provision as well as state provision.

5. Classifying Goods by Rivalry and Excludability

Richard introduces two questions economists use to classify goods:

  • Excludability: Can people be prevented from using the good?
  • Rivalry: Does one person’s use reduce or prevent another person’s use?
Type of good Excludable? Rivalrous? Example discussed Private good Yes Yes A car or iPhone Club good Yes No, or relatively little A Spotify or Netflix subscription Common good / common-pool resource No Yes A crowded public park Public good No No A lighthouse or public safety

These categories help explain why different goods face different provision and access problems. Richard says the non-private categories are especially relevant to the arts and to later course discussions.

6. Lighthouses, Free-Riding, and Public Provision

A lighthouse is used as a classic public-good example. Ships can benefit from its warning light without being excluded, and one ship’s benefit does not prevent another ship from benefiting. This creates a free-rider problem: some users may benefit even if they did not contribute to the cost.

Richard cites economist Henry Sidgwick on the difficulty of charging every ship that benefits from a lighthouse, and John Stuart Mill on the state’s role in providing goods of broad public benefit. The underlying lesson is that individually chosen contributions may not be enough to fund something that benefits many people.

7. Game Theory and Why Worthwhile Projects May Not Happen

Richard uses a two-town project to show how strategic incentives can block public-good provision:

  • The project costs 20 million in total.
  • Each town values it at 15 million, giving a combined value of 30 million. Since total value exceeds total cost, the project would be worthwhile overall.
  • If both contribute equally, each pays 10 million and receives a benefit worth 15 million, for a net payoff of +5 million.
  • If one contributes alone, it pays the full 20 million but receives only its own 15 million in benefit, for –5 million.
  • If one town does not contribute while the other pays for the project, the non-contributor still receives its 15 million benefit without paying.
  • If neither contributes, the project is not built and both receive 0.

Each town may be tempted to hold back and let the other pay. Because each anticipates that the other may do the same, both may choose not to contribute. The project then fails even though it would have created a net benefit for the two towns together. Richard describes this as a version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and an inefficient outcome: a potentially beneficial project is left undone.

Contracts can change these incentives if they are credible and enforceable. For example, a penalty for withdrawing after committing could make contribution preferable. But contracts are less effective when parties do not trust the legal system or cannot rely on enforcement.

Richard distinguishes this non-cooperative game theory, which often assumes that people act strategically in their own interests, from cooperative game theory. He also points to Elinor Ostrom’s work on communities that manage shared resources through reciprocal agreements.

8. Community Reciprocity and Cultural Participation

Monica describes Andean communities where people collectively organize and fund festivals through reciprocity, taking turns in different roles. She notes that participation and preparation may matter as much as the final performance. Richard relates this to cooperative game theory and Ostrom’s research on communities working together to protect shared resources.

Speakers and Sources Featured

Live Speakers and Participants

  • Richard — Lecturer; presented the economics material and answered questions.
  • Tiffany — Session host and moderator; handled opening and closing logistics.
  • Lily — Raised the Great Depression example of food sitting unsold while people went without.
  • Anna — Commented on government intervention and incentives around market outcomes and quotas.
  • Christopher — Asked how inflation affects fairness and the distribution of costs.
  • Kyla — Questioned whether the bee-and-apple example overlooks the pollination benefit to apple growers.
  • Tanika — Emphasized how judgments about value and protection shape economic systems.
  • Grace — Asked about access to a paper on Copenhagen’s Royal Theatre and later about contracts in public projects.
  • Monica — Described reciprocal resource-sharing and festival organization in Andean communities.
  • George — Briefly mentioned in connection with the session transcript.

Authors, Economists, and Other Sources Referenced

  • James Meade — Apple-and-bee externality example.
  • Mervyn King — Cited as the author of a blog about Meade.
  • Alfred Marshall — Referenced in describing market equilibrium.
  • A. C. Pigou — Associated with Pigouvian taxation.
  • Ronald Coase — Associated with property-rights approaches to externalities.
  • Adam Smith — Cited on the duties of the state and public works.
  • Henry Sidgwick — Cited on lighthouse funding and free-riding.
  • John Stuart Mill — Cited on government provision of public goods.
  • Antoine Augustin Cournot — Mentioned in connection with the development of game theory.
  • John Nash — Referenced for Nash equilibrium and the film A Beautiful Mind.
  • Elinor Ostrom — Cited for research on cooperation and communities managing shared resources.
  • Journal of Cultural Economics research — Referenced in relation to cultural value and benefits to non-users.

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