Video summary

People Aren't Buying New Games, So Valve Changed Steam.

Main summary

Key takeaways

News and Commentary

Overview

Steam has launched major changes to how wish lists work, prompted by worsening economics for new releases on the platform. The video argues that wish lists have become less effective at driving day-one purchases than they used to, and that Steam needs to better support “post-launch” sales and long-tail discovery—especially for smaller studios whose launches can otherwise fail financially.

Key points and arguments

1) New game sales are declining; growth is coming from the back catalog

  • In the first half of 2026, revenue from new releases reportedly fell by $390M (from $2.79B to $2.4B).
  • Steam’s overall growth is said to be powered mainly by older/back catalog games, while new launches are “net negative.”

2) Valve is redesigning wish lists to improve engagement and conversion

Steam has rolled out multiple wishlist improvements, including:

  • Custom wishlist categories
  • More granular wishlist options, such as Steam Deck or “wait for review”
  • Better search
  • More control over notifications
  • Autoplaying trailers
  • Direct links to demos
  • Sharing wish lists, which can pair with Steam gifting so others can buy from your wishlist (compared to a “wedding registry” model)

The goal is explicitly to drive sales more effectively, especially beyond launch day.

3) “Wishlist funnels” are claimed to be broken compared to the past

Steam’s long-standing funnel has been:

  1. Acquire wish lists
  2. Convert wish lists to sales

Traditionally, launch day has been critical.

Valve is said to recommend not running pre-orders, because it funnels attention toward the launch window.

4) Next Fest demos are not functioning as a typical “demo → wishlist” engine

Using demo data, analyst Chris Zakowski is cited:

  • Only ~15.9% to 23.2% of demo players go on to wishlist (for most games).

The video argues demos are often created for content creators, press, and hardcore fans (“sickos”), not the broader audience that later generates wish lists.

5) Wish lists appear to come from other moments, not primarily from demos

Examples cited include:

  • Viral-trailer effect (via Alina Analytics), where wish lists spiked at trailer virality
  • Steam’s personal calendar changes (e.g., Factory Town 2 showed growth when promoted)
  • Anecdotal evidence of a slow build over years (e.g., Twisted Tower wishlist history)

6) Wish list → purchase conversion rates are described as modest—sometimes low

Steamwork guidance outlines a three-step process:

  1. Create “coming soon” pages early
  2. Convert repeatedly via events/updates
  3. Analyze what drives interest

Developer-shared figures mentioned:

  • A reported ~22% conversion is described as “above average”
  • Another example: ~14.1% conversion (from Belli’s Chess Roguelike Gambonanza), described as around average
  • For AAA/high-price games, conversion is said to drop into single digits, because players wishlist to wait for deep future discounts

7) “Millions of wish lists” don’t guarantee huge sales

Using average conversion math, the video estimates:

  • Even a 1 million wishlist announcement could yield roughly ~140,000 sales if conversion stays average.

So wishlist spikes matter mainly as a starting base, not a guaranteed outcome.

8) “Launch day is everything” is said to be outdated

The video claims Steam’s algorithm gives new games only ~2–3 days to find an audience before being siloed by tags/audiences. Because behavior has changed (including that many players wait for discounts), Valve is adjusting wishlist mechanics to monetize after-launch interest.

9) Why this matters: the “wish list bookmark” problem and indie survival

A key quote is used:

“The AAA wish list is a bookmark, not a basket.”

Many players—especially highly engaged ones—don’t buy full price; they wishlist as a later reminder.

The video argues this is structurally dangerous for indies because if a game doesn’t earn enough early, studios often can’t fund updates, a second game, or survival—making failures more damaging than “launch performance” metrics imply.

Steam is framed as limited in what it can do:

  • It can’t force people to buy full price.
  • It can’t change publisher financing.

So Steam is focusing on enabling purchases later, such as through gifting and evergreen mechanisms.

10) Beyond wishlist changes: propose a small developer fee reduction program

The video argues the bigger missing lever is support for developers to survive “game one.”

It proposes a small business program similar to Apple’s model—lower platform fees for low revenue tiers—suggesting that reduced fees could improve developers’ unit economics (e.g., 30% down to 15% in the example).

Closing view

The narrator says the wishlist changes are “actually really good”, but emphasizes that Steam should also tackle the lower-end survivability problem more directly.

Presenters / contributors

  • Connor (mentioned as a team member with a high wish list count)
  • Professor Just Van Dunan (analyzed Steam numbers)
  • Chris Zakowski (analyst behind How to Make a Game; ran demo/wishlist numbers)
  • Matteo (developer of Paddle Paddle Paddle; shared wishlist conversion info)
  • Belli (developer of Chess Roguelike Gambonanza; shared conversion info)
  • Alina Analytics (source of multiple analytics claims)
  • Thomas Brush (co-developer of Twisted Tower; shared wishlist history)
  • A narrator/interviewer voice (overall commentary; no name provided)

Original video