МЫ ХОТЕЛИ УБРАТЬ ГОРБАЧЁВА И ЕЛЬЦИНА. УЧАСТНИК ГКЧП РАССКАЗЫВАЕТ ПРАВДУ | Владимир Лизун

Summary of the Video’s Main Points (Based on Auto-Generated Subtitles)

Context and significance of Aug. 19 (35 years ago)

Vladimir Lizun frames the State Emergency Committee (GKChP / “August putsch”) as a world-historic event, arguing it was tightly connected to the Soviet Union’s collapse and to global consequences.

Claim: GKChP was prepared as a “restoring order” response to the 1991 crisis

Lizun describes a worsening situation in early to mid-1991, citing:

• economic collapse
• social unrest
• wage arrears
• protests by miners
• general “unrest from below”

He argues Soviet leadership concluded that action was needed to prevent the state from disintegrating.

Claim: Gorbachev selected participants and approved plans (including “three options”)

Lizun asserts that by March 1991, the GKChP lineup and plans were developed in several variants, and that Gorbachev personally chose names—crossing out and selecting others.

He adds that the GKChP did not strictly require a special coup framework because a law on a state of emergency already existed, but leadership allegedly still pursued “ceremonial legislative hype.”

Trigger: the Union Treaty starting Aug. 20 would dismantle central authority

Lizun claims the timing was connected to the Union Treaty procedure, scheduled to begin the next day (Aug. 20). In his view, the treaty would effectively replace strong central authority with near-confederal arrangements.

Allegation: Gorbachev refused to lead directly (international reputation and illness)

Lizun claims emissaries warned Gorbachev the situation was out of control and that one option had to be activated. He says Gorbachev consented but insisted he could not “lead this emergency” himself, citing:

• his Nobel status
• fear of being seen as a dictator
• and even joking about his back/illness

Lizun summarizes the outcome as: “Go ahead.”

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Why the Coup Failed (Lizun’s Analysis)

1. Failure to act decisively and isolate opponents Lizun states key operational expectations were not met—especially the need to isolate separatists and protect Yeltsin and his team.

2. Strategic messaging mistake He argues the GKChP leadership announced that after “normalization,” Gorbachev would return to power, which Lizun claims alienated public support because people already blamed Gorbachev for disaster.

3. Misplaced hope and hesitation Lizun criticizes the committee’s lack of a clear command structure and program, portraying members as fearful and unable to execute a coherent plan.

4. Command paralysis and shifting relationships (including Yeltsin’s actions) He recounts events around the White House, claiming military units (including “Alpha,” as referenced) did not receive or follow the arrest order. He also argues Yeltsin exploited gaps and confusion.

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Narrative About the White House and Public Reaction

Lizun describes personally checking the situation at the White House, claiming there were young supporters but no mass crowd backing GKChP ideas. He says he reported this back, implying expectations of public support were inflated.

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No “CIA Conspiracy,” According to Lizun

Lizun strongly rejects claims of a foreign-managed plot. He says he met American officials/CIA leadership in a meeting and that the CIA head allegedly explained Soviet collapse as driven by internal dynamics and expectations not matching reality, not a hidden plot.

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Root Causes of USSR Collapse (As Lizun Frames Them)

• “Betrayal” and cowardice of the ruling elite, not external sabotage
• Degeneration of the party-state elite away from the rank-and-file (linked to a theme tied to Stalin’s predictions)
• Replacing intelligentsia/scientific progress with bureaucratic management, leading to “decomposition”
• He draws parallels to later political changes, arguing personnel selection was central

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Stalin/China Comparison and a Future Lesson

Lizun uses Stalin-era and China as contrasts:

• Stalin (as praised): reliance on intelligence, scientific workers, and strict personnel discipline
• China (as praised): stronger accountability systems
  • leaders must achieve visible results
  • public control and enforcement via party/youth/trade-union structures

He claims these differences explain why China continues strong development while the USSR disintegrated.

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Current Policy Commentary (Russia / Foreign Policy)

Later in the discussion, Lizun generalizes “lessons” from the GKChP into a contemporary argument:

• words must be backed by actions
• hesitation and fear of Western reaction lead to weakness

He criticizes what he sees as overly cautious diplomacy and “verbal protests,” advocating for decisive measures.

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Lesson Conclusion

Lizun’s bottom line is that:

• decisive action is necessary
• inconsistency between promises and actions undermines legitimacy
• hesitation can be fatal, connecting the GKChP’s failure to broader national tragedy

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Presenters / Contributors Listed at the End (From the Subtitles)

• Vladimir Nikolaevich Lizun (main guest/speaker)
• Host / interviewer (unnamed in subtitles; only greetings and direct address appear)

Mentioned participants for a separate conference advertising block

• Alexander Artomonov
• Roman Gazenko
• Oleg Pavlyuchenko
• Nikolai Subotin

Mentioned individuals throughout the discussion (not presenters)

• Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Kryuchkov, Yanayev, Varennikov, Khazbulatov, Primakov, Yazov
• Prokhanov, Popov (Moscow mayor, as stated), Shenin, Baklanov, Benediktov, Mekhles
• and others referenced in passing