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Róna Dániel: Orbán olyan helyzetben van, amiből én nem látom a kiutat

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Overview

Telex’s political program discusses Hungary’s near-term constitutional vote in parliament and the likely attempt to remove or replace President Tamás Sulyok (“weights” in the subtitles).

Political analyst Dániel Róna argues that the decisive “rule-of-law” boundary-crossing occurred earlier—through Orbán/Fidesz’s two-thirds majority and the restructuring of institutions. The current steps, he suggests, represent an escalation, but not the first major shift.

1) Parliament vote and the strategy around Sulyok

  • Parliament is set to vote on a constitutional amendment that would substantially affect the president’s fate.
  • Péter Magyar and others claim the amendment could be challenged via a petition to the Constitutional Court, while Fidesz leaders deny specific coordination.
  • Róna frames the broader move as part of an institutional contest involving Fidesz and Magyar.
  • Róna believes Sulyok is unlikely to resign voluntarily and portrays him as increasingly focused on preserving his position rather than on the presidency’s institutional authority.
  • Even if the plan involves filing to the Constitutional Court and then proceeding to impeachment/deprivation procedures, Róna emphasizes uncertainty:
    • the Constitutional Court’s involvement and the process for replacing a president via the speaker involve “grey zones”
    • outcomes could still be contested in practice.

2) What counts as the real “border crossing”

Róna repeatedly distinguishes between:

Major, real institutional crossings already achieved by Fidesz

  • Using the two-thirds majority to push major constitutional outcomes.
  • Curtailing the Constitutional Court’s ability to review substantive content.
  • He points to the end of László Sólyom’s mandate as an earlier example of Orbán/Fidesz acting even when it wasn’t truly “necessary,” arguing the political system’s prior conditions no longer applied.

The current move

  • Filing the amendment with the Constitutional Court “formally” while not allowing substantive review is also described as a boundary-crossing.
  • However, Róna argues it is not the primary structural break—more a continuation of opportunities already created by Fidesz.

3) Feasibility timelines and procedural risks

  • If the amendment is accepted, it must be signed/processed on a tight schedule; the president’s signature (or refusal) creates timing windows.
  • If Sulyok does not sign, Róna expects impeachment/deprivation steps to begin quickly, but warns the process may not be “instant”:
    • because the Constitutional Court’s role and the speaker’s replacement power are not straightforward
  • He also notes the possibility of a blocking minority within the Constitutional Court, which could prevent certain proceedings through agenda-setting and interpretive barriers.

4) Why Tisza may avoid direct presidential elections—for now

The discussion turns to how the successor president may be chosen:

  • The government/parliamentary side signals the next president would be elected by the parliamentary majority (associated with Tisza).
  • Magyar has floated direct presidential elections (a popular vote) as a constitutional option.
  • Róna argues Tisza’s “wait” is strategic:
    • Direct elections carry political risk, opening a new contest with potentially multiple challengers and unpredictable results.
    • It may be politically useful for the parliamentary majority to appoint someone first, strengthening their position over time.
    • Direct elections could also allow voters to channel dissatisfaction into a candidate not nominated by Tisza, helping opponents.

5) Public/popularity legitimacy of Sulyok vs. why he likely won’t resign

Róna adds a political-psychological angle:

  • He reviews past resignations (e.g., Pál Schmitt, Katalin Novák) where leaders argued they could not embody “national unity.”
  • By that logic, Sulyok should resign—but Róna argues he is politically trapped:
    • unlike Katalin Novák, he did not build broad public legitimacy
    • he is among the most unpopular presidents in current polling
  • Therefore, he is less likely to resign without clear incentives; Róna describes him as more isolated and lacking the “bridge” role that might make resignation politically resonant.

6) Fidesz’s expected reaction and campaign dynamics

  • Róna interprets Fidesz’s posture as partly enjoying that Magyar is absorbed in a new institutional battle, potentially slowing Magyar’s momentum.
  • On “rule of law” messaging:
    • he argues Fidesz voters have been conditioned for years to treat rule of law as “not important”
    • shifting slogans now may not persuade committed voters
    • disillusioned voters have already detached
  • He compares potential parliamentary boycott tactics to earlier opposition behavior, concluding there is no “miracle” strategy capable of quickly reversing Fidesz’s downward trajectory.

7) Possible cooperation/realignment risks (Our Homeland vs Fidesz vs others)

  • Róna references comments and rhetorical softening between Fidesz and Our Homeland (Mi Hazánk) figures, describing it as a “death hug.”
    • He suggests the aim is to win over Fidesz voters rather than pursue genuine rapprochement.
  • He also notes that, long-term, parties could cooperate on presidential nominations in a way reminiscent of past joint candidacies.
    • But he emphasizes that close ideological proximity often increases rivalry and uncertainty.

8) The constitutional amendment’s “12-year mandate limit” as a tactical move

Beyond the Sulyok issue, the amendment includes a 12-year limitation on parliamentary mandates.

Róna reads it pragmatically:

  • It could be intended to provoke opponent internal dynamics—especially within Fidesz—by making long-term parliamentary careers feel blocked.
  • He argues it may trigger psychological and loyalty-related pressures inside Fidesz and reduce incentives to remain loyal.

Presenters / contributors

  • Balázs Rédli — host/presenter (Telex)
  • Dániel Róna — guest, head of the 21st research center

Mentioned/quoted participants in the discussion (not as presenters)

Péter Magyar, Tamás Sulyok, Gergely Gulyás, Viktor Orbán, Péter Hak, Gábor Török, László Sólyom, Katalin Novák, Pál Schmitt, and others including references to Mi Hazánk (e.g., László Torockai), plus interview-participants such as Andrea Rost and Szabolcs Dull/RÚF Bint, along with “others” (e.g., Fidesz/Our Homeland figures).

Original video