Καλεντερίδης: Προετοιμαστείτε για το χειρότερο σενάριο!

Overview

Military analyst Savvas Kalderidis argues that Europe should prepare for a worsening strategic situation (a “worst-case scenario”). He links this to the risk of a broader conflict involving Russia, while warning that Europe remains politically fragmented and geopolitically weak.

Ukraine–Russia escalation and behind-the-scenes diplomacy

Kalderidis describes a key set of signals as a chain of events involving senior U.S. officials and NATO leadership:

• The CIA director visited Moscow
• Then the U.S. top leadership became involved (following discussion at the White House)
• The U.S. Secretary of Defense met with NATO leadership, including Rutte

He interprets this sequence in two possible ways:

• Russia probing whether it could strike a NATO country (he suggests Britain as the most likely target)
• Or an intentional “leak” meant to force NATO mobilization

He also claims that Russia’s leadership met extensively with “KNER” (as he describes it) for map-based planning, after which Americans delivered a concrete proposal to Russia.

Pressure on Ukraine (as described)

Kalderidis alleges that later U.S.-mediated pressure on Ukraine included demands that President Zelensky:

• Surrender key Donbas areas: Kramatorsk and Sloviansk
• Cede part of Zaporizhzhia
• Discuss whether to recognize annexation referendums

He frames Zelensky’s refusal as nearly unavoidable due to heavy casualties (Kalderidis cites “100,000 people have been killed”). He argues this contributes to why negotiations are difficult and why the war is likely to continue into winter—while also suggesting there are pressures intended to prevent expansion into Europe.

U.S. strategic constraints and the “end of the Ukraine war” possibility

Kalderidis argues that U.S. concerns—including depleted strategic stockpiles and resource limits—may lead the U.S. to test NATO’s “reflexes” during a period when U.S. posture is weaker.

He also references internal Pentagon readiness and leak-management efforts (noting that “50 executives… passed a truth test”), and suggests Moscow believes these leaks indicate U.S. vulnerability.

From this, he forecasts that a “light at the end of the war” could appear in Ukraine—implying negotiation and settlement dynamics may accelerate.

Europe’s absence, fragmentation, and costs

Kalderidis’s central critique is that Europe is absent from major diplomatic and strategic processes despite being a large economic bloc. He argues that Europe has:

• “Zero geopolitical footprint”
• Therefore, it cannot meaningfully influence outcomes compared with the U.S., Russia, or China

He also points to additional pressure tied to Trump’s stance that Europe should repay the U.S. for supporting Ukraine (cash, loans, or weapons). He describes this as a transatlantic cost shift, while emphasizing that the war was not “in a vacuum,” implying earlier British/U.S. planning and responsibility within U.S. policy.

Domestic European politics as a threat to EU stability

Using Germany as an example, he highlights several concerns:

• AfD polling around 44%, including pro-Russia relations on its agenda
• Polling suggesting AfD leads in multiple German states
• Concern that if AfD gains national power, Germany could push outcomes that unravel the EU

He specifically mentions possible scenarios such as:

• Germany exiting the euro
• Deporting even second-generation Germans

He warns these pressures could combine with French political developments to threaten the EU’s continued existence (“end of Europe as we knew it”). He also connects Europe’s weakness to:

• Deindustrialization (particularly Germany)
• “Agenda” issues such as immigration and social-cultural change—framed as undermining societies from within

Greece’s preparation and alternative regional planning

Kalderidis recommends Greece prepare for a worst-case future, including:

• EU dissolution, or
• Transformation into something that no longer serves Greek regional interests

He suggests that, at an academic level, Greece should develop stronger understanding and coordination with Italy and Albania to form a kind of confederation among the three—arguing that otherwise great powers will “dance on their backs.”

He also praises Greece’s asylum policy toward refugees compared with other European countries, while calling Greece a “laggard in politics” because it has not converted policy into a robust integration plan.

Proposed approach to integration

He proposes a more structured model:

• Visas
• Managed labor migration
• Cultural and social integration for those who wish to integrate
• Rather than unfenced or uncontrolled integration

Upcoming great-power meetings (Asia-Pacific / “new Yalta” concern)

Kalderidis claims information suggests that Putin’s Russia and other top powers will meet in/around November, including:

• A meeting around September 28 at or near Trump’s White House (referencing “Ceping” as stated in subtitles)
• A later trilateral meeting in Beijing at the Asia-Pacific Cooperation summit

He describes these as involving Trump, China, and other leaders—framed as “the three most powerful countries.”

He adds that Moscow advisors—such as Ushakov and Dmitriev—are signaling they are shaping the agenda, and he mentions reports about a “new Yalta.”

His expectation is that as the wars in Ukraine and Iran become clearer, powers may agree on spheres of influence, again noting Europe’s absence because it has little leverage.

Call to awareness and support for independent coverage

The segment promotes geopolitical awareness via Geopolitico.gr, ending with an appeal to viewers to register/support, describing the work as “difficult” but ongoing.

Presenters / contributors

• Savvas Kalderidis (military analyst and author)
• Christos Konstantinidis (editorial director, mentioned in the channel/website credits)
• Pantelis Savidis (mentioned in the Geopolitico.gr credits)
• Ioannis Baltzoi (mentioned in the Geopolitico.gr credits)
• Giannos Charalambidis (mentioned in the Geopolitico.gr credits)
• Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos (mentioned in the Geopolitico.gr credits)
• Michel Rubin (mentioned in the Geopolitico.gr credits)
• SAL (mentioned in the Geopolitico.gr credits)
• Tamer Chilliar (mentioned in the Geopolitico.gr credits)