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Les philosophes ne comprennent rien à la LIBERTÉ

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Overview

The speaker argues that “classical” free will—where an action counts as free only if:

  1. the agent could truly have done otherwise in the exact same circumstances, and
  2. the agent’s will is self-determining (not determined by external causes),

—is not what most people intuitively mean by “acting freely,” and may be a poor match even for common-sense judgment.

They also criticize their own earlier video (from five years ago) defending the incompatibility between determinism and classical freedom. They claim that classical freedom has been treated as a standard, widely accepted definition in French philosophy education and by many scientific disciplines (citing examples such as Sam Harris and Sabine Hossenfelder), even though many contemporary philosophers reject it.

Core critique of classical free will

Determinism vs. classical freedom (as traditionally framed)

The speaker summarizes the classical incompatibility picture:

  • If every event is causally fixed by prior states, then:
    • (a) the agent cannot genuinely do otherwise, and
    • (b) the agent’s will is not independent of external determining conditions.

On this view, classical free will seems impossible.

Quantum-indeterminism doesn’t rescue classical freedom

The speaker argues that quantum explanations still do not reinstate the classical requirements (i.e., they still fail to satisfy the relevant classical conditions).

Empirical challenge using surveys (“what people actually think”)

The speaker reports large-scale survey results testing whether ordinary intuitions align with the classical definition.

Survey 1: “Harry” scenarios (over 11,000 respondents)

They find:

  1. Baseline free choice (Scenario 1): Harry kills a neighbor for money without coercion—about 90% judge the act as free. Philosophers are somewhat more skeptical than non-philosophers.

  2. Coerced/uncontrollable via hidden drug (Scenario 2): Harry kills while drugged unbeknownst to him—a majority (more than in Scenario 1) judge it not free.

  3. “Frankfurt cases” (Scenario 3): Harry cannot ultimately avoid killing, even though he deliberates between options. Still, a strong majority (about 75%, with some disagreement) says he acted freely.

    • Implication: undermines the classical requirement of real alternative possibilities.

  4. External influence on character/values (Scenario 4): Identical quadruplets are raised in different families with different values; chance adoption determines values that lead to killing vs refusing. Even though values are heavily shaped by external chance, a majority (about 75%) says the killers acted freely.

    • Implication: undermines the classical requirement of self-determination/autonomy.

  5. Highly deterministic “time-loop/cyclical determinism” (Scenario 5): A universe where everything repeats identically. Even here, about 60% still judge Harry acted freely.

    • Implication: suggests people do not treat the incompatibility of freedom and determinism the way classical incompatibilists often assume.

Extra survey: time-loop variations (over 4,300 respondents)

The speaker adds scenarios modeled on “Groundhog Day/Edge of Tomorrow” logic, including both deterministic and indeterministic versions.

  • Even when determinism is strongly suggested (and sometimes when indeterminism is present), around 80% still judge the agent acts freely.
  • Conclusion: ordinary intuitions tend to view determinism/indeterminism as not directly canceling freedom. Instead, the common intuition seems closer to freedom understood as deliberative control, even in deterministic settings.

Conclusion about disagreement: semantic vs. substantive

The speaker claims many debates become “semantic trick” battles, but that they reflect deeper disagreements about:

  • what the ordinary concept of “acting freely” includes, and
  • whether classical metaphysical conditions are part of that ordinary meaning.

They argue that incompatibilists often treat “classical freedom” as the relevant meaning and then conclude free will doesn’t exist. But once you notice ordinary intuitions don’t track those metaphysical criteria, the incompatibilist framing becomes overreaching—“straw-man-like.”

Proposed “modest” compatibilist direction

They describe a contemporary compatibilist view:

  • freedom is not metaphysical miracle-making; it is control over one’s action, typically cashed out as:
    • deliberation among options (options are epistemically possible, even if not really possible), and
    • action guided by reasons rather than by external coercion (contrasting a gun-to-the-head case with motives integrated into identity/values).

They emphasize that “free” is graded (like “bald”) rather than a strict binary with sharp borders.

They also note experimental results suggesting moral responsibility tracks freedom closely, though not perfectly: about 10% more people attribute responsibility than freedom.

Final stance

The speaker’s position is:

  • the classical definition is outdated and unintuitive, and
  • compatibilist “deliberative control” better matches how people ordinarily use “freedom.”

They advocate using “free” without heavy air quotes and engaging disagreements by focusing on practical/psychological deliberative agency, rather than metaphysical impossibility.

Presenters / contributors

  • Presenter / speaker: (the channel’s author; no name given in the subtitles)
  • Referenced contributors (not speaking in the video): Sam Harris; Sabine Hossenfelder; Immanuel Kant; Jean-Claude Van Damme (metaphor); Baruch (Blaise) Spinoza; Harry Frankfurt; Maxime Leforestier (lyric reference); Augustine; Patrick Baud.

Original video