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Top 5 GWOT gun and gear fails: Barely used, not tested properly, or completely worthless.

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Overview

This video is a “Top 5 GWOT gun and gear fails” rundown, focusing on weapons and equipment that were either:

  • disliked by troops,
  • problematic in testing, or
  • overtaken by newer systems and real-world combat realities.

The host frames each “fail” as something that sounded promising on paper—but didn’t hold up once it reached the field.

1) HK Mark 23 Mod 0 pistol — “offensive pistol” that became a burden

The host dives into the Mark 23’s backstory and corrects common myths:

  • It wasn’t simply meant to standardize SEALs/Special Forces sidearms.
  • Its original purpose was an “offensive pistol” concept for CQB room-to-room fights, paired with an M16/M4 outdoors.

In practice:

  • It was described as extremely accurate.
  • It was also comically huge, likened to a “giant boat anchor.”
  • Special Forces largely rejected it almost immediately because nobody wanted to carry something that big.

The key knockout: the rifle system it was meant to complement effectively became obsolete via the M4A1 (compact rifle capable of both outdoor fighting and room clearing), so the Mark 23’s niche disappeared quickly.

Reaction highlight: the host mentions trainees/lower-level users laughing at how ridiculous it looked on kit due to its size.

2) FN SCAR Light (Mark 16) in 5.56 — “finicky” mechanics and a new type of jam

The host says he was deeply involved in final user testing (Fort Bragg) and even helped write the evaluation paper that influenced non-adoption in 5.56.

The promise: the request sounded like a dream:

  • AK-like reliability
  • quick-change barrel ideas
  • an AK-style reciprocating charging handle

What went wrong in testing:

  • Weak buttstock latch (could collapse while moving/running)
  • Barrel wasn’t actually “quick change” in practice
  • Reciprocating charging handle could jam if bumped on gear/cover
  • Cartridges/casings could snag in the op-rod channel, causing jams that required disassembly to clear

Testing-table punchline: when commanders asked how it beat the M4, the users agreed:

“Nothing.”

Contrast: full-auto performance could be better than the M4A1, but in semi-auto, many shooters felt the M4A1 was superior for handling and firing speed.

The host notes FN later fixed many issues in later civilian versions, but says the damage was done for the 5.56 Light program.

3) XM25 “Punisher” — counter-defilade that didn’t find enough real targets

The XM25 is described as a 25mm laser-rangefired airburst system intended to hit enemies behind cover by bursting above them.

On paper: it was pitched as a better solution to counter-defilade than older grenade launchers.

In reality (Afghanistan), limitations reduced its usefulness:

  • Heavy: near 20 lbs loaded
  • Small magazine: 5 rounds
  • Required specific conditions (enemies didn’t hold still, didn’t stay clumped, and moved unpredictably)
  • At short range it could devolve into basically a grenade launcher—so it wasn’t always the right tool

Program timeline:

  • Fielded around 2010
  • Pulled out of service / rare by 2013
  • Later shelved, eventually reappearing as modernized proposals

Host’s conceptual “fail” argument: FPV drones make the premise increasingly obsolete—why carry a specialized weapon when drone systems can deliver similar effects more cheaply with less burden on infantry.

4) SPEAR/BALCS body armor — MOLLE and Velcro-level construction problems

This segment focuses on the SPEAR vest component of SOCOM’s SPEAR BALCS system (armor plus pouches/rucks).

Major issue #1: MOLLE layout and “fast reload” that didn’t really happen

  • The vest used vertical MOLLE webbing (the host says it was new to SF at the time).
  • A SEAL rep claimed it enabled faster horizontal mag mounting.
  • But the pouch design required re-buttoning, negating the supposed “fast reload” advantage.

Major issue #2: hook-and-loop (Velcro-type) failure under load

  • The vest relied on cheap hook-and-loop, only secured at shoulders and sides.
  • Under movement and load, it would separate at the shoulders and fall apart.
  • Field reaction highlight: the host says it was common to see Green Berets taping the shoulders to keep it from coming undone.

Outcome: it was used during invasions, but by late 2004 it was largely replaced by better plate-centric armor, such as the Eagle Industries CIRAS Maritime.

Overall “fail” framing: it helped make armor-wearing common, but the specific design was sub-par—forcing many users to modify it themselves.

5) GWOT uniform/armor philosophy fails — ACU camouflage + IOTV risk-averse armor thinking

This section presents two rapid-fire “fails” tied to a broader armor/clothing philosophy mismatch.

Army Combat Uniform (ACU) in UCP

  • The camouflage was auto-pixelated and allegedly blended into “nowhere,” especially in Iraq/Afghanistan terrain.
  • The host argues it made soldiers easier to spot.
  • He jokes about its blending performance (including “grandma’s couch” style humor) and criticizes the program as a major money waste that increased risk to troops.

IOTV Improved Outer Tactical Vest (conventional forces, 2007)

  • Presented as an extreme example of risk-averse thinking: armor them up so they “can’t be hurt.”
  • The host argues it ignored what matters in real gunfights—mobility and comfort.
  • He claims it offers lots of coverage, but the meaningful ballistic protection doesn’t scale like the bulk does, resulting in heavy, restrictive gear.
  • Key argument: special operations moved toward more mobile plate carriers instead of full vests, because maneuverability improves survivability and combat effectiveness.

Main standout themes / jokes / reactions

  • Adoption failed due to weight and bulk, plus reliability/maintenance problems and design assumptions that didn’t match combat reality.
  • Troop reaction moments:
    • Mark 23: users laughed at the “boat anchor” size
    • SPEAR vest: troops added tape because the design would separate/fall apart
  • Repeated contrast between “sounds great on paper” and “doesn’t outperform existing gear in the real fight”:
    • SCAR Light: “Nothing” vs M4
    • XM25: not enough practical targets
  • Drone-era comparison:
    • the XM25 premise is dismissed as outdated because FPV drones can accomplish similar effects more cheaply with less burden

Personalities appearing (as described in the subtitles)

  • Host: Jeff Gurwitch (Modern Tactical Shooting)
  • Interview/test participants / representatives mentioned:
    • A Navy SEAL (unnamed) — regarding the vertical MOLLE reload rationale
    • An Army major (unnamed) — representing Special Forces input
    • Commanders at a final evaluation meeting (unnamed)
    • Rangers leadership/management (unnamed)
    • FN developers/program team (unnamed)

Original video