Video summary

9 MITÓW O WOŁYNIU - UPA, BANDERA, RZEŹ, LICZBA OFIAR

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News and Commentary

Overview

The video discusses the July 11 anniversary of the Volhynia massacre (often called “Bloody Sunday”), framing it as a long-running genocide carried out mainly by Ukrainian nationalist formations (UPA/OUN). Speakers argue that contemporary Polish–Ukrainian tensions have been worsened by competing national narratives and “myths” about responsibility, motives, and victim counts.

Core claims and debunked “myths”

1) UPA/OUN symbolism and the Bandera cult

  • The video argues that UPA/OUN symbolism in Ukraine is not “anti-Polish” in the way Poles often assume.
  • Instead, it presents the cult of Bandera as a war-time and identity-building phenomenon.
  • The video claims the cult grew strongly after 2014/2022, as Ukrainians sought anti-Russian symbols and heroes.
  • Even if many Ukrainians may not know Bandera’s detailed ideology, the video links the cult’s growth to modern conflict needs.

2) Bandera and “anti-Polish hatred” narratives

  • The video rejects the idea that Bandera was “anti-Polish” due to a specific hatred narrative.
  • It claims Bandera’s worldview involved extermination/hostility toward “non-Ukrainian” groups.
  • Volhynia and violence in Eastern Lesser Poland are presented as an extension of that logic.
  • It criticizes attempts to dilute responsibility.

3) The “you did the same” symmetry argument

  • The video frames the symmetry argument as false.
  • It claims Polish interwar and wartime actions cannot be equated to the organized genocide carried out in Volhynia.
  • The video emphasizes a causal chain:
    • Mass murders by Bandera supporters preceded Polish retaliations
    • Retaliations are framed as defensive responses, not equivalent genocidal policy

4) Volhynia as an organized operation, not a spontaneous uprising

  • The video argues the rebellion was planned and organized by underground Ukrainian leadership.
  • It references OUN/UPA congress decisions in 1943.
  • It also claims the brutality included torture and mass killings of women and children.
  • Coercion and selective killing of those who refused to participate are highlighted.

5) Bandera’s imprisonment is not seen as absolution

  • The video acknowledges Bandera was imprisoned for part of the period.
  • However, it argues he was not a typical detainee:
    • He allegedly never condemned the massacres.
    • His role in shaping policies/ideology is presented as morally contributing to what followed.

6) UPA as genocidal, not analogous “armed resistance”

  • The video describes the UPA as a genocidal formation, not a comparable “armed resistance” to the Polish Home Army (AK).
  • While acknowledging anti-Soviet fighting after 1944, it insists UPA’s defining early actions included:
    • Extermination of civilians
    • Suppression of opposition

7) Victim-number disputes as politically motivated

  • The video treats victim-number disputes as politically motivated.
  • It criticizes Ukrainian-side figures for allegedly:
    • Underestimating Polish deaths
    • Promoting “civil war / mutual purges” narratives
  • It cites multiple estimate ranges, including larger totals such as:
    • 60,000–80,000
    • 100,000–120,000
  • It characterizes low numbers as “artificial symmetry.”

8) Rejection of Operation Vistula as an equivalent revenge

  • The video rejects claims that Operation Vistula (1947) is an equivalent “revenge.”
  • It argues deaths during Operation Vistula were far lower than those in Volhynia.
  • It also claims forced relocations—though brutal—are not comparable to mass genocide.

Additional contextual points

  • The video provides background on how Ukrainian national identity was suppressed by the USSR, arguing that post-1991 commemoration in Western Ukraine helped foster UPA/Bandera hero memory.
  • It claims that during WWII, nationalist actors:
    • Exploited international developments
    • Anticipated killings would become irreversible “faits accomplis”
  • It expands the victim list beyond Poles, stating that Jews, Roma, Armenians, Czechs, and other minorities were also killed by nationalist forces, along with Ukrainians who resisted or hid Poles.
  • It argues that Polish-language media (especially “left-liberal”) sometimes repeated Ukrainian nationalist frames, and it calls for rejecting what the speaker labels propaganda narratives.

Overall conclusion

The presenters conclude that Volhynia should be treated as genocide and organized extermination, not mutual civil war. They argue that modern commemoration and political debate should not rely on “narrative symmetry”, which they say minimizes Ukrainian nationalist responsibility.

Presenters / contributors

  • Andrzej Matowski
  • (Another studio participant, named in subtitles as “Ernato” — exact identity unclear due to subtitle/audio extraction errors)

Referenced historians / researchers (not presented as hosts)

Grzegorz Motyka, Bogdan Hud, Ewa and Władysław Siemaszko, Damian Markowski, Grzegorz Rosoliński Libe, Volodymyr Viatrovych, Karol Nawrocki, Volodymyr Zelensky, Leonid Kravchuk.

Original video