Warum Männer der Gen Z ganz rechts wählen und Frauen ganz links wählen

Overview

Young voters in Germany (and similar democracies abroad) are increasingly drifting apart politically by gender. In the 2025 federal election, young women (18–24) voted much more for left parties (Left Party: 37.1%) than young men (17.6%). Conversely, young men supported the AfD far more (25.2%) than young women (12.6%).

The video argues this reflects a broader international pattern (including South Korea, the Netherlands, the UK, and the USA): young men increasingly move toward right-wing/right-wing populist options, while young women increasingly move toward progressive/left options.

Key claims and analysis

Don’t oversimplify “men are conservative / women are progressive”

The host emphasizes that research is more nuanced than stereotypes suggest:

• The gender gap is larger among younger people largely because young women have moved further left.
• Young men are not necessarily “more right-wing than older men” on average across Europe.
• Still, polarization between genders is clearly growing.

Populism is central—but not inherently left or right

• Populism is defined as a worldview dividing society into “the real people” versus a “corrupt elite,” with parties claiming to represent the general will.
• Populism can appear on both left and right.
• In Europe, right-wing populism has gained ground strongly (especially in Germany via the AfD), though left parties can also exhibit populist traits.

Why populism appeals: identify real problems, then push risky solutions

The video highlights two linked dynamics:

1. Populists often name genuine weaknesses

   • Political decisions sometimes align more with higher-income preferences than lower-income ones.
   • This allows populists to point to real democratic problems.

2. Populism weakens democracy and tends to underperform economically

   • Populist governments often weaken democratic checks and balances (e.g., courts, parliament, independent media).
   • The video cites large studies showing worse economic outcomes across populist regimes (regardless of whether they’re left or right), including:
     • more protectionism
     • less international integration
     • less stability
     • higher debt and inflation

Why people still vote for populists: “disillusioned democrats”

Populism “works” because it offers:

• Simple messages and easy causal stories for complex problems (e.g., “the system doesn’t work because an elite rules against ordinary people”).
• Voters often do not reject democracy outright; rather, they feel dissatisfied with how democracy works and feel unheard, disrespected, or status-losing.

A major driver is economic uncertainty, not just unemployment. Example for Germany:

• Overall price level was about 22% higher in 2025 than in 2020
• Food prices about 36% higher
• Real wages returned only to around 2019 levels by 2025
• Rents rose sharply, making home ownership harder—especially for first-time buyers

The video argues this insecurity can:

• increase openness to anti-system promises
• reduce trust in established parties
• shift attitudes toward issues like migration (especially among young people)

Why young men and young women diverge further

Young men → more right-wing/populist lean

The video suggests several interacting factors:

1. Perceived status loss / “gender backlash”

   • Men may interpret women’s progress not as overall progress, but as competition threatening jobs, education, partnerships, and recognition.
   • This can make traditional gender-role narratives more attractive—messages the host says are common in right-wing populist parties.

2. Men falling behind in education

   • Women increasingly outperform men in education in many countries.
   • Education is tied to income, status, and partnership prospects.
   • The video claims this decline can become “real life reality,” especially in weaker regions where better-educated young people leave, and more women move away—leaving young men behind (example cited: figures for Saxony-Anhalt).

3. Loneliness

   • Young men experience sharp declines in social contact and may lack someone to discuss worries.
   • Loneliness is framed as a political risk factor that can increase susceptibility to right-wing populist messaging (without claiming it automatically causes voting).

Young women → more left-leaning

1. Equality policy affects women more directly

   • Women are described as generally having stronger equality-oriented preferences that show up in concrete issues such as:
     • abortion rights
     • childcare
     • equal pay
     • work-family compatibility
     • discrimination
     • role models
   • Left-leaning parties are said to offer more progressive positions here.

2. Economic policy preferences

   • Women are described as more supportive (on average) of redistribution, inequality reduction, and public social benefits—aligning more with social-democratic/left platforms.
   • The video adds this may still reflect fear of economic insecurity or status loss, but with different political solutions:
     • left parties: more redistribution and welfare
     • right populists: reduce an “oversized state” and target benefits to “our own” population

3. Cultural shift: weaker ties to conservative religion/tradition

   • Historically, women were more religious and thus more tied to Christian Democratic/conservative parties.
   • With secularization among younger generations, that linkage has weakened, making left-leaning voting more plausible.

The video also clarifies that “leftward women’s voting” does not automatically mean “left-wing populist” voting. In the 2025 election, women reportedly voted more for SPD, Greens, Left Party, and BSW than men—but SPD/Greens are not portrayed as populist, and the Left Party’s populist classification is said to be less clear-cut. The phenomenon is therefore broader than a simple “men right-populist vs women left-populist” story.

Amplifier: social media

A “new” factor presented is social media’s ability to produce different political/social realities:

• Algorithms can expose young men and young women to different content pathways (e.g., masculinity and “wokeness” for men; feminism, mental health, abortion rights, climate for women), increasing exposure to tailored narratives.
• Evidence cited suggests:
  • more social media use by men in rural areas correlates with more right-wing positions
  • more use by women in urban areas correlates with more left-wing positions
• The host describes a feedback loop:
  • polarizing content drives attention and reach
  • that incentivizes further polarization
• Parties that communicate effectively on social media benefit from this dynamic.

What established parties could do (proposed remedies)

The conclusion is that social media amplifies dynamics, but root causes are deeper, especially material problems for young people.

Suggested policy directions include:

• Increasing housing supply to reduce rent/home costs
• Lowering energy/living expense burdens
• Tax relief on labor for low- and middle-income earners
• A broader tax shift away from labor, paired with reducing privileges/exemptions elsewhere, such as:
  • reforming inheritance/gift taxation
  • raising ongoing property taxes
  • reducing VAT exemptions
  • improving tax enforcement
  • adjusting environmentally harmful tax breaks

The argument: young people must visibly benefit from policy rather than feeling the system serves “everyone else.” Otherwise, simple populist answers—right or left—remain attractive.

Bottom line

The gender divide among young voters is framed as evidence that young men and women often experience different social realities, prioritize different problems, and therefore seek different political solutions.

The key open question is whether politicians can address these issues without pitting genders against each other.

Presenters / contributors

• Simon — channel host; described as creating content on finance, economics, and society for over six years