'Abiy Ahmed Fights Trump': Ethiopia Turns To BRICS To Escape The US Dollar Trap | Firstpost Africa

Overview: Ethiopia’s BRICS pivot and the rationale

Ethiopia is portrayed as shifting toward BRICS and broader “Global South” partnerships to reduce dependence on the US dollar amid growing foreign exchange pressure and geopolitical headwinds.

The coverage argues this is not a symbolic push for “de-dollarization,” but an effort to secure more financing and trade optionality, particularly as Washington threatens severe tariffs on countries that abandon the dollar.

Ethiopia’s BRICS move and the rationale (de-dollarization as necessity)

• Ethiopia officially joined BRICS on January 1, 2024, framed as a major economic and diplomatic turning point toward a multipolar world order rather than Western financial dominance.
• The video claims Ethiopia is trying to avoid being trapped by:
  • dollar-based borrowing, and
  • currency shortages that can worsen during market fluctuations.
• US pressure is presented as a direct geopolitical risk, including Donald Trump’s threat of 100% tariffs, which Ethiopia aims to counter by diversifying partners and financing channels.

Economic performance used to justify the shift

• Ethiopia is said to have recorded export revenue of over $10.7 billion in 2025–2026, up from about $8.3 billion in the prior fiscal year.
• Key exports mentioned: gold, oilseeds, horticulture, livestock, and textiles.
• IMF projections cited:
  • 9.2% growth (2025–2026)
  • 7.8% (2026–2027)
• Ethiopia’s own target is described as 10.2% growth by year-end.
• The message emphasizes that Ethiopia is strengthening its domestic momentum, not only seeking external financing—thereby improving its negotiating position.

Foreign exchange pressures and the debt crisis context

• Dollar dependence is described as continuing because Ethiopia needs dollars for:
  • fuel
  • medicine
  • equipment
  • external debt
• The video connects the de-dollarization push to Ethiopia’s 2023 Eurobond default (about $1 billion), which reduced access to international capital and forced complex restructuring.
• A recent FX shortage signal is highlighted:
  • A central bank foreign exchange auction allocated $500 million
  • Banks demanded over $710 million
  • Leaving approximately $210 million unmet—used as evidence of persistent FX scarcity.

What BRICS (and related institutions) are expected to provide

The coverage emphasizes BRICS policy direction rather than a “new BRICS currency” (noted as nonexistent):

• more trade in national currencies
• local-currency financing
• payment systems that could reduce reliance on the dollar

It also points to the BRICS-linked New Development Bank (NDB) as a practical bridge:

• over $35 billion approved for 100+ projects
• though it acknowledges the dollar still dominates the bank’s active portfolio, and Ethiopia wants access to more alternatives

Partner network beyond BRICS: China, India, Russia, South Africa, and UAE

Ethiopia’s BRICS membership is framed as a gateway into a broader economic network:

• China
  • described as Ethiopia’s largest trading partner and major source of investment/infrastructure
  • mentions March talks involving debt restructuring and financing for Bishoftu International Airport
  • cites China’s efforts at zero tariffs for some Ethiopian goods to reach China’s consumer market
• India
  • described as investing over $5 billion across textiles, manufacturing, healthcare, and more
  • creating 75,000+ jobs
  • relations are described as elevated to a strategic partnership level, with BRICS membership referenced as part of that momentum
• Russia
  • described as pursuing longer-term energy cooperation
  • exploring nuclear tech via Rosatom to power industrial parks
  • additional investment interest is also mentioned
• South Africa
  • presented as providing direct access to Africa’s largest industrial economy’s corporate and financial networks
• United Arab Emirates (UAE)
  • noted as an additional investment/logistics partner that extends capital sources within the wider BRICS/global-South orbit

Climate diplomacy and “build at home” narrative

• Ethiopia is said to have been selected to host COP 32 in Addis Ababa in 2027, positioned as increasing Ethiopia’s role in climate finance and South–South cooperation.
• Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s message is summarized as:
  • development should not rely entirely on foreign aid
  • Ethiopia’s capacity to build major infrastructure independently is emphasized—especially the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, financed without aid/credit
• The broader strategy is framed as:
  • build domestically
  • attract investment
  • expand exports
  • diversify sources of development financing

Expert commentary (Zemedeneh Negatu): balance, not confrontation

A geopolitical observer/investor, Zemedeneh Negatu, argues:

• Ethiopia’s economics are inseparable from geopolitics, and it is pursuing internal economic reforms aimed at self-sufficiency and sovereignty over economic choices.
• Ethiopia is trying to maintain balance:
  • closer ties with BRICS/Global South
  • while still keeping good relations with the United States, cited through frequent US official/business visits
• He claims Ethiopia’s approach fits an economy that is becoming more open to investors again, making foreign investment possibilities (e.g., Indian firms) more realistic than they were 15–20 years ago.

Replicating self-sufficiency: examples and flexibility in financing

Negatu suggests Ethiopia’s self-financing model can be extended through large projects:

• Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as proof of domestic capability (fully Ethiopian-funded)
• Bishoftu International Airport as a mixed model:
  • described as debt-financed
  • but with significant Ethiopian contribution, including Ethiopian Airlines funding
• Additional South–South/African investment examples, including:
  • a $3 billion fertilizer plant involving Ethiopia’s sovereign wealth fund and Aliko Dangote

BRICS summit framing (India context)

The subtitles also switch to a broader scene-setting around the 18th BRICS summit in New Delhi, portraying it as highly geopolitically tense (wars, trade as a weapon, shifting alliances) and suggesting India’s presidency could turn instability into opportunity.

Presenters / contributors

• Zemedeneh Negatu (geopolitical observer and investor; reporting from Addis Ababa)
• Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed
• Donald Trump (referenced)
• Vladimir Putin (referenced)
• Narendra Modi (referenced)
• Ebrahim Raisi (referenced)
• Cyril Ramaphosa (referenced)
• Lula da Silva (referenced)
• Mehaim Korsaroya (host of a related segment: “Vantage on First Post”)