El MAR al ROJO VIVO: GUERRAS CONECTADAS

Overview

The speaker frames the Red Sea region as a “geopolitical rebalancing” zone where overlapping conflicts are reshaping regional power—even if the shifts are unstable and likely to create further problems. Drawing on an article from Foreign Affairs, they argue that wars around the Red Sea (and connected areas like the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula) are not isolated. Instead, they are interlinked through alliances, external financing, logistics, and rivalries between major Gulf states.

Key regional conflicts and their drivers

Somalia (fragmentation + terrorism risk)

• Somalia is described as fragmented, with:
  • Somaliland: effectively independent since the overthrow of central authority.
  • Puntland: pursuing independence without fully breaking from Mogadishu.
• Mogadishu is portrayed as controlled/contested by powerful militias, including al‑Shabab (linked to al‑Qaeda).
• The speaker emphasizes foreign interventions and regional involvement, notably Ethiopia, and alleged influence tied to maritime ambitions.

Sudan (civil war as an external-supported proxy struggle)

• After 2019, leaders aligned with the Rapid Support Forces and the army promised a democratic transition.
• The speaker says the arrangement collapsed when the army leadership staged a coup.
• External support allegedly enabled the Rapid Support Forces to become the main alternative power.
• The conflict is centered on Kordofan (north/west highlighted), with government and Rapid Support Forces competing for territorial control.

Ethiopia–Eritrea and Tigray (sea access + renewed war risk)

• Ethiopia’s strategic interest is access to the sea, constrained after the long Eritrea–Ethiopia war, particularly due to Eritrea.
• The speaker notes temporary rapprochement indicators:
  • Eritrea’s role in the Tigray war
  • Eritrea’s involvement in peace negotiations (Pretoria)
• That stability is described as weakening due to internal dynamics within Tigray:
  • A more skeptical faction gains control and launches attacks on key airfields/airports
  • Federal forces respond effectively (as in 2022)

Yemen (battlefield shifts + Gulf fissures)

• The speaker recounts Ansar Allah (Houthis) taking major territory and ousting President Hadi.
• A Gulf-backed attempt to restore Hadi (2015) is described as ultimately failing.
• Ongoing offensives and counter-offensives are discussed around major corridors and cities, alongside skepticism about how far each side actually advanced (citing an “Institute for War Studies” report).
• Yemen is portrayed as a major theater where Gulf actors compete indirectly via shifting coalitions and escalation tactics, including actions intended to raise costs and increase pressure.

The main argument: Gulf rivalry shapes outcomes across the Red Sea

A central thesis is that the breakdown in cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the UAE is driving two major geopolitical trends affecting the Red Sea and neighboring theaters. The speaker argues that:

• Saudi Arabia and the UAE support different sides in Yemen and Sudan, and their rivalry spills beyond borders.
• Their split began with policy/economic disagreements, including disputes over influence in Gulf monetary structures and OPEC (ending with the UAE leaving OPEC).
• The speaker emphasizes personal and elite rivalry (with bin Salman vs. al‑Fayed cited).
• There is competition to become hubs in international logistics connecting Asia to Europe/Africa.
• Wars persist because they are financed and sustained by external patrons, reflecting broader patterns of globalization and influence-seeking.

External actors and shifting alliances

Turkey’s role (Somalia and support networks)

• Turkey is said to have intervened in Somalia, securing agreements and seeking benefits, including energy exploration by a Turkish seismic vessel.
• Turkey is also described as supporting Sudan’s Burhan government, which the speaker links to Burhan’s alleged ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and a broader Islamist network.

Egypt’s role (paradox support for Burhan via anti-Ethiopia stance)

• Egypt is described as supporting Eritrea primarily against Ethiopia, driven by tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt and concerns connected to the Ethiopian Renaissance/ongoing disputes.
• The speaker highlights a “paradox”: Egypt supports Burhan despite suspicions about his Islamist connections.
• This is tied to evolving Turkey–Egypt relationships after earlier ideological clashes.

Russia and Libya (Sudan and Red Sea ambitions)

• The speaker claims Russia backed different sides at different times, but is now leaning more toward Burhan.
• The motivation cited is interest in a Red Sea naval base in Sudan.
• Eastern Libya—linked to Khalifa Haftar—is also mentioned, along with control/export routes for gold.
• The Wagner Group is referenced as having involvement in earlier gold export management.

Bottom-line forecast

The speaker concludes that the Red Sea is a “tinderbox”: depending on who wins these struggles, some states may expand influence further, while others become “outliers” seeking protection from stronger patrons.

• Saudi Arabia and the UAE are singled out as major poles.
• Ethiopia is described as a significant wildcard, due to its size and independent geopolitical ambitions.

Presenters / contributors

• Presenter/author: The video speaker (no name provided in the subtitles; references include “Professor” and a later “Maric Carmen” remark).
• Referenced secondary sources (not presenters in the video):
  • Foreign Affairs article
  • “Institute for War Studies” report