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Turkey's $20 Billion Fund Collapse Explained

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Finance

Summary

Turkey’s investment-fund crisis followed a period in which funds associated with financier Emre Tezmen’s Tera group reported extraordinary returns while buying shares in Tera and other affiliated or thinly traded companies. The resulting price increases boosted fund valuations and potentially supported the value of the companies and brokerage connected to them. When buying was restricted and investors sought withdrawals, the funds could not meet redemptions. Illiquid holdings and inflated collateral then made losses worse.

The video describes the conduct as alleged market manipulation and reports that Turkey’s justice minister called the situation “Ponzi-like.” The allegations and investigations are ongoing; the video does not establish that every person or company discussed committed wrongdoing.

How the alleged mechanism worked

  • Buy affiliated shares: Regulatory filings cited by Bloomberg showed that, at one point in 2023, Tera’s flagship fund held 99% of its assets in Tera’s own parent-company stock.
  • Reinforce valuations: Fund purchases could lift affiliated share prices, increasing the funds’ reported net asset values and potentially making the fund manager and parent company appear more valuable.
  • Use IPOs and small free floats: Tera also took companies public, while its funds bought shares in some of them. With relatively few shares available to trade, concentrated buying could have an outsized effect on market prices.
  • Borrow against inflated shares: Bloomberg reported that firms in the group borrowed against stocks used as collateral. Some money-market funds reportedly made these loans through reverse repos, booking them at face value even though the collateral consisted of thinly traded, allegedly inflated shares.
  • Depend on continued inflows and buying: High reported returns attracted investors, while ongoing purchases helped support prices. When a regulator’s new rule stopped funds from adding to some positions, the buying that supported the prices weakened.
  • Trigger a liquidity spiral: Falling prices reduced collateral values and borrowing capacity, forcing sales that pushed prices lower. Redemptions added further pressure: funds could sell their most liquid assets first, leaving remaining investors exposed to less-liquid holdings.

Key figures and events

  • Tera’s flagship fund reported a return of more than 66,000% over three years and, according to the video, more than 1,500% in one year. One questioned fund return was 10,128%.
  • Turkey’s capital-markets regulator ordered the liquidation of 131 funds holding about $20 billion. The video says 455,758 investors had savings locked in the funds.
  • Turkey’s inflation had averaged roughly 50% annually for three years, making the funds’ exceptional reported returns especially attractive to savers.
  • Tera brokerage borrowing reportedly grew from 132 million lira at the end of 2024 to 59.8 billion lira a year later—about 450 times higher.
  • Vişne Madencilik: Tera took the mining company public in February 2025, with 21% of shares placed in public hands. Its stock rose more than 2,100% by the end of July; Tera’s fund and brokerage sold shares that month, and the stock fell 75% in August. Two Tera fund managers were fined 8.9 million lira each, or about $199,000, for creating a misleading impression of the share’s price, supply and demand.
  • Destek Finans Faktoring: Its shares rose more than 4,700% after its 2025 IPO. Even after market turmoil began, it traded at about 132 times earnings, compared with roughly 15 times for JPMorgan. The video says the crash erased about $4 billion from its controlling shareholder’s paper wealth.
  • Özata shipbuilder: Hilmi Güvenal’s analysis cited in the video says the company was losing money and had equity of about 4.5 billion lira. By September, its share price had reached 4,482 lira, implying a market value of about 320 billion lira, or 71 times book value. A Tera hedge fund reportedly held about 15%, worth roughly 48 billion lira at that price. The regulator filed criminal complaints against 11 people over trading in Özata shares.
  • An opposition politician alleged that a ruling-party deputy chair bought about 63 million lira of Özata shares in April and sold them for about 1.34 billion lira in September. Bloomberg said the claims had not been independently confirmed. She had not been charged and was not among the 11 people named by the regulator.
  • Investors withdrew about $4.7 billion from Turkish investment funds in just over two weeks. In mid-September, Pusula said it could not meet redemption requests; on September 16, Tera said it also could not pay clients seeking their money back.
  • On August 29, the Capital Markets Board introduced a cap on how much of a company’s free float a single fund could hold. Funds already above the limit had until 2029 to comply, but could not buy more.
  • Warnings preceded the crisis: an Istanbul prosecutor reportedly asked the regulator to investigate unusual trading by Pusula’s chairman in February 2025; Turkey’s finance minister publicly acknowledged manipulation through some funds in November 2025; and MSCI warned of possible coordinated trading in June 2026. The video also cites an earlier internal regulatory memo describing some prices as fictitious.
  • MSCI warned it might consult on Turkey’s market classification. S&P Dow Jones later put Turkey under review for a possible downgrade. The video says frontier-market status could place Turkey alongside markets such as Tunisia and Romania.
  • The justice minister said 217 suspects had been targeted and 56 people jailed pending trial. İşbank and state-run Ziraat Bank were given up to six months to liquidate the 131 frozen funds. Hilmi Güvenal said investors whose sell orders were cancelled would share in whatever liquidation proceeds are recovered, rather than remain owed a fixed amount. OMG Capital Advisors CEO Murat Gulkan estimated the assets might fetch “pennies on the dollar.”
  • Turkey’s sovereign wealth fund was reportedly buying blue-chip shares to support the wider market. A state-owned Islamic bank was in talks to take over two Pusula savings-finance companies; a deposit-insurance fund was expected to receive assets courts determine are crime proceeds.

Market lessons and cautions

  • A quoted price may be a poor guide to realizable value when trading is thin and large holders help set the price. A stock’s screen price may not survive sale into a deep, liquid market.
  • Money-market funds are not risk-free cash substitutes if they lend against hard-to-value collateral or hold exposures that become difficult to liquidate.
  • Large redemptions can disadvantage investors who remain in a fund: liquid assets may be sold first, leaving the least-liquid holdings to be sold later at steep discounts.
  • The video draws on the “market for lemons” idea: when investors cannot distinguish sound businesses from manipulated or poorly supported ones, they may avoid the whole market or demand lower prices. That raises honest companies’ cost of capital.
  • It also highlights the importance of enforcement. A fine of about $199,000 may provide little deterrence when alleged gains are far larger; the video argues that credible regulators, independent courts, accountable auditors and a free press matter to market integrity.
  • No explicit “not financial advice” disclaimer appears in the subtitles.

Historical parallels and concepts

  • Portfolio pumping: The video contrasts Tera’s alleged year-round buying with a milder practice documented in a 2002 paper by Carhart, Kaniel, Musto and Reed, in which some U.S. mutual funds bought stocks near quarter-end to nudge closing prices used to measure performance.
  • Tunneling: The video uses the term for insiders benefiting at the expense of outside investors—for example, a fund buying overpriced shares and leaving its investors with the loss.
  • Liquidity spiral: As described by Brunnermeier and Pedersen, falling asset prices reduce collateral values and borrowing capacity, prompting forced sales that can drive prices down further.
  • Bernie Cornfeld and Investors Overseas Services (IOS): A later U.S. court ruling described a 1969 transaction in which a small sale of Canadian Arctic oil-and-gas permits at a high price was used to revalue a fund’s much larger holding. The SEC had forced IOS to stop selling its funds to U.S. investors in 1967.
  • Bill Hwang and Archegos: Hwang used swaps from global banks to build leveraged stock positions, including in ViacomCBS. The video compares Archegos’ 2021 collapse with the Turkish funds’ reliance on leveraged positions and inflated collateral. Hwang was convicted in 2024 of fraud, market manipulation and racketeering and sentenced to 18 years; the video says he was free on bail while appealing and had applied for a presidential pardon.

Assets, firms and instruments mentioned

  • Funds and financial instruments: Tera and Pusula investment funds, equity funds, money-market funds, hedge funds, reverse repos, IPOs and stocks used as collateral.
  • Companies and securities: Tera, Vişne Madencilik, Destek Finans Faktoring, Özata, JPMorgan, Lazard, Beşiktaş, ViacomCBS, and the Canadian Arctic oil-and-gas permits discussed in the IOS example.
  • Other assets and market references: Gold, Turkish blue-chip shares, Borsa Istanbul equities, and Turkey’s sovereign wealth fund. The video briefly mentions crypto only in its closing recommendation to watch another video; it provides no crypto-market analysis here.
  • No stock tickers are given in the subtitles.

Presenter, sources and disclosure

Presenter: Patrick Boyle.

Sources cited or discussed: Bloomberg; the Financial Times, including Robert Armstrong and John Paul Rathbone on its Unhedged podcast; The Economist; Hilmi Güvenal’s Substack; MSCI; S&P Dow Jones; Turkey’s Capital Markets Board and justice minister; and academic research by Carhart, Kaniel, Musto and Reed; Sirri and Tufano; Brunnermeier and Pedersen; Gary Becker; Bernard Black; Simon Johnson and co-authors; Raymond Fisman; and George Akerlof. The video also cites a later U.S. court ruling concerning IOS.

Disclosure: The video includes a paid Saily eSIM sponsorship, with a promoted 15% discount using code BOYLE.

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