ВОЕННОЕ ПРЕСТУПЛЕНИЕ ИЛИ ЗАКОННАЯ ЦЕЛЬ? БЕСЕДА С ЮРИЕМ ФЕДОРОВЫМ @fedorovexpert

Summary of the broadcast (war crime or legitimate target)

The hosts discuss controversies within Russian emigration circles about whether attacks on targets inside Russia—particularly logistics hubs and warehouses associated with the Wildberries marketplace—can be considered legitimate military targets or war crimes. The debate is framed as a broader question of how “civilian” objects are classified under the logic of war and international norms (including references to the Geneva Conventions), and whether such classifications are meaningfully enforceable today given the lack of functioning international accountability mechanisms.

1) Lack of functioning international accountability

Fyodorov argues that there is no effectively operating international body that can credibly assess and punish alleged war crimes under the current global system:

• The UN cannot act effectively due to Security Council veto power and paralysis.
• The International Criminal Court (ICC) and related mechanisms are either not functioning as expected or are politically constrained.
• As a result, in his view, claims like “Ukraine committed a criminal act” often amount to “shaking the air” rather than producing real legal consequences.

Even so, he distinguishes between the absence of enforcement and the underlying legal/moral question: he maintains that the issue can still be assessed through national criminal law and moral/political reasoning, despite international enforcement being blocked.

2) Ukraine’s right to strike “war-sustaining” infrastructure

Fyodorov’s core position is that Ukraine has legal, political, and moral justification to strike Russian objects that help Russia wage aggression. He argues that strikes on Wildberries-type logistics warehouses can be justified because such sites may:

• Store and enable dual-use or military-related goods (e.g., components used for drones, ammunition-related materials, batteries, tactical gear).
• Operate as logistics nodes supporting the flow of resources to the Russian war effort.
• Provide economic support to the Russian state and the system enabling the war (including through taxation and procurement-related functions).

He contrasts this with arguments that the targets are merely civilian marketplaces, calling that view a misreading of how modern “consumer” infrastructure can directly support military needs.

3) Applying Russian domestic criminal-law concepts rather than international adjudication

A central analytical move in the discussion is Fyodorov’s claim that, even without international trials, actions can be evaluated under Russian criminal law:

• He frames Russia’s conduct as the crime of aggression (as defined in Article 356 of the Russian Criminal Code, per the speaker).
• He describes roles in terms of accountability: leadership figures (e.g., Putin and his circle) as organizers, fighters as perpetrators, and the broader bureaucratic apparatus—including economic actors and financiers—as enabling or aiding through provision of means.

On this basis, he argues there is no reason to treat the attacks as unjustifiable: striking infrastructure that supports aggression is portrayed as legally and morally coherent, especially if a civilian/military dual-use element is established.

4) Why disputes arose inside the Russian émigré community

The broadcast suggests that disputes about “war crimes” are not only legal, but also part of political strategy among some émigré groups:

• Fyodorov claims certain groups are trying to remain acceptable to a Russian electorate that does not want to see itself as criminally complicit.
• He suggests they aim to position themselves for future roles as negotiators/mediators with Western elites and possible post-Putin power groups.
• He argues that ordinary people may not require these intermediaries, and he criticizes assumptions that such figures will be in demand after regime change.

5) Rejecting “air truce” as a workable fix

When discussing proposals such as an air truce or limiting strikes to the immediate front, Fyodorov argues Russia refuses because:

• A pause on deep strikes would allow Ukraine to build or expand secure military production and infrastructure, including missile-related capabilities.
• If Ukraine stops hitting Russian rear targets while Russia continues attacking in Ukraine, he expects drones and other systems to be redirected more effectively to the front—thereby increasing Russian losses.
• Therefore, he argues Russia has incentives not to agree to such arrangements.

He concludes that ceasefire logic is flawed: peace is not only about sparing civilian targets in the abstract, but also about strategic and operational realities.

6) Prediction: war impacts all infrastructure and ordinary life

Fyodorov repeatedly emphasizes that if war is conducted by striking key systems, it will inevitably affect:

• power plants and substations,
• communications and data infrastructure,
• energy and heating systems, and
• civilian life through outages and winter hardships.

He cites Crimea as an example (“model”) of what these impacts look like, arguing that trying to limit war to “acceptable” targets is unrealistic.

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Main presenters / contributors

• Host/Presenter: The speaker introducing the guest on Fgenoten Life (name not clearly stated in subtitles).
• Guest/Contributor: Yuriy (Yurgenvich) Fyodorov — referred to as Yuri Evgenievich Fyodorov, linked as @fedorovexpert / “Fedorov Expert”.