Скільки заробляє monobank насправді? Банк Тігіпка і IT-компанія Гороховського

Summary

Business model and operating structure

• monobank is an app and brand, not a licensed bank. Its banking license, customer deposits, and loans sit with Serhiy Tigipko’s Universal Bank. The app, product design, customer support, and marketing are handled by the founders’ IT companies.
• The arrangement pairs two businesses: the bank provides regulated financial infrastructure, while the IT company builds and runs the customer-facing product. The companies’ exact commercial terms and revenue split are not public; Forbes has reported that the partners share the project on a roughly equal basis.
• Fintech Band was founded by former PrivatBank managers, including Oleg Horohovsky, Mykhailo Rogalsky, and Dmytro Dubilet. Dubilet later left the partnership. The IT business is now controlled by Horohovsky and Rogalsky.
• The model helped monobank grow without building a branch network or waiting for its own banking license. But it also creates mutual dependence: the bank needs the app to reach customers, while the app needs a bank to hold deposits and issue loans.

Scale and financial performance

• Monobank reportedly grew from about 5 million customers before the full-scale war to 9.9 million in autumn 2025 and 11 million in 2026.
• Universal Bank held almost UAH 150 billion in customer funds, placing it third in Ukraine by this measure, despite having no branches.
• The bank’s results were closely tied to monobank: past estimates from Tigipko and Universal Bank’s chair put mono at 80–95% of the bank’s income or profit. No newer breakdown was cited.
• For 2025, Universal Bank reported:
  • UAH 27 billion in revenue, up 40% year over year.
  • UAH 10.3 billion in net profit, about 2.5 times the prior year.
  • Roughly UAH 1,000 in annual net profit per monobank customer—a simple profit-to-customer calculation rather than disclosed customer-level economics.
• The video says Universal Bank earned UAH 5.4 billion in the first eight months of 2026, up 36%, while the wider banking system’s profit was down. It also notes that banks’ income-tax rate had risen from 25% to 50%.
• Two IT companies associated with the founders—Kilobyte 1024 and Fintech Band—reportedly made about UAH 3.25 billion combined net profit in 2025. Kilobyte alone made about UAH 2.5 billion.

How the bank earns money

Unlike many Ukrainian banks, which the video says receive much of their interest income from government bonds and National Bank certificates, monobank relies heavily on lending to individuals.

• Credit cards: Customers have up to 62 days to repay without interest. After that, the stated charge is 3.1% per month; the video explains that the bank’s annualized effective rate is 44%, rather than simply 3.1% × 12. A bank loan example showed that borrowing UAH 10,000 for a year would cost nearly UAH 14,000 to repay.
• A 2021 figure attributed to Rogalsky said only 30% of borrowers had never exceeded the grace period; the other 70% had paid interest at least once. The presenter cautions that this is an older figure and assumes the proportions may be similar today.
• Universal Bank’s consumer loan portfolio was UAH 54 billion in August of the prior year, then grew by another UAH 20 billion over the following eight months. The video reports around 4% unpaid loans, versus about 10% across banks nationally.
• Installments: The customer pays no interest, while the seller pays the bank a commission. Installment purchases, including instant installments, represented about one quarter of monobank loans in 2025. On Black Friday, the video cites 89,000 purchases at an average of UAH 13,500—over UAH 1 billion in transaction value.
• Card payments and cashback: Merchants pay a transaction commission, part of which goes to the bank. A 2021 statement from Horohovsky said monobank returned more than half of this revenue to customers as cashback and bonuses. In this account, cashback is funded by merchant fees, not simply by the bank.

Valuation, ownership, and strategic risk

• In October 2025, the U.S.-backed fund UMAIEF bought a reported stake in the Fintech IT holding at a valuation of $1 billion. Forbes reportedly put the stake at 4%, which would imply a payment of about $40 million if accurate. The video stresses that the $1 billion was an implied valuation based on a minority transaction, not a sale of the entire company.
• Universal Bank, despite earning substantially more than the IT businesses, had no comparable public valuation. Tigipko had said he would consider selling up to 10% to a strong investor, with a larger sale dependent on a better investment climate.
• The presenter identifies three reasons the IT company may be easier to sell than the bank:
  1. Regulation: Buyers of significant bank stakes require National Bank scrutiny and approval.
  2. Tax: The video contrasts the bank’s 50% tax rate with the IT company’s usual 18% rate.
  3. Transferability and perceived scalability: The bank owns Ukrainian loans and other local financial exposures; software, a team, and a brand can be presented as a technology asset with potential to scale internationally.
• The structure’s central organizational risk is shared control across two separate owners or businesses. When interests align, the partnership enables speed; when a major decision requires agreement, two equal partners can become a bottleneck. The video cites a failed 2021 sale process, reportedly due in part to the partners not reaching agreement.
• Takeaway for businesses: Distinguish profitability from sale value. Identify which assets—such as brand, software, customer relationships, or a license—could be sold or scaled independently, and clarify who owns them and who has decision rights.

International expansion and product strategy

• In 2023, monobank announced Stereo by Mono in Poland, using its technology with a local partner, Vodeno, under a banking arrangement connected to Belgium’s Aion group.
• Poland’s financial regulator warned that advertising should not mislead customers about which entity provides the service and raised concerns about the entities’ status and management. The launch was postponed indefinitely; more than 230,000 people were reportedly waiting at the time. The project remained unlaunched as of early 2026.
• Rogalsky’s stated lesson was that a future international launch should obtain its own license, rather than rely on a partner whose regulatory position may be uncertain. The video contrasts this with NovaPay’s reported decision to buy a small bank to obtain a license.
• At home, the IT company was also building products beyond core banking, including Market by Mono, payment and restaurant-tipping tools, and services for entrepreneurs. The company said UMAIEF’s investment would support small businesses and new products.

Playbooks and actionable lessons

• Partnered operating model: Combine a licensed financial institution with a specialized product and technology company to launch faster, but define commercial terms, ownership, and decision rights clearly.
• Customer monetization: Use a large deposit base to support consumer lending, while adding seller-funded installments and merchant-funded card rewards.
• Embedded distribution: Make borrowing and payments available directly in the app to reduce customer friction; monitor whether ease of use also encourages customers to carry costly debt.
• Expansion readiness: Before entering a new market, establish who legally provides the service, who manages it, and whether the licensing and advertising model satisfies the local regulator.
• Asset and exit planning: Separate operational earnings from strategic value. Make key assets—technology, brand, customer relationships, and licenses—clearly owned and transferable.

Presenters and sources mentioned

• Presenter: Andriy Polishchuk.
• Sources cited in the video: Universal Bank reporting; Forbes; analyst Andriy Shevchyshyn; statements by Serhiy Tigipko, Oleg Horohovsky, Mykhailo Rogalsky, and Universal Bank chair Iryna Starominska; UMAIEF’s announcement; and statements or warnings from Poland’s KNF regulator.