❗️ГРАБСЬКИЙ: ОПОРИ МОСТУ — НЕ ГОЛОВНА БІДА! Готують удар ПО ПРОЛЬОТАХ? Росія може ПЕРЕЙТИ НА РАКЕТИ

Overview

The speakers review multiple developments in the Russia–Ukraine war, emphasizing:

• Air and missile threats and the technologies shaping them
• Countermeasures and their effectiveness (including “double accounting” of drone outcomes)
• Ukrainian operational successes—especially around the Liman direction—while stressing constraints from secrecy and operational security
• Limits of optimism, noting fighting continues elsewhere and Russia retains offensive capability

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1) Israeli airliner hijacking account (framework of intelligence history)

• The discussion begins with a clarification of the “latest version” of a claimed Israeli intelligence narrative about an attempted hijacking of an Israeli airliner.
• In this account, a terrorist (the second pilot) allegedly kills the first pilot and tries to take control, with an intended target in Tel Aviv described in 9/11-style terms.
• The case is used to revisit how modern intelligence and counter–air terrorism capabilities were historically shaped, especially:
  • After the 1972 Munich attack
  • Through creation of specialized assault units such as “Alpha,” including Soviet counterparts

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2) Kyiv drone strikes: can drones destroy bridges?

• A key technical claim is that destroying a bridge support with drones is characterized as technically impossible or at least not feasible as a reliable method.
• Instead, drones are described as capable of:
  • Psychological effects
  • Disrupting traffic for hours
• The emphasis shifts toward persistent, cumulative damage—described as “perforation.”
  • Examples referenced include repeated attacks on bridge areas such as the Antonovsky Bridge and others.
• The speakers also note uncertainty about the enemy’s “recklessness”—i.e., willingness to expend resources on difficult, non-obvious objectives.

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3) Precision: ballistics vs drones/missiles, and countermeasure effectiveness

How accuracy is framed

• Ballistic/cruise missiles: portrayed as historically designed for nuclear delivery, where large deviations (tens to hundreds of meters) were acceptable.
• Drones: depicted as potentially more guided (and able to carry cameras), but still limited in penetrating power.

Countermeasures against missiles

• One phase is said to have involved Russian air defense shooting down all missiles in that attempt (example: 3 missiles).
• Another night is alleged to have resulted in no missiles shot down, with 10 reportedly hitting/impacting—while acknowledging that damage effectiveness may vary.

Countermeasures against drones

• Roughly half are claimed to be shot down.
• Many others are said to be suppressed via electronic warfare.
• The speakers explain a “double accounting” problem:
  • Drones may be jammed or shot down
  • Yet debris can still reach targets and trigger explosions, fires, and casualties

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4) Escalating drone threats and the “cat-and-mouse” cycle

• Kyiv is described as under siege conditions, with danger reportedly higher than in places like Odessa based on strike frequency.
• The speakers argue Kyiv’s defenses are increasingly able to defeat more jet drones.
• However, they emphasize a continuing technological competition:
  • Jet drones evolve (more speed, but higher cost and overheating issues)
  • Interceptor-type drones are then designed to catch/destroy newer jet threats
  • A cited interceptor speed is around 700 km/h

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5) FirePoint FP7 missile: purpose, range, and what it changes

• The segment highlights information that the FirePoint FP7 missile had its first combat test, supported by leadership statements and released footage.
• Operational framing:
  • FP7 is not treated as simply a “missile that hits Moscow.”
  • It is positioned as a defense/strike element targeting Iskander launcher hunting.
  • It is intended to enable fast strikes during deployment or withdrawal windows.
• Effectiveness window (quoted): approximately 5–7 minutes after readiness/arrival stages.
• Range (described as “mid-strike”): about 160–200 km, depending on launch depth and geography.

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6) Why Ukraine can’t easily develop its own medium-range ballistics (historical-industrial explanation)

The speakers answer why Ukraine allegedly cannot build its own ballistic missiles easily, arguing that missile development is not only about having “missilemen,” but also requires:

• Industrial and scientific continuity
• Specialized infrastructure and institutional knowledge

Key points:

• ICBM-like/multi-stage vs operational-tactical/single-stage: treated as different technological worlds requiring different skills and industrial capabilities.
• Over ~30 years, missile-building incentives and continuity were allegedly not maintained to allow rapid scaling during the current war.
• The discussion contrasts this with cases where capability lags behind acquisition (example used: North Korea’s missile performance).
• Precision and calibration are emphasized as the hardest parts—not basic projectile development.
• Historical analogies are used:
  • Soviet progress is described as dependent on an industrial/scientific school
  • Access to expertise (including captured/relocated specialists) is highlighted
  • Ukraine is portrayed as lacking a comparable option

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7) Operational security: silence about weapon development (Grom 2 example)

• When asked about Grom 2, the response emphasizes operational security.
• Silence is framed as purposeful protection:
  • Even partially incorrect disclosed details can help adversaries infer capabilities and limitations.
• The speakers contrast earlier public reporting that provided detailed counts after deliveries of Western systems with later reporting that includes less detail.

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8) Velyvate offensive / Liman direction lessons and the hybrid-warfare angle

• The speakers discuss reported results from a “third season” offensive in the Liman area (attributed to an operation described as Vivaldi/“Harvest”).
• They characterize it as a limited operational-tactical offensive with significant tactical/operational novelty, including:
  • Use of robots, drones, and ground robotic systems
  • Innovations involving airborne/robot delivery deep behind enemy lines
• Robots are described as operating independently to disrupt logistics and command/control before the main assault.
  • “Kamikaze” style units are referenced as an example.
• Additional themes:
  • Ukrainian skill is highlighted as more important than numbers—performing complex operations under heavy pressure.
  • Psychological effects: losing both artillery cover and defensive initiative is argued to reduce resilience.
  • Interagency cooperation is presented as a differentiator (roles attributed across Armed Forces, National Guard, and National Police), overcoming “ossified Soviet” command structures.

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9) Caution despite euphoric messaging; fighting continues elsewhere

• Even with praise for gains in Liman, the speakers stress that the broader situation remains tense.

• Continued pressure is mentioned near:

  • Dobropillya
  • Kostiantynivka
  • Chasovyar (southern flank of the discussed theater)

• They warn against overly optimistic narratives, arguing Russia still retains offensive capability.

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Presenters / contributors

• Євгеній (Evgeny) Алеkсеєвич (Evgeny Alekсееvich)
• Сергій (Sergei) Жирнов (Sergei Zhirnov)
• Сергій (Sergei) Маратович (Sergei Maratovich)
• Юрій (Yuriy) Кузьменко (Yuriy Kuzьmenko) — viewer question
• Аргил Рустам Задек (Argil Rustam Zadek) — cited external expert
• Генерал Белецький (General Beletsky) — mentioned as commander of the referenced corps
• “РПЦ/Російська Православна Церква” (Russian Orthodox Church) — mentioned as reporting about relics
• Unnamed “senior command” / “outside observer” (no additional names provided in subtitles)