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Session 26: More on acquisitions and first steps on value enhanceement
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1. Why acquisitions often fail to benefit the acquirer
The lecture argues that acquisition gains frequently flow to target-company shareholders, while the acquiring company overpays. Damodaran emphasizes several valuation rules:
- Value the target on its own merits. Use the target’s risk and cost of equity—not the acquirer’s—to assess the target.
- Do not treat the acquirer’s access to cheap debt as value belonging to the target. It is not a reason to pay the target a higher premium.
- Value synergy explicitly. A claim of “synergy” is not enough. Identify where it will appear—such as higher growth or lower costs—then estimate its effect on cash flows and risk. The acquirer should negotiate to retain some of that value rather than surrendering all of it through the purchase premium.
2. Why common acquisition arguments are unreliable
- Transaction multiples can be misleading. A sample of completed acquisitions is biased because acquirers often overpay. If multiples are used, the comparison set should be broad and differences between companies should be accounted for. Relying only on prior transaction prices risks repeating others’ mistakes.
- Accretion and dilution do not establish whether a deal is good. An acquisition can raise earnings per share and still destroy value. For example, a high-P/E acquirer buying a lower-P/E company may report higher EPS, but the target’s lower growth or higher risk does not disappear. The combined company’s valuation multiple may fall.
- A CEO’s desire to complete a deal is not evidence that it is worthwhile. The lecture notes that ego, empire-building, or compensation incentives can influence acquisition decisions.
- “Defensive” acquisitions are risky. Buying a company simply because a competitor might do so can pull the acquirer into an unattractive business and a continuing cycle of overpaying.
- The ability to walk away is essential. If the seller insists on a price that does not make sense, declining the deal may be the best outcome for the acquirer’s shareholders. Winning an auction can be a “winner’s curse”: the winner may have paid more than everyone else thought the asset was worth.
3. The HP–Autonomy example and accountability
Damodaran uses HP’s acquisition of Autonomy to illustrate how a deal can be justified with claims about rigorous valuation, accretion, and synergy, then later unwound at a large loss. In the lecture’s account, HP paid about $11.1 billion—roughly $5.2 billion above the market value—and later recorded a write-off of about $8.8 billion.
He attributes the loss to several sources: synergy that did not materialize, alleged accounting deception, and deterioration under HP’s post-acquisition management. His broader lesson is that acquisition failures often bring little accountability: dealmakers may claim credit when a deal succeeds, while responsibility is diffused when it fails.
4. Conditions that can improve the odds of acquisition success
Damodaran presents these as ways to improve the odds—not guarantees of success:
- Prefer being the sole bidder to entering a bidding war. He cites research in which bidding-war winners’ share prices performed poorly after the deal, while losing bidders did better.
- Consider private targets. Unlike public targets, they do not have a quoted market price that the buyer must typically exceed with a premium.
- Look for small targets. Even modest synergies can represent a large percentage of a small target’s value; large “mergers of equals” are harder to execute.
- Consider corporate divestitures. A company eager to sell a subsidiary—sometimes after a new CEO decides to dispose of an inherited business—may offer an opportunity to buy at an attractive price.
- Choose the payment method carefully. If the acquirer’s stock is overvalued, using it as acquisition currency may be advantageous to the acquirer. But the target may interpret a stock offer as a signal that the shares are overpriced and demand a higher premium.
- Favor concrete cost synergies over vague growth promises. Specific plans—such as closing overlapping facilities—are easier to implement and measure than general claims that a merger will “grow faster.” The lecture cites evidence that cost synergies are delivered more often than growth synergies.
- Plan for talent retention. Acquisitions made to obtain skilled people or technology can fail if those people leave once the small company is absorbed into a large organization.
- Set responsibility and stopping rules. Synergies should have owners, plans, and accountability. Acquirers also need to know when to stop buying rather than repeating an approach after it ceases to work.
5. AB InBev–SABMiller: valuing control and synergy
The lecture applies a structured valuation to AB InBev’s 2015 acquisition of SABMiller. The companies had relatively little geographic overlap, and AB InBev’s history of cost-cutting gave its synergy claims some credibility. The analysis proceeds in stages:
- Value SABMiller as a standalone business. The lecture estimates its equity value at about $51.5 billion, below its market value of roughly $75 billion. On this analysis, the deal was not justified by simple undervaluation.
- Estimate the value of running it differently. Raising margins toward AB InBev’s level produces an estimated value of about $56.2 billion—around $4.7 billion of control value, but still well short of the market price.
- Estimate merger synergy. The instructor models improvements such as cost reductions and growth opportunities from the combined business. The estimated synergy is about $14.6 billion.
- Compare the value with the price paid. AB InBev agreed to pay about $104 billion, a premium of roughly $29 billion over SABMiller’s market value. Damodaran concludes that even the estimated synergy did not justify the premium, and that AB InBev overpaid.
The figures are the instructor’s estimates and assumptions, not a claim that the precise values are certain. The general method is to separate standalone value, control value, and synergy value before deciding whether the acquisition price is justified.
6. Value enhancement versus price enhancement
The lecture distinguishes improving a company’s intrinsic value from temporarily changing its stock price. Damodaran cites studies of companies that added “.com” to their names during the dot-com boom: their share prices rose sharply despite no underlying business change. Later, companies removed “.com” when the market’s enthusiasm reversed.
The lesson is that price can move with investor psychology; value improvement requires changing the business economics.
7. Four levers for increasing company value
The central value-enhancement framework has four levers. Any restructuring proposal should ultimately affect at least one of them.
A. Increase cash flows from existing assets
Possible actions include:
- Improve efficiency and reduce costs, raising operating margins on existing revenue.
- Sell or close businesses expected to lose money indefinitely.
- Reduce taxes within the law, including through appropriate tax and transfer-pricing arrangements.
- Use existing excess capacity rather than continuing unnecessary capital investment.
- Manage working capital more effectively—for example, inventory and customer credit.
- Consider whether risk management can reduce earnings volatility and, in turn, taxes.
B. Increase value from future growth
First, compare return on capital with the cost of capital:
- If return on capital exceeds the cost of capital, growth can create value. The company may reinvest more, add projects, expand margins, improve asset turnover, or pursue acquisitions that make financial sense.
- If return on capital is below the cost of capital, growth can destroy value. The company may be better off shrinking and returning cash to shareholders rather than investing in poor projects.
The lecture discusses growth paths in roughly this order:
- Develop new products: potentially the highest-value path, but with a high risk of failure.
- Expand an existing market: for example, enter new geographies or find new uses for an existing product.
- Grow with a growing market: a company can expand even without increasing market share if the overall market is growing.
- Compete for share in a stable market: often requires price cuts, which can reduce margins and value.
- Acquire other businesses: the lecture cites historical evidence that acquisitions have often been a particularly value-destructive growth strategy.
The key is not merely to grow, but to grow in ways that earn more than the cost of the capital invested.
C. Extend the period of high growth
A company can add value by maintaining returns above its cost of capital for longer. In practice, this means building or strengthening barriers to competition and sustaining competitive advantages, rather than simply extending a forecast period in a spreadsheet.
The lecture names several possible advantages:
- Brand strength
- Legal protection, such as patents—while recognizing that regulated protection can come with limits on pricing power
- Switching costs: make it easy for customers to adopt a product, but difficult to leave it
- Cost advantages: use lower costs either to compete aggressively or to earn higher margins
D. Reduce the cost of capital
Ways to lower the cost of capital include:
- Choose an appropriate mix of debt and equity.
- Make products or services less discretionary, which can reduce business risk.
- Match debt to the company’s assets and cash flows—for example, align currency and maturity—and use swaps or other derivatives to reduce mismatches.
- Make operating costs more flexible. High fixed costs create operating leverage and can increase beta; greater flexibility can reduce risk.
8. Closing themes
Acquisitions should be treated like exceptionally large capital-budgeting decisions: mistakes can affect a company for years. Damodaran’s overall advice is to be disciplined about price, quantify and assign responsibility for synergies, avoid bidding wars, and remain willing to walk away.
In value enhancement more broadly, growth is not automatically valuable. A smaller company that returns cash to shareholders can sometimes serve owners better than one that expands into low-return investments.
Speakers and sources
Speakers
- Aswath Damodaran — instructor and primary speaker.
- Students identified by name in the subtitles: Dave, Conrad, Bill, Laura, Tim, Pablo, Jeff, and David. Their brief contributions are mainly questions or comments; the subtitles do not provide their full names.
Studies, analyses, and examples mentioned
- An unnamed 2011 study comparing acquiring-company stock performance for winners and losers in bidding wars.
- A late-1990s study titled “A Rose by Any Other Name” on companies adding “.com” to their names, and an unnamed 2003–2004 follow-up on companies removing it.
- McKinsey research on how often announced cost and growth synergies were achieved, and research comparing the value created by different growth strategies.
- Damodaran’s own analyses of HP–Autonomy and AB InBev–SABMiller, including a referenced blog post on the latter.
- Company examples discussed include Walmart–Flipkart, Facebook–Instagram, Disney–Pixar, Cisco, Tata Motors–Jaguar Land Rover, Apple, Eastman Kodak–Sterling Drugs, Microsoft, and Saudi Aramco.
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