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15,000 Broke the USSR. Why Haven't 400,000 Broken Putin?

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Host Constantine argues that Russia’s much higher reported losses in Ukraine have not produced the kind of public political reckoning associated with the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan because the two wars unfolded under very different political systems.

The Soviet–Afghan War

Constantine recalls that the Soviet Union disclosed its Afghanistan losses in 1988, after years of secrecy: 13,310 dead, 35,478 wounded, and 311 missing. He argues that the war did not, by itself, cause the USSR’s collapse. Stagnation, an ineffective command economy, political rigidity, and national tensions had already weakened the country. However, the war accelerated the loss of public faith in the Communist Party, the military, and the Soviet Union’s ability to project power. Gorbachev-era glasnost also allowed criticism to reach a national audience.

Russia’s response to losses in Ukraine

By contrast, Constantine says, Putin’s Russia has suppressed public opposition and made military service more transactional. He cites leaked records suggesting more than 400,000 Russian deaths in Ukraine, while emphasizing that reported losses have not generated mass protest.

Recruitment bonuses, salaries, and death benefits can provide struggling families with significant sums, while the human cost falls disproportionately on poorer regions and communities far from Moscow and St. Petersburg. State propaganda frames soldiers’ deaths as patriotic sacrifice. Laws punishing criticism, fear of reprisal, and public disengagement further limit collective protest.

Constantine cites a Levada Center poll reporting that 69% support the military’s actions, 65% favor negotiations, and 26% want the fighting to continue. He argues that declared support for the military and a desire to continue the war are not the same thing.

Economic pressures and political risks

Constantine contends that the more serious pressure on Putin’s system may come from the war’s cumulative economic costs. Deaths, injuries, mobilization, and emigration have reduced the available workforce amid an existing demographic decline. The state must also continue paying recruitment bonuses, military salaries, and compensation; replacing weapons and equipment; and supporting wounded veterans and their families.

He cites official budget figures showing a growing deficit and says defense and internal security together account for about 44% of federal spending. In his view, the resulting competition for resources threatens civilian services, regional budgets, and the state’s ability to maintain elite loyalty.

Constantine identifies the central political risk not simply as the death toll, but as a failure to deliver a convincing victory after the Kremlin has justified the sacrifices by promising success. Because Putin personally launched the invasion and defined its aims, a disappointing outcome could sharpen disputes among military leaders, security officials, regional authorities, and business interests.

He points to the 2023 Prigozhin mutiny as evidence that tensions within the system can sometimes become open confrontation. However, he cautions that elite disagreement does not automatically lead to regime collapse; it could instead provoke greater repression.

Veterans’ return to civilian life

The return of large numbers of veterans is another long-term concern. Constantine expects many to face injuries, psychological trauma, difficulty finding civilian work, and strained family circumstances.

He cites official reporting that about 57% of veterans who had left the military found employment, as well as research suggesting that employers may be reluctant to interview applicants who disclose voluntary service in Ukraine. The Kremlin’s “Time of Heroes” program seeks to bring selected veterans into public life, but Constantine expects many more to feel abandoned than to be integrated into the system.

Possible futures

Constantine lays out three possible futures:

  1. Authoritarian endurance: Putin remains in power through repression, propaganda, and financial incentives, while Russia becomes poorer and more militarized.
  2. A negotiated end followed by stagnation: The Kremlin presents a settlement as victory, but sanctions, labor shortages, demographic decline, and veteran-related costs continue to weigh on the country.
  3. A regime crisis: Military setbacks and economic pressures weaken confidence among influential groups, potentially leading to public disagreements, disobedience in the security apparatus, or competing centers of power. Constantine considers this the most likely scenario, though he stresses that none is inevitable.

Constantine distinguishes a possible end to Putin’s political system from the breakup of Russia itself, saying that regime change would not automatically cause territorial fragmentation. His central conclusion is that wars become politically transformative when they erode the institutions, resources, and loyalties that sustain a system—not simply when they kill large numbers of soldiers.

During the later livestream discussion, Constantine also claimed that a Ukrainian missile strike had brought down an arch of the Kerch Bridge and disrupted traffic. This was a separate current-events aside, rather than part of the main historical comparison.

Presenters and contributors

  • Constantine — Host of Inside Russia; surname not stated.
  • An unnamed professor from the University of Southern California — Prompted the central question and discussed Russia with Constantine.
  • An unnamed Soviet television news anchor — Appears in archival footage about the Afghanistan withdrawal.

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