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Overview: A new “stage” in Black Sea pressure

The broadcast argues that Ukraine’s long-running campaign against Russian maritime logistics is moving into a new “stage” in the Black Sea, building on earlier pressure in the Sea of Azov. The speakers frame these actions as part of two strategic goals:

1. Weaken Russia’s military-economic capacity by disrupting exports of grain and oil and the infrastructure that supports them.
2. Isolate Crimea so Russia can’t effectively use it for defense and operations in southern Ukraine.

What the operation is said to be doing (strategic/operational framing)

• Ukraine’s unmanned systems (naval/air) and naval forces are described as systematically striking Russian ships, especially oil tankers, ferries, patrol vessels, and other “vulnerable” assets.
• The expert claims that from mid-2025 to mid-2026 (until June) the number of strikes on Crimea and nearby infrastructure reportedly doubled.
  • Initial focus is said to have been on destroying or degrading air-defense and key energy/functional facilities.
  • The claimed purpose is to make subsequent strikes into previously defended zones easier.
• After air-defense degradation, the broadcast describes a shift toward disrupting supply, electricity, and bridge-related support for Crimea, including real-time monitoring of these effects.

Claimed results in the Sea of Azov

• The expert asserts that Ukraine recorded 116 hits over 9 days in the Sea of Azov, mostly against oil-related shipping.
• The operation is described as achieving a high proportion of intended effects, estimating ~85–90% effectiveness against key targets.
• The argument is that these strikes reduce Russia’s ability to maneuver and sustain maritime flow, temporarily removing tankers from service for weeks to months (repairs are possible but costly and time-consuming).

“Second stage” in the Black Sea: cutting maritime communications

The broadcast claims the operation entered a Black Sea phase marked by 20 new hits, with 17 reportedly against oil tankers.

The emphasis is on approaches to the Kerch Strait and logistics nodes connected to Russian export routes:

• Oil transshipment and loading areas near Kerch/Taman
• Ports such as Kavkaz, Anapa, Novorossiysk, and other nearby points

The speaker argues that oil transported from the Sea of Azov toward ports like Novorossiysk/Toapse/Anapa passes through large transshipment volumes, so disrupting these “chokepoints” would be a serious blow.

A key claim is that ~40% of Russia’s grain and oil exports are carried through the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, so cutting maritime communications is meant to hit Russia’s export revenue (“petrodollars”) and thus its capacity to sustain the war.

Reported Russian reaction and expected “follow-on effects”

• The broadcast says Russia’s information response appears unusually strong, citing Sergey Lavrov describing Ukrainian actions as “worse than piracy,” framing Ukraine as destroying shipping rather than taking it.
• The expert links this to suspected operational effects:
  • Intensification of attacks on Odessa, described as an “emotional reaction” alongside attempts to adapt at sea.
• The forecast is that Russia may try to strengthen defenses, but the speaker argues such improvements are limited.

Why the expert says Russian protection is unlikely to work

The argument is that Russia has:

• Insufficient ability to defend maritime communications from unmanned and air threats
• Ships that are not well suited for protecting tanker and transshipment areas

Additional operational factors mentioned:

• In the Azov Sea, depth and navigation constraints force ships into more predictable routes, making targeting easier.
• In the Black Sea, variability is higher, but the speaker still expects Ukraine’s forces to be effective.

Examples are also cited where Russian patrol/border assets are portrayed as unable to respond effectively to drone attacks.

Legal and international-law justification (maritime actions)

The broadcast includes a detailed legal argument that Ukraine’s strikes are framed as lawful self-defense / permissible maritime actions:

• Ukraine is said to have closed certain ports (e.g., Berdyansk, Mariupol, Crimean ports) and claims Russia’s use of them is illegal, therefore strikes on ships involved in that trade are justified.
• The speaker claims international law permits action in the aggressor’s territorial sea and in open sea / waters beyond territorial seas, referencing constraints and rules under the law of the sea.
• It also asserts that Russia’s actions against shipping near Odessa are described as illegitimate aggression, not “symmetry.”

Potential expansion: Baltic Sea and long-range pressure

The expert argues that if maritime communications can be disrupted elsewhere, the effect could become “final,” citing:

• Baltic Sea operations and legally argued strike options (territorial sea vs. open waters)
• Strategic/ethical restraint as a reason Ukraine may avoid escalating against Baltic states’ critical interests

The broadcast also mentions other possible alternatives for Russia’s trade routes (e.g., rail/road or northern routes), but argues they do not remove the impact of maritime disruption.

Nuclear-related claims (“Operation Spider”)

The broadcast asserts that Russia periodically signals readiness to use nuclear weapons and suggests Ukraine may be working on plans to strike Russian nuclear delivery capabilities to reduce the perceived ability to launch nuclear attacks.

Potential focus areas discussed include:

• Submarine forces
• Missile-carrying platforms
• Other nuclear delivery assets

These are framed as defensive necessity, not escalation beyond the claimed legality.

Presenters / contributors

• Vasyl Pykhno (host/presenter)
• Stepan Yakym’yak (retired captain, military-science candidate, associate professor, expert at the Center for Defense Strategies)