Захар Прилепин | Назад в СССР или вперед к царю: какой миф нам пытаются продать вместо правды?

Overview

The discussion centers on Zakhar Prilepin’s argument that Russia is in an “ideological crisis” after the failure of a Western-oriented liberal model. He contends that the current Russian establishment still aims to preserve “liberal-bourgeois achievements,” but lacks a coherent state identity. As a result, it compensates with symbolic and selectively used historical or ideological themes.

Main arguments and analyses

Russia’s elites need a new identity, but avoid real ideological change

• Prilepin argues the West no longer accepts Russia as part of its liberal project, forcing a search for identity.
• However, he says the ruling elite does not want to adopt a genuine alternative paradigm—whether Soviet, left, Eurasian, or monarchist—because such change could threaten stability and established interests.

“Liberal-bourgeois with inertia”: imperial elements without “imperial positioning”

Prilepin characterizes the system as liberal-bourgeois in practice, with only an “inertia” of imperial behavior rather than an explicit ideological commitment to empire.

• The state, in his view, emphasizes legal continuity with the USSR while politically keeping distance.
• It selectively retains certain “red” symbols—especially victory in 1945—while removing much of the rest.

Neo-Soviet and other nostalgic rhetorics as selective/instrumental

He claims ideologues highlight fragments of the Soviet legacy—such as:

• a welfare state
• administrative strength
• anti-oligarch redistribution

—but primarily to participate in elections or gain leverage, not to restore a holistic left project.

He also argues the establishment uses ideological “backdrops” (e.g., Scythians/Huns/Eurasianism, monarchist–Orthodox themes) without serious commitment.

Why leftist ideology is allegedly suppressed

A key claim is that the liberal-bourgeois establishment fears a unified left coalition that could win elections and potentially trigger:

• property audits, and/or
• a return to a left-wing Soviet-style order

In his view, the left is kept from forming a cohesive political platform because it remains electorally dangerous.

Anti-colonialism as an imitative “cover,” not true anti-colonial action

Prilepin argues Russia’s anti-colonial rhetoric often functions mainly as:

• messaging for conferences and publicity

rather than genuine anti-colonial revolutionary politics.

He contrasts this with what he describes as Western manipulation and the interests of the global “business establishment.”

Proposed “real” ideology for the establishment: liberal-bourgeois + anti-colonialism

Prilepin suggests the only ideology exportable by the current elite is an unspoken liberal-bourgeois worldview paired with anti-colonial messaging.

His metaphor is that many “socialist/communist” regimes abroad still contain capitalist elements. The core commonality, he argues, is:

• defending independence from the U.S.
• keeping a bourgeois system intact
• challenging Western dominance

Rejection of hopes that Russia will become a hub for Western conservatives

He criticizes the notion that disillusioned European “conservative” forces will migrate to or be attracted to Russia.

• Prilepin’s view: Russia is not truly conservative.
• He also argues outsiders would not realistically settle there due to adaptation barriers and because the ideology is portrayed as “imitative,” weakening the pitch.

Critique of Western “conservative values” branding and of Russia’s lack of a theoretical foundation

Prilepin argues ideology must be supported by an exportable theory and concrete conditions—not merely slogans like “conservative values.”

• He claims Russia’s messaging lacks consistent doctrine.
• It often reduces to elite-level bargaining (“profitable to trade with us”) instead of offering a compelling political program.

Strategy in the post-Soviet space: dependence on intermediaries and mismanagement

He argues Russia over-relies on intermediaries (citing examples tied to anti-Russian influence) and assumes control that does not materialize.

Broader claim:

• informational influence is shaped by the West
• Russia pays the price through failed or reversed outcomes in former Soviet republics

“Time of Heroes” as imitation; concern about real personnel selection and nepotism

Prilepin claims the recruitment pipeline tied to SVO-veterans and the “heroes” framing often amounts to simulated selection rather than genuine formation of a new political stratum.

• He argues the system prefers dynasties, so even SVO-linked candidates do not automatically translate into real power formation due to bureaucratic self-interest.
• He further argues that genuine veterans and people with a strong “sense of justice” are socially and politically dangerous to the current setup because they could challenge liberal/Westernist views inside institutions (e.g., universities, cultural training).

Historical/political worldview

• He asserts that the USSR’s collapse ended with the “death of the Red Idea” and created conditions favorable to today’s elites.
• He also offers a broad argument about how the U.S./West gained dominance through violence, economic advantage, and post-WWII advantages that undermined socialist competition—plus Hollywood/branding that “aged up” their historical legitimacy.

Overall takeaway

Prilepin depicts Russia’s political establishment as caught between:

• preserving liberal-bourgeois interests, and
• using selective ideological myths

He argues that a genuine left revival threatens elite property arrangements, so the system favors fragmented, imitative messaging over coherent ideology and real political reform. He also claims internal governance is constrained by nepotism and a simulated “heroism/veterans” renewal.

Presenters / contributors

• Maxim Nevenchi — host/interviewer
• Zakhar Prilepin — guest (writer, public military figure, Telegram author)