John Mearsheimer: All-Out War in the Middle East & Trump's War on Russia

Overview

John Mearsheimer (interviewed by Glenn) argues that the U.S.-Iran conflict is rapidly expanding into a wider regional war. He also contends that—contrary to U.S. expectations—the United States lacks a coherent “theory of victory.” Finally, he links the Iran crisis to broader failures in U.S. strategy and to increased cooperation among Iran, Russia, and China.

Iran war: “horizontal escalation” and pressure on global oil routes

The interview describes an ongoing escalation in Iran’s regional conflict with the U.S., including attacks that broaden across multiple neighboring states (e.g., Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, and involvement associated with Yemen/Saudi Arabia).

Interference with oil shipping through key chokepoints and ports

A major operational theme is disrupting oil shipping through critical choke points and ports:

• Mearsheimer emphasizes that Iran (and/or allied groups such as the Houthis) could disrupt exports by targeting or shutting down flow through:
  • Fujairah (UAE)
  • Yanbu (Saudi Red Sea port)
• He argues that even if Bab al-Mandab isn’t fully closed, Iran could still choke Saudi exports by striking Yanbu.
• He also claims oil flow from Fujairah has already been cut.

Escalation spreading geographically

He characterizes the current phase as escalation occurring more horizontally than vertically—widening the conflict geographically rather than relaunching a larger air-war.

U.S. strategy critique: blockade/tit-for-tat have “not worked” and coercive leverage is lacking

Mearsheimer claims the U.S. (particularly under Trump) does not have a credible path to victory.

The June 17 memorandum as effectively a surrender

• He frames the June 17 memorandum of understanding as effectively a surrender by the U.S., arguing Iran “won” the 14 points while the U.S. lost.

No restoration of leverage afterward

Since then, he argues the U.S. has not restored leverage:

• The reimposed blockade resembles a previous blockade that allegedly failed (April 13–June 17).
• The ongoing tit-for-tat bombing campaign lacks evidence of U.S. superiority; Iran is described as striking regional targets and disrupting shipping successfully.

No plausible better outcome

He concludes there is no credible explanation for how renewed blockade or tit-for-tat will produce a better deal than the June agreement.

Iranian strategy: hardliners, bargaining power, and an endgame likely—but on Iran’s terms

From Iran’s perspective, Mearsheimer argues bargaining is driven by leverage accumulation as the war continues.

• He claims internal Iranian “hardliners” gained the upper hand after the June 17 deal, reducing incentives for Iran to return quickly to negotiations on U.S.-friendly terms.
• He suggests Iran expects the U.S. to become more economically and politically desperate over time, strengthening Iran’s ability to demand deeper concessions.
• He interprets Trump’s threats (e.g., attacking bridges and power stations) as evidence the U.S. feels pressure to end the conflict, citing munitions limits as a constraint.
• He warns that as escalation rises, Iran can retaliate broadly in ways the U.S. lacks dominance over—especially through oil-shipping chokepoints whose disruption would harm the world economy.

Wider consequences: U.S. credibility and alliance dynamics; Europe/NATO and the Russia war narrative

Impact on U.S. basing and Gulf alliances

He argues a Gulf “defeat” would have major consequences for U.S. basing and alliance structure in the Persian Gulf.

Europe/NATO and Ukraine

• He claims the Iran crisis has not yet definitively weakened NATO/Europe on the Ukraine track, pointing to European and NATO engagement in mid-2026.

East Asia deterrence posture

• He argues the U.S. has already reduced its deterrence posture in East Asia by shifting assets away from the region during the Middle East crisis.

The Western narrative about Ukraine

• He says Western propaganda emphasizes drone effectiveness and suggests Russians are in deep trouble.
• He counters that, on the battlefield, Russians are winning and Ukrainians are in desperate straits.
• In his view, drones keep Ukrainians going, but do not necessarily change the strategic outcome.

Russia-Ukraine: sanctions + long-range drone campaign aimed at Russian economy and prestige

Mearsheimer describes a Western escalation effort combining:

• expanded drone support (including European industrial capacity for producing drones), and
• a renewed push for sanctions targeting the Russian economy (citing a bill favored by Trump, though described as watered down).

He argues Western decision-making is driven by the belief that they are “winning,” expecting economic and political effects to undermine Putin and Russia’s great-power status. He emphasizes that battlefield reality matters most and asserts Russia maintains the advantage.

NATO/EU involvement in drone attacks: integrated “de facto” alignment with Ukraine

When asked about NATO involvement in strikes on Russia, he reframes the issue:

• He argues Russia attacked Ukraine in 2022 in part because it feared Ukraine becoming effectively part of NATO.
• He claims the West and Ukraine are increasingly “intermingled” militarily and politically (including intelligence sharing, integration, and weapons production).
• His broader point is that, from Russia’s viewpoint, the West is directly involved even without formal NATO/EU membership.

Russia’s end goals: more territory and a more dysfunctional Ukraine

Mearsheimer argues his earlier prediction remains: the war will end with Russia conquering substantial territory, while Ukraine emerges as a dysfunctional rump state.

He claims incentives push Russia toward:

• taking additional regions beyond the four oblasts,
• capturing Odessa, and
• ensuring Ukraine has no usable Black Sea ports.

He emphasizes that while Russia’s ability to take more territory at acceptable cost is uncertain, Russia has strong incentives to try. He adds that avoiding a “deal” aligns with the goal of wrecking Ukraine as much as possible.

Why the U.S. “lost” the Iran war: Hormuz control + improved Iranian missile/drone capability

Mearsheimer argues Iran’s success comes from two main factors:

1. Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, preventing the U.S. from reopening it.
2. A major advantage in ballistic missiles and drones, improved after a prior conflict (referencing a 12-day war in June 2025).

He claims Western assumptions underestimated both:

• how formidable Iran’s missile/drone inventory is, and
• how many weapons are reaching targets.

Geostrategic result: Iran-Russia-China coordination increases; the U.S. gets “pinned down”

Mearsheimer argues that before February 28, incentives for Iran, Russia, and China to coordinate existed but were constrained by differing priorities. After the Iran war begins, he claims incentives increase substantially:

• Russia and China help Iran with intelligence and military equipment.
• The longer the U.S. remains stuck fighting in the Middle East, the more that benefits Russia and China.

He also argues China would prefer the U.S. remain pinned in the Middle East rather than fully pivot to East Asia—and that the same logic applies to Russia’s Ukraine position.

Nuclear deterrence: warning that pressure and humiliation risk catastrophe

Across the final sections, Mearsheimer argues that escalation—especially “backing a nuclear power into a corner”—reduces the possibility of negotiation and increases the risk of major war.

• He contrasts this with Cold War thinking, asserting the West today does not sufficiently respect nuclear deterrence and red lines.
• He argues the West misunderstands deterrence: efforts to coerce Russia (via drones, sanctions, and military pressure) will likely trigger further escalation (carrying forward a Caraganov-style logic), rather than produce capitulation.

Presenters / contributors

• John Mearsheimer (Professor)
• Glenn (interviewer / host; named “Glenn” in the subtitles)