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VPN блокируют по-новому. Насколько близка изоляция Рунета? | Климарев
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The episode is a quarterly/regular-style discussion about the tightening of control over the Russian internet. It focuses on new blocking techniques aimed at VPNs and the broader implications for “Runet isolation.” The speakers argue that Russia is no longer merely blocking websites and applications; instead, it is systematically attacking the infrastructure that enables “free” access—while also building mechanisms that can support censorship and surveillance at scale.
They also cover:
- DNS / DNS-over-HTTPS blocking
- Changes in Russian crypto regulation and what they mean for control and payments
1) Intensification of VPN Blocking (and Why It’s Getting Harder)
The speakers claim authorities have learned and adapted their VPN-blocking methods over time, leading to:
- More VPNs being blocked
- Escalating intensity of blockages
They describe a “cat and mouse” dynamic:
- When VPN providers adapt, blocks often reappear shortly after as the state updates detection mechanisms and blacklists.
A key element is that blocking increasingly targets VPN infrastructure at the:
- IP address
- Hosting-provider level rather than only at the level of individual services.
2) A “Gray IP Database” and Pressure on Providers (“Directly Shrink the Territory”)
Klimarov claims access—through operator leaks and personal connections—to a database called the Unified Duty Base (UDB). It is described as:
- Lists of IP addresses associated with “VPN gray zone” behavior.
The described workflow:
- Authorities identify which autonomous systems / providers the flagged IPs belong to.
- They block entire provider networks, not just single addresses.
- Providers hosting VPN infrastructure are repeatedly targeted until VPN operators migrate elsewhere.
The implication is that this process is:
- Ongoing
- Increasingly consistent
- Supported by dedicated monitoring/analytics capabilities
3) Pressure on IT Companies Through Incentives Tied to Accredited Status
The discussion references earlier actions attributed to Minister Maxim/Shadayev (described by the speaker as “digital degradation”). The claim is that pressure was applied to major IT companies to remove malware access.
The enforcement mechanism described:
- Losing “accredited IT company” status affects military deferments for employees.
- This creates strong incentives to comply.
The broader argument: enforcement relies not only on technical blocking, but also on state-backed incentives.
4) Moving From Application-Level Blocking to Infrastructure-Level Blocking (DNS Focus)
A major shift is described: blocking efforts are moving “up the stack”, from application-level measures to infrastructure-level controls.
A focus is on attempts to block:
- DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH)
- Encrypted DNS methods
Reasoning given:
- Encrypted DNS reduces visibility into which domains are queried.
- If visibility drops, the state allegedly responds by blocking DoH endpoints/services (with Google/Cloudflare mentioned in passing).
5) Certificate / PKI Issues: Distrust, “National Certification Centers,” and Potential Interception Logic
The speakers argue that increased use of encryption (e.g., HTTPS) makes traditional DPI-style blocking harder, because censors may only see that encryption occurred—not the destination/content.
They discuss efforts related to:
- Russian-focused certificate authority / certificate regulation
Key claims include:
- Russia allegedly does not rely on the certificates trusted by mainstream browser/OS ecosystems.
- The system could potentially allow Russia to issue certificates that enable interception/inspection while still making traffic appear legitimate.
Klimarov links this to legal frameworks that, in the speakers’ view, make Russian authorities potentially untrustworthy to international certification ecosystems—requiring workarounds, including attempts to emulate trusted roots.
They also suggest that Western sanctions are used as an excuse, but that the infrastructure groundwork was allegedly started earlier.
6) “Whitelists” and Likely Differences Between Mobile vs. Fixed Networks
The speakers say whitelisting (allowing only approved resources) is appearing on some fixed-line operators and could expand during politically sensitive periods.
They also discuss how mobile and fixed networks may differ:
- Mobile operators may use more DPI-like/optimization equipment due to constraints of spectrum and centralized limitations.
- Fixed-line networks are described as more distributed, potentially offering resilience, but possibly enabling different approaches to whitelisting.
7) AI / Surveillance Claim: Not Necessarily Real-Time AI, But Storage and Search
In response to a question about whether AI is needed to monitor massive data, Klimarov argues:
- Advanced AI is not strictly required.
- Data can be stored and searched later/queried as needed.
- Existing search/relevance systems (compared to Yandex-style approaches) may be sufficient for extracting information.
He claims Russia is building:
- Data center and archiving capacity for correspondence/communications “just in case.”
He also contrasts this with the idea that Russia is excluded from global frontier AI hardware supply chains, limiting “sovereign AI” at the frontier level.
8) “Sovereign AI” Is Unlikely: Hardware Shortage and Hyperscalers
The speakers argue Russia cannot realistically match frontier AI due to:
- Lack of GPUs/accelerators
- Difficulty scaling hardware imports
They reference hyperscaler models (infrastructure providers) and speculate why Russian companies might struggle to replicate these systems under current constraints.
Example cited:
- Even a single major data center abroad reportedly uses far more GPUs than the total accessible supply available in Russia (as described by the speaker).
9) Crypto Regulation: Law Becomes More “Legal,” but Control Remains
The second half shifts to crypto regulation. The claim is that a federal law took effect on September 1, changing how crypto is regulated.
The argument presented:
- Crypto is becoming more “legal” in form.
- But in Russia, “what is legal is controlled,” meaning monitoring and oversight remain.
They connect the shift to practical needs:
- Under sanctions, crypto is hard to stop because blockchains are distributed.
Key points:
- States can’t fully ban crypto networks; they can restrict chokepoints (e.g., exchanges, trackers).
- Centralized gateways are easier to regulate than decentralized blockchain itself.
10) Digital Ruble Critique: Not Blockchain, but Strong Central Control via “Smart Conditions”
The speakers contrast cryptocurrencies with Russia’s digital ruble, described as:
- Not a blockchain
- Fully issued/controlled by the central bank
They claim digital rubles can include “smart contract” conditions restricting spending—for example:
- Only on certain stores/platforms
Core warning:
- If central authorities change conditions opportunistically, citizens could lose effective freedom over their funds.
11) Risks of Centralized Exchanges: Custody vs. Non-Custody Wallets
A human-rights organization is mentioned as having published claims about Binance leaking data tied to a crypto-related criminal case. The speaker notes uncertainty and that the claims are based on what authorities allege.
Advice given:
- Avoid centralized exchanges (custodial platforms)
- Avoid custody wallets
Explained distinction:
- Custodial wallet: the exchange can identify the user and may comply with legal demands.
- Non-custodial wallet: the user controls the seed phrase; identity is not inherently attached to on-chain transactions.
They also mention the danger of losing seed phrases (including an anecdote about losing access after early Bitcoin mining due to disk failure).
Presenters / Contributors
- Grigory Fralov (Transit channel host)
- Mikhail Klimarv (Head of the Internet Protection Society; Executive Director of VPN Generator)