Rafał Ziemkiewicz: nadchodzi największa zmiana od 2005 roku? Czego nie rozumieją Tusk i Kaczyński?

Overview

Rafał Ziemkiewicz argues that Polish politics may be approaching a genuinely large shift—potentially the biggest since 2005. However, he emphasizes that this does not necessarily produce a brand-new political “system.” Instead, it is likely to generate new waves of leadership responding to deeper structural transformations.

Main thesis: the “wave” is historical, not party-driven

Ziemkiewicz frames politics as something like surfers catching waves: parties rise or fall depending on whether they can respond to incoming historical currents.

He claims a generational and civilizational reset is underway because the long post-2000 consensus—“liberal democracy + the free market is eternal and there’s nothing new to invent”—has broken down.

He points to multiple shocks as proof that the world has become unrecognizable compared with just 10–20 years ago, including:

• COVID-19
• the war in Ukraine
• Trump’s return to political prominence
• rapid technological change, especially AI

Why the old European and political model is breaking down

He argues that EU institutions have become ineffective and internally contradictory:

• Formally, the EU presents itself as “community.”
• In practice, it operates like a marketplace dominated by large states, especially Germany.

He also says Poland mistakenly treated EU and Euro-Atlantic integration as a guarantee of prosperity and security “on autopilot.” In his view, the EU increasingly delivers costs, such as:

• directives and regulatory burdens
• ETS / Green Deal–style constraints
• immigration-related outcomes
• expensive compliance requirements

“EU as a bank loan” metaphor

Ziemkiewicz uses an analogy: Poland benefited from investment and access to the common market, but now it is being asked to accept new constraints tied to EU priorities—without meaningful Polish influence.

Loss of the EU as a stabilizer

He claims the EU no longer functions as a stabilizer of shared interests. Instead, major players override rules when convenient—for example, in relation to Schengen decisions.

Social consequences: the transformation and “two worlds” division

He argues that Poland’s economic growth after 2004 came with a high social cost:

• increased inequality
• social regression
• a Darwinian market model that favored elites and left many behind

He describes Polish elites as broadly split into:

1. An “elite” that sees itself as superior and embedded in power structures—likened to a “postcolonial comprador” type serving outside interests.
2. Ordinary citizens, who feel development is blocked and opportunities are distributed unfairly.

He also claims that much of the transformation was designed to convert nomenklatura power into wealth, creating a long-term mechanism of control through:

• banks
• courts
• state institutions

Why PiS lost (in his interpretation) and what might replace it

Ziemkiewicz says PiS lost power partly because it failed to understand the political environment and society’s motivations.

He portrays Polish political life as detached from real public demand:

• “the political class” allegedly lives in a bubble
• it allegedly commissions research that confirms its assumptions

He also argues that PiS’s narrative strategy has become sterile and increasingly myth-based—for instance, relying on Smolensk symbolism as a core political resource.

Possible “new quality” in leadership: Morawiecki vs. Nawrocki

Morawiecki (Mateusz Morawiecki)

He suggests Mateusz Morawiecki could represent a more pragmatic alternative due to:

• governance experience
• an image of competence / technocratic management

However, Ziemkiewicz doubts Morawiecki’s capacity as a “leader” in the charismatic sense. He frames Morawiecki more as an administrator than a revolutionary narrative-builder.

Nawrocki (Karol Nawrocki)

He presents Karol Nawrocki as having genuine political charisma, partly because he avoids being pulled into the personal-conflict style associated with Tusk while still aligning with the anti-Tusk direction that voters want.

At the same time, he frames Nawrocki’s role as partly electoral-maximizing—for example, “overthrow Tusk” as a unifying message—rather than presenting a fully articulated new governing program.

Prospect of a major change: whether a new deal is possible

Ziemkiewicz argues Poland shows strong hunger for change. He claims that when a society wants “a new deal/story,” a new leader eventually appears—sometimes unexpectedly.

He stresses that it is difficult to “map” demand for an emerging political phenomenon until it enters the “market” (in his surfing/wave analogy).

Overall, he repeatedly returns to the idea that:

history’s direction has shifted, and old certainties can no longer anchor politics.

Presenters / contributors

• Rafał Ziemkiewicz (guest, interview subject)
• Host / interviewer (name not clearly present; subtitles reference “Rafał” and “open channel,” but no explicit host name is given)