Стоит ли идти на выборы и за кого голосовать? | Максим Кац на Breakfast Show

Maxim Katz on Participating in September Elections

Maxim Katz argues that Russians should participate in the upcoming elections (held in September) as the safest and most legitimate way to express opposition to Putin and the regime—especially since opposition and previously politically inactive liberals may turn out this time.

He emphasizes that in authoritarian systems the outcome is typically predetermined, but elections still matter because they function as a “demonstration” to both elites and citizens that leadership control remains intact.

Key Points and Reasoning

Vote participation is necessary—even if the system is rigged

Katz’s long-standing position (since 2011) is that people should go vote when there is a legal, safe way to oppose the system. He rejects a “don’t participate” stance, which he sees as spreading in online discussions.

Even in a rigged system, participation can be the safest form of opposition where legal participation is possible.

The main political axis is war

He claims that nearly all parties occupy a spectrum where most are effectively pro-war, with Yabloko at the anti-war end. Therefore:

• If voters oppose the war, Katz argues they should vote for Yabloko.
• If Yabloko is unacceptable, he suggests “new people,” though he considers this option much worse.

Registration status is uncertain (Yabloko / “Apple”)

Katz highlights legal maneuvering and uncertainty around candidate lists. He notes:

• Competitors’ lists are being removed.
• Timing depends on lawsuits and an approximately 10-day window after registration actions.
• There are regional examples of lists being removed and the possibility of an additional legal challenge.

Why elections still matter in an authoritarian setup

Katz explains that authorities care less about whether people agree with leadership and more that they appear not to be against the system.

He suggests authorities need one of two things:

• Low turnout and very high ruling-party percentages, or
• A “plausible” result that preserves the illusion of control.

The only scenario that could create real political shock

He argues that real shock would occur only if independent results in localities diverge sharply from official projections. He compares this to Belarus in 2020, where many people could tell Lukashenko lost even without observers.

His key idea:

• If authorities’ projected victory collapses in genuinely counted precincts, the deception could become too visible to ignore.

But he doubts Russian society will defend its vote

Katz contrasts Russia with Belarus. He believes Russians currently face:

• Fatigue and hopelessness
• Uncertainty about whether individual actions can influence anything

His expectation is that, for now, many will at most cast protest ballots (safe participation), while more dangerous resistance is less likely until deception becomes undeniable.

How protests might emerge after the vote

He argues protest determination typically begins only when people feel their voices were ignored.

Unlike 2011—when experts assumed protests were impossible—he suggests:

• If results are clearly falsified and citizens recognize the fraud, protest energy could grow afterward.

Campaign / Tactics Discussion

• Katz says opposition political discussion is happening more privately than publicly, but a broader coalition could form around the goal of delivering a unified message.
• He references a tactic framed as “noon against Putin” (associated with Maxim Reznik) and suggests it’s a reasonable topic—if timed close to election day, because the immediate priority is whether people will actually turn out.
• He notes that many voters may consider alternatives:
  • Some may view voting for the Communist Party as pointless because it is pro-war.
  • Others may consider not voting at all because “they’re all the same.”

In his view, the election debate will therefore first be about participation, and then about which party to support.

Overall Assessment

Katz’s bottom line is that participation is both the morally justifiable and strategically important move now—despite expectations of a controlled outcome—because it helps keep the anti-war opposition vote coherent (especially via Yabloko) and could produce political consequences if falsification becomes too visible.

Presenters / Contributors

• Maxim Katz (Максим Кац) — main speaker
• Ella Pamfilova (Элла Памфилова) — referenced as the likely announcer of official results
• Maxim Reznik (Максим Резник) — referenced regarding tactics and opposition discussion
• Alexei Navalny / FBK (ФБК) — mentioned as still active
• Mikhail Khodorkovsky (Ходорковский) — mentioned
• VTSIOM (ВЦИОМ), FOM (ФОМ), Levada (Левада-центр) — referenced as pollsters whose publication he claims may stop
• Lukashenko (Лукашенко) — referenced via the Belarus comparison
• Orbán (Орбан) — referenced in a contrast between authoritarian and democratic contexts
• Yashin’s party / Yashin (Яшин) — referenced as having appeared in the discussion