Will Canada Defend Itself? | World on Edge

Overview

The discussion centers on whether Canada’s upcoming federal budget will meaningfully strengthen national and Arctic defense—and what mix of spending would be most effective rather than merely meeting NATO targets.

1) What “significantly more defense spending” could mean

F-35 question

Guests consider the likely meaning of expanded funding in light of Canada’s contemplated acquisition of 88 F-35s (via a contract Canada has not reportedly fully seen).

• Wesley War argues the F-35 is not necessarily the best fit for Canada’s needs and should be part of a broader mix rather than the default “big-ticket” choice.
• Janice Stein raises concerns about dependence—especially because advanced weapons rely on software updates, and long-term relationships can become politically strained.

Alternative aircraft

• Stein and War discuss the Saab fighter as a credible alternative, arguing Canada should consider platforms that better match operational needs and strategic constraints.

2) Risk of meeting NATO spending goals the “wrong way”

The panel warns that quickly meeting 2% of GDP defense spending can tempt governments to buy large, expensive, and potentially obsolete equipment.

Drones and “cheaper, faster” systems

Both guests emphasize a shift toward high-tech, networked capabilities, including:

• drones (air/ground/maritime/undersea)
• related software and sensors

Economic and industrial strategy

A key theme is that Canada should use defense spending to:

• improve productivity and economic competitiveness, and
• rebuild Canadian defense-technology capacity (software, sensors, computing), rather than locking in legacy procurement timelines.

3) Political context: the Canada–US relationship and credibility

Defense planning is framed as inseparable from US politics and trade negotiations—with USMCA renewal highlighted as a near-term pressure point.

“51st state” language and annexation talk

Both guests say Canadians are increasingly tired of this rhetoric.

• Wesley War suggests Canada should not necessarily issue simplistic ultimatums, but should push back through clear messaging and a tougher public posture.
• Stein implies that while the rhetoric is treated as joke-like, Canadian public support for defense spending depends on trust that Canada will build more at home, not just comply.

4) “Golden Dome” missile defense: study vs. commit

What it is (as understood)

War says Golden Dome’s exact form is unclear even inside the US, with potential implications including very ambitious technologies and possible tensions with space weaponization concerns.

Main critique

Canada should be cautious about joining a system with:

• unknown feasibility
• unknown costs
• unclear threat justification (the discussion suggests an ICBM-type attack may be less likely than other deterrence needs)

Why not stay entirely out

Stein and others argue that avoiding study entirely could mean Canada has less voice in future decision structures—especially since Canada rejected missile defense in the 1990s, leading the US to create alternative structures outside NORAD.

Compromise position

A suggested middle course is: “Study it to delay and to understand,” while leaning toward:

• deterrence
• surveillance/detection
• arms control efforts
• more conventional preparedness rather than buying into an uncertain architecture.

5) Arctic sovereignty and “defense” priorities

The panel reframes Arctic threats as not primarily military, but tied to climate change—making Arctic defense partly about resilience and infrastructure such as:

• harbors and ports
• telecom
• roads
• airports

NATO spending credit

War argues NATO accounting of certain Arctic spending is advantageous for Canada because Nordic states want Canada to shoulder more burden, given Russia’s much larger Arctic buildup.

Domain awareness gap

Both stress Canada’s limited situational awareness in the Arctic (surface/under-ice/space/cyber), which should be addressed through improved sensors and communications.

Scenario planning for sovereignty incidents

War describes how an unannounced US warship passage through the Northwest Passage would likely be viewed as hostile or at least unacceptable, and argues Canada needs capabilities to manage:

• search-and-rescue
• community alerts

6) Icebreakers and procurement flexibility

• The guests emphasize more icebreakers as both real operational infrastructure and a concrete defense enabler.
• A procurement critique is raised: delays and overly rigid specifications can prevent faster options (including possibilities to build/charter sooner), reducing Canada’s ability to respond to emerging needs.

7) Churchill and Arctic logistics

The discussion considers whether investing in Churchill, Manitoba as a deeper-water Arctic export/transport hub is worth extremely large costs.

• In favor: the lack of deep-water northern infrastructure and potential economic/strategic benefits if Arctic shipping conditions improve over time.

8) NATO relevance and NORAD’s place

• Both see NATO membership as Canada’s central long-term security insurance, especially given Russia’s threat profile.
• NORAD is still important, but less central than NATO to Canada’s broader security direction.

9) Submarines: diesel vs. an undersea-drone approach

• Janice Stein supports substantial investment in undersea drone and swarming—noting they can be faster and cheaper to iterate—and questions why the budget favors diesel submarines instead.
• War argues submarines remain necessary, but as a long-term, incremental project, while Canada rapidly builds undersea and surface drone capabilities now.

They acknowledge this is a relatively modest disagreement: both align on prioritizing drones and smart systems, while differing on how strongly to weight submarines in the near term.

Presenters or contributors

• Steve (host/presenter) — Pagan Podcast / World on Edge segment
• Janice Stein — Monk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy
• Wesley War (Wesley Wark) — Senior Fellow, Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI); Fellow, Balsley School of International Affairs