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Новые способы набора на фронт уже применяют

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News and Commentary

Overview

This episode of Meduza discusses how Russian men may be able to avoid or reduce forced participation in the war, what recruitment or mobilization might look like next, and where anti-war Russians (especially conscientious objectors and deserters) can realistically seek safety abroad.

Future mobilization vs. “new forms” of recruitment

Likelihood of another general mobilization

  • The guest (a lawyer from the conscientious objectors movement) argues Russia is unlikely to announce another general mobilization in the near term—framing it as unlikely that Putin would declare a new large mobilization.

What may intensify instead

  • He warns recruitment could intensify through other mechanisms, particularly:
    • contract recruitment rather than classic mobilization waves (like Sept–Nov 2022).

The main fear

  • He is especially concerned about practices resembling what reportedly happened in places such as Penza, including:
    • coercion,
    • intimidation,
    • and forced signing of contracts.

Why people end up at the front

He argues most people are not motivated by ideology, but are pushed into participation via:

  • deception or promises,
  • intimidation (including threats of criminal liability),
  • coercive state behavior that he claims often lacks clear legal grounding.

He emphasizes that the state does not consistently provide fully “legal” mechanisms that reliably control outcomes; instead, coercion and bureaucratic pressure function as substitutes for legality.

Territorial/operational differences: small towns and “targeted visits”

He reports coercion and forced recruitment are reportedly more common in smaller towns than in major cities like Moscow or St. Petersburg.

Targeting, he says, often aligns with vulnerability signals, such as:

  • criminal records (including “spent” records),
  • debts (including microloans),
  • exploitation of family circumstances, including orphanhood or lack of support networks.

He cites examples including alleged contract-signing attempts involving minors (e.g., attempted contracting at 17), along with other claims that legal/medical capacities were ignored.

“Corporate mobilization” and electronic targeting

He extends the analysis beyond police raids:

  • Large organizations (state corporations, universities, companies) may be used to deliver quotas.
  • Institutions may push individuals toward military registration actions “under the guise of reservations.”

He also argues the system is moving toward more systematic, data-driven targeting using the electronic summons/registry infrastructure, which may allow authorities to quickly identify and select groups of men based on attributes such as:

  • service history,
  • specialties,
  • health/records,
  • and location.

Practical advice for people in Russia

The guest outlines several “tools” conscientious objectors and at-risk men can use if they cannot or do not want to leave:

  1. Create a support network
    • e.g., power of attorney for relatives/lawyers,
    • and arrange rapid help if detained.
  2. Prepare a “security folder”
    • with health documents and relevant paperwork.
  3. Use legal/administrative channels fast
    • e.g., online court/prosecutor systems,
    • and rapid filing of complaints/lawsuits.

He also discusses high-risk tactics he claims can sometimes work under coercion—most controversially including advice to exploit medically relevant grounds for disqualification, and (in some guidance) to claim certain serious illnesses when detained without documents, framed as an attempt to prevent contract signing.

Overall message: people often “break down” under threats or false promises; informed resistance and readiness can reduce harm.

Deserters and asylum/exit options: Europe vs. “Armenia first”

Pessimistic view of the EU

He presents a skeptical view of the EU as a destination for deserters/conscientious objectors, arguing:

  • Europe is not reliably protecting them through humanitarian programs.
  • Asylum systems have become more restrictive.
  • Decisions may include terminology and risk-assessment mistakes, such as:
    • confusing reservists with deserters,
    • dismissing risk via generic “internal protection” logic.

While he says judicial practice has improved in some European places, he argues it often requires heavy legal resources, and many cases are rejected at initial stages.

“Armenia first” approach

He presents Armenia as comparatively more workable:

  • deserters may live with more freedom,
  • he calls it a major “desertion hub,”
  • and obtaining new documents there can enable routes to additional visa-free options.

He cautions against risky public behavior, such as rallies or visible presence before journalists.

Kidnapping/abduction risks in neighboring states

He discusses reported cases of Russian deserters being detained and transferred from countries such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to Russia, arguing this violates international legal norms (including reference to non-extradition exceptions related to military service/order issues).

He advises avoiding actions that could increase exposure in dangerous jurisdictions, including:

  • not going to Russian embassies/consulates in certain countries,
  • avoiding public interviews or revealing one’s location in Kazakhstan.

He contrasts this with Armenia, where he says deserters generally face fewer direct handovers.

Change in German/EU asylum procedures (border/airport “fast track”)

He explains EU asylum reforms from June 12, noting that Russians are included in a simplified border procedure due to low approval rates (he states <20%).

Key consequences he highlights:

  • interviews and decisions happen quickly at the border,
  • limited time to justify the case,
  • restrictions on NGO/legal support during appeal,
  • easier deportation if denied.

Overall conclusion

Despite the claim that “mobilization is over,” he argues Russia continues recruiting and coercing men. He emphasizes that effective resistance requires:

  • preparation,
  • knowledge of rights,
  • and rapid legal/administrative action.

For those fleeing, he stresses Armenia as the most practical first step, rather than relying on asylum in Europe as the main exit route.

Presenters / contributors

  • Vladislav Gorin (host/interviewer)
  • Artem Klyga (head of the legal affairs department of the conscientious objectors movement; lawyer)
  • Meduza (publisher; mentioned as the outlet for the podcast/coverage)

Original video