Biggest Market Shift Now: ‘You’re Making A Mistake’ Ignoring These Assets | Ted Oakley

Finance-focused summary (markets, investing, macro, positions)

Macro / geopolitics and oil (Strait of Hormuz)

• Iran-linked risk escalated:
  • UAE says Iran targeted a tanker in the Strait of Hormuz (no casualties).
  • Ongoing strikes continue in/around the Strait.
• Key question: “Why isn’t oil at $100/bbl?”
• Ted’s framing (opinion):
  • The oil market has been held down by extremely large CFTC-managed shorts.
  • Reported number: ~480 million barrels short (described as among the biggest ever).
  • If positioning “flips” (short covering / fewer willing sellers), oil could reprice higher.
  • He suggests strategic/preserve-reserve behavior by the US/others, but adds “running out of time”—implying tighter supply could emerge later.
• China angle:
  • China purportedly suppressed oil via cut imports and used reserves.
  • This can’t last indefinitely; eventually behavior must change (e.g., more take from Russia/elsewhere or restored import levels).

Ted’s oil & energy view (what to own)

• Not worried about oil being overbought at the cited level:
  • Oil reference: WTI around $83 (level mentioned).
• Energy equities are cheap (vs history/peers), with demand muted by ESG-style hangovers:
  • Example valuation language: “7 and 8 times earnings” for some holdings.
  • He references a “hangover” where people “don’t want to buy fossil fuel.”
• Own the full oil & gas value chain:
  • Recommendation: own multiple layers rather than only one segment.
  • Producers (examples):
    • Chevron
    • Matador (Matador Resources)
  • Midstream (examples): pipelines (no specific ticker in the excerpt)
  • Natural gas (examples):
    • Antero
    • Apache (APA) (explicitly stated “Apache or APA”)
  • Drillers / services (examples):
    • Schlumberger
    • Transocean
  • Refiners: less favorable on refiners, though he suggests they “can probably be owned.”

Rates / yield curve risk to stocks

• Market context:
  • S&P near ~8,000; figure cited: 7743.
  • 30-year Treasury yield > 5% for 30+ sessions, cited at 5.24%.
• Risk threshold (opinion):
  • He guesses the long-end needs to reach around ~5.5% before it meaningfully hits stock valuations.
  • Logic: leverage sensitivity—higher rates affect mortgages and leveraged balance sheets.
• Corporate debt duration:
  • Corporate yields depend on duration:
    • Longer corporates track the Treasury long end.
    • Short corporates may show smaller spread.
  • He notes a tax consideration: Treasuries don’t have state tax, which can matter for relative value.

Leverage / margin debt as a late-cycle signal

• Margin debt rose 7.9% in June, cited as a record high (article date noted: July 20).
• Interpretation:
  • Typical late-stage bull behavior: investors borrow after gains rise.
  • But risk doesn’t “come home” until a bear market.
  • Presented as a sentiment/investor-confidence indicator, though it can precede later drawdowns.

Valuation and risk sentiment (Shiller CAPE)

• He cites Shiller CAPE ~42 (and notes it has been above 35 for months).
• Historical claim:
  • When CAPE > 35, you typically “don’t make any money the next 5 years.”
• He does not claim the fund is more defensive than in January:
  • Fund allocation stated: ~45% cash.
  • He describes adjusting holdings after miner corrections.

Fund positioning: cash, miners, gold/silver, and “booking profits”

• Cash / precious metals cycle:
  • Sold miners and silver in Q4 last year and January (about a 90-day-ish timeframe referenced).
  • Miners corrected 35–40%; they replenished over the past ~6 weeks at cheaper prices.
• Silver timing / magnitude:
  • Silver cited as up 215% in 12 months.
  • He attributed it to “hot money” / late momentum buying.
  • Sold when momentum likely faded.
• Profit-taking rules:
  • Default holding horizon: 3 to 10 years.
  • If a stock runs unusually fast and becomes overvalued in 1–2 years, he will sell some.
  • Tax behavior:
    • He argues retail investors often refuse to sell due to fear of taxes, which can be harmful.
    • Emphasizes removing cost + some profit to manage opportunity cost and the time value of money.
• Example realized trades (specific):
  • Hecla:
    • Sold at/after ~over $30 (earlier holding around $9).
    • Bought back at ~$14.5–$15 (this year after selling earlier).

Precious metals / miners he bought back or added

• Gold:
  • Bought around ~$4,000–$4,050, re-added near ~$3,950, and still considered entries around ~$4,300.
  • General timing view: gold should do well in the last half of the year.
• Silver miners / royalty / specific names mentioned:
  • Franco-Nevada (royalty company) added back.
  • Hecla added.
  • Agnico Eagle added.
  • Alamos Gold added.
  • Equinox added (valuation detail: “5.5x earnings” and “27 earnings”—wording implies an earnings multiple/figure around those numbers).
  • Also added some straight silver.

Data centers / critical minerals / commodities theme

• Texas data centers:
  • Mentions Texas moratorium on data center construction being examined (including water constraints).
  • Speculated timing: an election in ~2.5 months could change the moratorium outcome.
  • He thinks water availability (especially West/South Texas) is the bigger constraint than construction itself.
• Investability caution:
  • Compares to the fiber build-out bubble (1999–2000)—expectation that “we’ll never use all of this,” leading to stock pain later.
  • Conclusion: not investable now because they “don’t know where it’s headed.”

Base metals / critical minerals beneficiaries

• Metals mentioned as relevant:
  • Copper, aluminum, steel (also referenced earlier: tungsten and iron).
• Supply-chain / geopolitical framing:
  • US is behind on many critical minerals/metals; he says the US is not mainly behind on natural gas.
  • He frames the world as “multipolar,” with hoarding by China and Russia, implying long-run demand support for hard assets.
• Government “vault” / storage:
  • He suggests they partly follow government actions, but claims they were earlier:
    • Example: they already owned uranium before the US accumulation push.
• Uranium supply/demand disparity (cited):
  • US use: ~50 million pounds
  • US production: ~2.5 million pounds
  • Conclusion: “so far behind… it’s incredible.”
• Critical minerals mentioned (examples):
  • Antimony
  • Tungsten
• Specific company example not owned:
  • He says they didn’t own Alcoa because it “got ahead of itself” (cited range: ~85 to ~45, then back up).

Sector/asset selection at the end

• What he likes most (explicit):
  • Wants a mix with commodities / hard assets, arguing it would be a “mistake” not to have one given the next 10 years likely being more commodity-cycle oriented.
  • Specifically liked: energy, gold miners, gold, plus other commodity-linked names.
• What he likes least (explicit):
  • Semiconductors / “big names” described as feast-or-famine—risk that those who don’t sell will “pay the price.”

Financials / banks with steepening yield curve

• Overweighting financials:
  • He prefers regional banks over big universal banks.
  • Rationale: regionals do “banking as banking.”
• Valuation caution on big banks:
  • Big banks described as expensive (example: “three times book value”).
  • He says he only owns one bank: US Bank.

Tickers / assets / instruments mentioned

• Oil benchmark: WTI (level cited ~$83)
• Gold & silver
• Uranium (asset class; no ticker given)
• CFTC oil shorts (positioning metric; no ticker)
• Yields:
  • 30-year Treasury (quoted yield ~5.24%)
  • 2-year Treasury (~4.25%)
• Equities / companies:
  • Chevron
  • Matador (Matador Resources)
  • Antero
  • Apache (APA)
  • Schlumberger
  • Transocean
  • Lyondell Chemical (6% dividend mentioned; ticker not explicitly stated)
  • Bristol Myers (ticker not explicitly stated)
  • Visa
  • MasterCard
  • US Bank (ticker not explicitly stated)
  • Amazon
  • Apple
  • Microsoft
  • Netflix
  • Texas Instruments (historical reference)
  • Franco-Nevada
  • Hecla
  • Agnico Eagle
  • Alamos Gold
  • Equinox (company name given; ticker not explicitly stated)
  • Alcoa (not held; discussed)
• Shorthand indices/metrics:
  • S&P 500 (quoted level ~7743 and “closing in on 8,000”)
  • CAPE / Shiller P/E
  • Margin debt (Fed/market metric)
• Macro/policy:
  • Fed / FOMC
  • Mentions Treasury and “Treasury long end”
• Other commodity examples (no tickers):
  • tungsten, copper, iron, aluminum, steel, natural gas, lumber.

Methodology / framework elements explicitly stated

• Oil positioning “setup” framework (opinion):
  • Check CFTC shorts → if extremely short and sentiment flips, oil can reprice sharply.
  • Consider strategic reserves being used → potential time constraint.
  • Incorporate geopolitical chokepoints (Strait of Hormuz) into supply risk.
• Valuation/risk framework for market levels (opinion):
  • Identify a long-end yield threshold (~5.5%) where stock valuations and leverage-related pockets may break.
• Fund holding construction for commodities/energy:
  • Own multiple layers of the commodity value chain:
    • producers + midstream + drillers/services (selectively refiners).
• Profit-taking framework (practical):
  • Hold stocks 3–10 years by default.
  • If a massive move happens in 1–2 years and becomes overvalued, sell some.
  • Take cost out + some profit; don’t let tax aversion override risk/opportunity cost.

Key numbers called out

• Oil:
  • WTI referenced: ~$83
  • CFTC oil shorts: ~480 million barrels
• Rates:
  • 30-year Treasury: 5.24% (over 5% for 30+ sessions)
  • 2-year Treasury: ~4.25%
  • Estimated corporates: ~4.75–4.85%
  • Long-end “crack” guess: ~5.5%
• Equities:
  • S&P 500: 7743 / near 8000
  • Shiller CAPE: ~42; >35 historically not favorable for next 5 years
• Leverage:
  • Margin debt: +7.9% in June, record high (July 20 article reference)
• Cash allocation:
  • Fund cash: ~45%
• Precious metals:
  • Silver: +215% in 12 months
  • Gold purchase zones: ~$4,050, ~$3,950, still considering ~$4,300
• Hecla trade examples:
  • ~$9 → sold over $30 → bought back ~$14.5–$15
• Uranium supply/demand mismatch:
  • US use ~50 million pounds
  • US production ~2.5 million pounds
• Company-specific:
  • Lyondell: 6% dividend (ticker not given)
  • Equinox: cited ~5.5x earnings (and “27 earnings” wording)

Presenters / sources

• Ted Oakley — founder, Oxbow Advisors
• Interviewer: David Lin (repeated as “David” during conversation)
• Video title/source attribution includes: Ted Oakley (as shown in the provided title)

Disclosures / disclaimers

• Ted repeatedly frames multiple points as “just an opinion” and notes he has no way of knowing certain thresholds/predictions.
• No explicit “not financial advice” wording appears in the provided subtitles/excerpt.