INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR SALAFISM, ULAMA, AND STATE

Summary

Seminar Focus

The seminar examined how religious scholars (ulama) and the state have related to one another in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and how those relationships have changed. The keynote focused mainly on the two countries rather than on the details of Salafi movements. During the discussion, participants connected the comparison to Indonesia.

Keynote: How State-Building Changed the Ulama’s Role

• Ulama historically held important social roles. Until roughly the late 19th century, they commonly served as judges and educators. Their institutions and activities were partly supported by waqf endowments, which gave them a degree of financial independence from rulers.
• Modernization weakened their institutional position. From the mid-19th century onward, new state and colonial reforms introduced European-inspired civil law and schools. Religious courts were increasingly restricted, often to family matters, while state-run education displaced traditional systems.
• State control expanded through financial and administrative reforms. In many Arab countries, waqf assets were nationalized, and religious offices such as the mufti became more centralized and bureaucratic. The speaker described these developments as reducing the ulama’s independence and influence.

Egypt and Al-Azhar

Egypt broadly followed the regional pattern of secularized law and education, alongside increased state control over religious institutions.

Al-Azhar remained distinctive because of its prestige and symbolic value. However, a 1961 reform under Gamal Abdel Nasser made it a state institution: its scholars became state employees, and the Egyptian president appointed its grand imam.

The state nevertheless continued to value Al-Azhar’s religious standing and international influence. The speaker’s point was that state control did not eliminate the institution’s significance, but changed the balance of authority between Al-Azhar and the government.

Saudi Arabia’s Historically Different Arrangement

The speaker presented Saudi Arabia as an exception to the broader regional pattern, emphasizing that it was not colonized and that its political system developed differently.

He traced the system to an 1744 pact between Muhammad bin Saud and the religious scholar Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s reformist doctrine, which its adherents associated with Salafism, became the state’s official religious orientation.

The pact established a division of authority:

• The ruling family handled political decisions, including foreign relations, and invoked maslaha—the public or national interest—as a basis for policy.
• The ulama interpreted religious law and shaped social rules.

This arrangement helps explain how Saudi Arabia could pursue alliances with Western powers while also enforcing highly conservative social rules. The speaker described it as a state with, in effect, two centers of authority.

Religious enforcement also had separate institutions: the religious police, associated with the religious establishment, were distinct from the ordinary police.

Changes Under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman

The speaker argued that changes since 2015 have fundamentally altered, rather than merely adjusted, the former power-sharing arrangement.

A 2016 royal decree removed the religious police’s power to arrest people. In the speaker’s account, this reduced the ulama’s ability to enforce social rules: the body could still advise or admonish, but could no longer compel compliance.

The state also took a more direct role in decisions once shaped by religious authorities. For example, entertainment and concerts, previously restricted on religious grounds, came to be organized by state bodies.

According to the keynote, Saudi Arabia is moving toward a model more like Egypt’s, with religious authority increasingly subordinate to the state. The speaker linked this shift to changes in Saudi religious discourse and to the country’s influence abroad.

Discussant’s Comments and Conceptual Distinctions

• Women’s role in waqf and education: Dr. Sara emphasized that women—including royal women and wealthy donors—helped fund religious institutions and education through endowments. She argued that histories of the ulama and madrasas often overlook these contributions.
• The ulama between society and state: The discussant and keynote described scholars as occupying a middle position. They can represent social concerns and speak for justice while also negotiating with rulers.
• Justice and fear of fitna: The keynote said scholars differ over how to balance criticizing rulers with fears that confrontation could lead to disorder or civil conflict. In the Saudi Salafi tradition he discussed, obedience to political authority often discourages public criticism; some scholars may express disagreement privately instead.
• Traditionalist and Salafi conceptions of authority: The keynote contrasted Al-Azhar’s traditional emphasis on study with teachers and chains of authorization (ijaza) with Salafi claims that religious authority can be derived more directly from scripture. He noted, however, that Salafi communities can develop their own traditions and scholarly lineages over time.

Audience Discussion and Takeaways

• Salafism is not a single political model. The keynote distinguished conservative, nonviolent Salafi movements from the minority associated with violence. He also distinguished Salafi political participation from Islamist movements seeking to take over government: some Salafi groups may enter elections mainly to represent their constituency or exert pressure.
• Egypt’s post-2011 example: A student asked how Egyptian Salafis could move from criticizing electoral politics to forming a party after the Mubarak regime fell. The keynote framed such participation as a response to a fluid post-revolutionary situation and a way to defend the group’s interests. The discussion raised the question of whether this represented pragmatism or a deeper change.
• Indonesia’s context is different. The keynote suggested that Salafism has had less political influence in Indonesia than in Egypt, while stressing that this was a tentative impression rather than a settled conclusion. He proposed possible explanations, including Indonesia’s cultural context and the established social reach of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).
• Dr. Sara added that influence should not be measured only through parties or elections. Salafi ideas may also shape religious sensibilities, everyday practices, and consumer choices.
• Questions were raised about future religious authority in Saudi Arabia, opposition to Mohammed bin Salman’s reforms, modernization, and the future global influence of Salafism. The discussion did not resolve these questions into firm predictions.

Overall lesson: The seminar emphasized that the relationship between ulama, state, and society varies by country and changes over time. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia should not be treated as interchangeable cases, and neither Salafism nor Islamic political participation should be assumed to have a single form.

Speakers and Sources Featured

• Event host/announcer: Unnamed ceremony emcee
• Qur’an reciter: Abdul Rafi
• Moderator and introductory speaker: Dr. Muhammad Rafi Muzakir (the subtitles render the name inconsistently)
• Keynote speaker: Associate Professor Dr. Stéphane Lacroix
• Discussant: Dr. Sara Muahida (the subtitles render her name inconsistently)
• Audience questioners: Students identified in the subtitles as Erdia/Kadia, Rivy Rahman, Abizer, and Mah; another questioner’s name is unclear. Other participants also contributed comments, including one in Indonesian.
• Ceremonial musical sources: The Indonesian national anthem, “Indonesia Raya,” and the Muhammadiyah anthem/march, sung by attendees.
• Religious sources mentioned: The Qur’an was recited at the opening. The moderator cited a hadith about the earliest generations of Muslims; the discussant cited another report attributed to Anas and associated with Musnad Ahmad.