Russia is Doing Really Badly | Michael Kofman

Summary

Michael Kofman argues that the war in Ukraine offers important military lessons, but technology alone does not determine battlefield outcomes. Armies must adapt their force structures, training, logistics, and doctrine to use new capabilities effectively.

• Starlink and Starshield disruptions: Kofman describes reports that SpaceX restricted or throttled Ukrainian military communications used to control long-range strike drones and newer interceptor drones. The resulting instability reportedly caused drones to fly too slowly, lose connections, or be lost. He says the cause and extent of the restrictions were unclear, but that the disruption was already affecting important Ukrainian operations.

• U.S. leverage and political uncertainty: The United States still has substantial influence through intelligence, weapons, ammunition, and air-defense support. Cutting these off would not necessarily cause an immediate collapse of Ukraine’s front, Kofman says, but could worsen Ukraine’s position—especially in air defense—and convince Russia that it can wait for Kyiv to weaken. He criticizes a transactional approach to negotiations that treats a ceasefire as a deal to conclude without adequately addressing whether it would last or protect Ukraine and Europe.

• Europe cannot simply replace the U.S. role in NATO: European defense spending and production are growing, partly because of the war and uncertainty about U.S. commitments. But Europe’s defense industries remain fragmented, and higher spending does not automatically create the command, control, and large-scale military capabilities the United States provides. European countries may also face delays or shortages when buying U.S. systems.

• Drones require organizational change: Buying drones is not enough. Militaries need trained personnel, dedicated drone units, logistics, software, and systems for sharing battlefield information. Kofman favors starting with drone platoons in maneuver battalions and building up from experience, rather than announcing large “drone forces” without establishing who will operate and support them.

• Mass precision changes the battlefield: Cheap drones and other long-range precision weapons make it much harder to move or concentrate forces unseen. Even night operations may no longer provide the advantage they once did: inexpensive thermal-imaging drones can detect troops and equipment. Kofman argues that surprise remains possible, especially at the operational level, but requires careful planning and deception.

• Protection and deception matter: The discussion stresses camouflage, decoys, fortifications, dispersal, and point air defense alongside active defenses. These measures can protect valuable assets and personnel from drones and precision strikes. The speakers warn that Western militaries have become accustomed to operating with air and night advantages and may have neglected these practices.

• Maneuver remains possible, but takes preparation: The battlefield is not simply a fixed, positional stalemate. Operations such as “Vivaldi” illustrate that forces can make progress, but a successful advance must suppress or displace enemy drone units, protect logistics, and move far enough to disrupt the opponent’s system. Drones can give even lower-level units precision-strike reach, but that reach also creates coordination problems.

• Wet-gap crossings are exceptionally difficult: Rivers and other obstacles are not easy to cross under observation and fire. Pontoon bridges may need constant protection and replacement; ferries and drone-supported logistics can help, but require preparation and a secure foothold on the far bank. The panel also notes that NATO’s bridging equipment and units have often been neglected.

• Lessons depend on context: Kofman cautions against treating the later, attritional phase of the Ukraine war as a template for how every future war will begin. Military organizations should test lessons through training and experimentation, and pay close attention to force structure—not just technology or doctrine. Political leaders may make decisions based on assumptions and priorities that differ from those of military planners.

Presenters and contributors: Jordan Schneider, Justin McIntosh, Tony Stark, and Michael Kofman.