Ranking America's Enemies Special Forces Units

Evaluation Criteria

The presenter ranks adversary special-operations forces by more than toughness or reputation. His criteria include selection and training, equipment and funding, combat experience, mission complexity, intelligence and logistical support, integration with conventional forces, and—above all—demonstrated performance.

He argues that an elite unit depends on the larger system around its operators: intelligence, surveillance, communications, aviation, command, and the ability to adapt under pressure. He also cautions that information about some forces, especially those of China and North Korea, is limited and often shaped by propaganda.

Units Discussed

• GRU Spetsnaz — B. The presenter describes the force as experienced and formidable, with a history of reconnaissance, sabotage, and direct action. However, he says its broad and uneven structure, along with limitations in how Russia integrates its military capabilities, make an A-tier rating unwarranted.
• Chinese PLA special-operations forces — C+. China has invested heavily in modernization, technology, and joint capabilities, but the presenter says its forces have little modern combat experience. He distinguishes considerable potential from proven performance in a contested war.
• Iranian Saberin — C. Saberin formations have operational experience, including in Syria, and conduct commando-style missions. The presenter characterizes them as combat-oriented regional forces with a more limited technological and intelligence-support ecosystem.
• FSB Alpha and Vympel. Alpha is described as highly trained and experienced in counterterrorism and hostage-response operations. The presenter also notes the controversial outcomes and civilian casualties of the Moscow theater and Beslan crises. He does not give Alpha a clear grade in the subtitles. Vympel, with a history of sensitive external, reconnaissance, and sabotage missions, receives a B; public information about it is limited.
• North Korea’s 11th Corps, or Storm Corps — C. The presenter warns that estimates of a very large special-operations force should not be confused with an equally large number of elite operators. He sees its main purpose as wartime infiltration, reconnaissance, and sabotage, potentially making it dangerous on the Korean Peninsula, but says reliable evidence of its capabilities is scarce.
• Quds Force Department 400 — C+. The presenter describes the broader Quds Force as an external-operations and intelligence organization with substantial regional networks and clandestine experience. He says its reach and record beyond established regional networks are more limited, and that its support resources are smaller than China’s.
• Russian SSO — B+. He considers it Russia’s strongest force in the episode, citing its role in strategic operations and experience in Crimea, Syria, and Ukraine. He credits it with access to significant national capabilities but argues that Russia has struggled to integrate intelligence, communications, command, and other assets consistently.
• Ukrainian SSO — B. The presenter emphasizes the force’s rapid development since 2014 and its combat experience and adaptation during the full-scale war with Russia. He notes that Ukraine benefits from Western support, which he says can count as part of an operational ecosystem, while distinguishing access to allied capabilities from owning and controlling them. He also cautions against attributing every Ukrainian operation to the SSO, since other agencies and units conduct sensitive missions.

Overall Conclusion

Toughness, elite branding, and advanced equipment are not enough. A force’s effectiveness depends on how well its people, training, intelligence, technology, leadership, and support work together—and whether the organization can adapt as an opponent counters its advantages.

Coverage Note

The opening list names Shayetet 13, but the subtitles contain no discussion or rating for it.

Presenter

The Stoic Viking (Joe England), the video’s sole presenter.