Video summary

The national interest: politics after globalisation | LSE Event

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News and Commentary

Overview

The event argues that “national interest” is returning to the centre of politics because the era of deep global integration—supported by international institutions, law, and liberal-democratic technocracy—has been exposed by recent crises (finance, health, energy, and geopolitics).

Mark Carney’s framing—treating the moment as a “rupture” rather than a “transition”—is presented as evidence that the old global order will not simply return. This shift redirects debates toward sovereignty and the capacity of states to withstand external pressure.

Main arguments and analyses

1) National interest as democratic practice (Philip Kandeliff)

  • The surprise around “national interest” comes from roughly the past 30–40 years, when elites sought to dilute popular demands embodied in the nation through:

    • globalization
    • international law
    • wars
    • human-rights/climate agendas
    • transnational alliances
    • activist networks

  • A key correction: “national interest” should not be treated as a pre-existing document or abandoned policy package. Instead, it is best understood as a method that:

    • gives states discretion
    • enables policy to adapt to shifts in power and democratic opinion

  • Proper national-interest politics is framed as effective representation, involving:

    • public deliberation
    • competing visions of how to serve the country

It is positioned as a counter to populism, because populism rejects representation and claims a direct channel for leaders.

2) Globalization persists; the deeper issue is domestic politics (Anand Menon / Helen Thompson)

  • Globalization is not over, especially due to the ongoing role of financial markets.

  • While globalization previously helped lift people out of poverty and delivered valued goods, it was “appallingly badly managed”—treated as something done to societies rather than something societies choose and govern.

  • Failures are linked to UK domestic political economy, including:

    • a system that entrenches inequality and reduces responsiveness
      • first-past-the-post
      • safe seats
      • proportional underrepresentation
    • adversarial, short-term incentives that block long-term reform
      • constraints on the NHS/productivity linked to gaps in social care
      • repeated plans that never get implemented because each side frames solutions as partisan traps

  • Warning: “reclaiming nationhood” can be hijacked by the populist right, including exclusionary narratives about citizenship and “earned benefits,” described as racially coded.

3) Legitimacy and geopolitics: nationalism vs international authority (Helen Thompson)

Although the term “globalization” is criticized as ambiguous, two major changes are emphasized:

  1. National-state legitimacy is asserted against international authorities (with the EU as a central example—Brexit as emblematic).
  2. Geopolitical competition has returned openly: the world economy is no longer assumed to be a non-zero-sum benefit system for major powers.

Additional framing includes:

  • Nation-building as something that can be renewed, not restored.
  • A key mechanism question: democratic nationhood may require cultural reference points (language, narratives), which are difficult to detach from nation-building itself.

She also highlights a Europe sovereignty problem:

  • European states may claim sovereignty,
  • yet strategic realities (e.g., NATO/security dependence) make “full” sovereignty difficult,
  • illustrating tensions such as Denmark/Greenland and broader US/Europe asymmetries.

4) Sovereignty and “rupture” require responsibility, not moralized authority (Philip Kandeliff response)

  • Optimism is grounded in the idea that US retrenchment partly reflects recognition of limits—and it removes excuses for allies (e.g., bailouts are no longer guaranteed).
  • “Political self-sufficiency” is distinguished from economic self-sufficiency: the goal is democratic authority without needing external power as the final check.
  • The approach is framed as recalibrating globalization’s bargains and using national-interest politics to renegotiate how trade and interdependence work.

Discussion themes from audience Q&A

Globalization’s architecture and where change comes from

  • Questions addressed where a new international model could originate (grassroots vs top-down; activists vs institutions).
  • A central answer: the “architecture” should be internationalist rather than globalist—built on democratic legitimacy and rooted in national interest, not obedience to external authority or compliance with the status quo.

Demography

  • Declining birth rates and ageing are treated as serious pressures on pensions and tax bases.
  • Menon emphasizes the practical difficulty of solutions without immigration and the need for honesty about migration policy.
  • Kandeliff links demographic decline partly to weak collective identification; national identity at the national level could make reproduction/procreation politically meaningful.

Protectionism vs national-interest statecraft

  • National-interest politics is not automatically protectionist.
  • Tariffs are discussed as part of coercive state strategy rather than mere economic protectionism.
  • The state is expected to do more in energy and strategic sectors; “return of the state” is tied to resource dependence and industrial direction, not only trade barriers.

“Who will drive this agenda?” (elites, big business, weak representation)

  • Representative institutions are described as brittle, while global finance is powerful—making it unclear who can drive national-interest politics forward.
  • The discussion emphasizes democratic oversight and political accountability.
  • It also highlights elite transactions (using the Epstein/Mandelson example) to argue that what looks like globalization is often privately managed for insiders rather than justified publicly.

Social contract renegotiation

  • Several audience members connect “national interest” to renegotiating domestic power contracts, including:
    • workplace/union constraints
    • business–labour balance
    • regulation
    • financial governance
  • The hoped-for outcome: more equitable growth and a state capable of governing markets.

Bottom-line conclusion of the panel

Across speakers, “national interest” is framed as a mechanism for:

  • rebuilding democratic representation after decades of technocratic and transnational constraint,
  • enabling policy rupture and long-term reform,
  • providing a legitimate basis for state action in a more competitive and less institutionally reliable global environment.

At the same time, there is concern that the idea can be captured by exclusionary populism unless opponents articulate and practice a genuinely inclusive, representation-based national politics.

Presenters / contributors

  • Peter Ramsey (moderator; academic in law; University event context)
  • Dr. Philip Kandeliff (UCL; panelist; author)
  • Professor Anand Menon (King’s College London; panelist)
  • Professor Helen Thompson (Cambridge University; panelist)
  • Mark Carney (referenced speaker; not a participant)
  • Kama (Prime Minister referenced as “Kama,” i.e., Justin Trudeau—referred to by the subtitle speaker; not a participant)

Additional audience participants (asked questions; not fully identified by name in the subtitles):

  • “Adam” (question about right-wing grassroots movements)
  • “Roman Gardner” (online question mentioned)
  • “Edwin Vanar” (online question mentioned)

Original video