Penser la guerre aujourd’hui : pourquoi Clausewitz reste essentiel

Main ideas and concepts

• Clausewitz’s enduring relevance

  • The speaker argues that On War (by Clausewitz) remains “indispensable” for understanding war and international relations.
  • It is not merely descriptive; it revolutionizes how war is understood.
  • Clausewitz is presented as a key figure for thinking about war today, not as an outdated military manual.

• Who Clausewitz was (background and political context)

  • Clausewitz was Prussian and spent his life in the Prussian army, starting as a teenager.
  • He was shaped by major conflicts against France, including:
    • The French Revolutionary armies (early confrontation)
    • Napoleon’s armies, including his capture after the Battle of Jena
  • The speaker highlights a complex political/loyalty history:
    • Clausewitz’s hatred of Napoleon / the French Empire is emphasized.
    • In the 1812 context—when Prussia was briefly not engaged against Napoleon—Clausewitz is said to have joined Napoleon’s forces temporarily, then returned to the Prussian army later.
  • His career culminated in leadership and teaching roles, including the Berlin War College.
  • He dies of cholera (1831); his major work is published posthumously by his wife in 1832.

• The central “revolution”: politicizing war

  • Clausewitz’s major contribution is described as:
    • War is not just a means or a standalone phenomenon.
    • War is an instrument tied to political objectives, and therefore becomes part of politics.
  • The famous formulation is evoked:
    • “War is the continuation of politics by other means.”
  • The speaker contrasts Clausewitz with earlier (“small war”) traditions:
    • Earlier wars (Renaissance/medieval) are described as wars of barons/counts/dukes/kings, where aims were not political in the modern sense (e.g., ego, contempt, religious motivations).
    • Clausewitz is said to find these motives grotesque and to insist on the need for political purpose.

• Clarifying misconceptions: Clausewitz is not “pro-war” in a simplistic way

  • The speaker disputes the idea that Clausewitz is an extreme advocate of war.
  • Reasons given:
    1. If war is rejected for political reasons (even if those reasons are “bad,” such as oversized ego), war would be less likely—so eliminating war cannot be dismissed.
    2. Clausewitz is said never to have envisioned wars of extermination such as massacre/genocide (framed as characteristic of the 20th century).
    3. Clausewitz is portrayed as believing that if an agreement avoiding bloodshed is possible, it would be better—though the speaker claims he thinks such avoidance is often unrealistic.
  • Moral framing:
    • Clausewitz is said to treat war as one method to achieve political goals rather than focusing on moral philosophy.
    • The speaker also claims Clausewitz is not primarily concerned with whether war is “immoral,” noting that earlier thinkers (e.g., Saint Augustine) recognized “just wars.”

• Violence and tactics: violence is accepted, but not for endless wars

  • The speaker describes the kind of violence Clausewitz considers:
    • Primarily army-to-army clashes, including what is described as “absolute war.”
    • Emphasis on frontal shock at a decisive point, with the goal of ending the war quickly.
  • A recurring theme:
    • Clausewitz draws on Napoleon’s battlefield practices while trying to improve tactics to avoid prolonged campaigns.
    • Long wars are condemned as catastrophically destructive—cities/villages, devastation, suffering.
    • The example invoked is the Thirty Years’ War (17th century), described as massively destructive.

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Methodology / instructional points (how to read or use Clausewitz)

• Recommended reading focus

  • Read Clausewitz, especially:
    • Chapter 1 (explicitly recommended).
  • Later chapters are described as more technical, but Chapter 1 is presented as the conceptual core.

• How to interpret Clausewitz

  • Use Clausewitz to understand war as:
    • Politically driven (war linked to political objectives)
    • Not purely automatic, nor solely a moral/immoral phenomenon
  • The speaker suggests evaluating wars by asking whether:
    • Politics prevails over violence for limited objectives, or
    • Violence expands into “wars of ego,” massacre, and genocide.

• What other authors to consult (suggested by the speaker)

  • Read works by the speaker himself:
    • Frédéric Anel, The Art of War by Example
    • World War Will Not Take Place (Odile Jacob)
  • Read Kissinger as someone influenced by Clausewitz (presented as a Clausewitz follower).
  • Lenin and Mao are mentioned, but the speaker says it would be “annoying” to read them and does not recommend them enthusiastically.

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Historical/analytical claims made in the video

• Clausewitz’s influence via disciples

  • Bismarck is presented as a major Clausewitz disciple who applied these ideas in practice.
  • The speaker contrasts:
    • Bismarck as strategic, politically objective, effective
    • Kaiser Wilhelm II as not a great strategist, implying that in 1914 war lacked real objectives

• Why the 20th century is portrayed as “not Clausewitzian”

  • The speaker claims a “false paradox”:
    • Even though Clausewitz dominates thinking, the 20th century allegedly returned to:
      • Small-scale wars, mercenaries, fighters like “swordsmen”
      • Wars driven by ego, escalating to massacre/genocide
  • The argument offered: massacres occurred partly because Clausewitz’s precepts were not followed sufficiently.

• Wars considered examples where politics prevailed (as “more Clausewitzian”)

  • The speaker suggests the clearest modern case is:
    • 1870–1871: Prussia’s revenge leading to German unification—described as having a political objective under Bismarck, and not primarily a war of massacres.
  • A few other cases are suggested:
    • Israeli–Arab wars (1956 and 1967) are mentioned as relatively classic cases where politics prevails (subtitles are described as somewhat garbled, but the intended comparison is clear).
  • Many other conflicts are described as:
    • Guerrilla wars, or
    • Not truly Clausewitzian.

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Speakers / sources featured (as mentioned)

• Frédéric Anel (guest/interviewee; PhD in geopolitics; professor at Sciences Po)
• Carl von Clausewitz (author of On War / Vom Kriege)
• Napoleon Bonaparte (Clausewitz’s battlefield opponent and influence)
• Frederick II of Prussia (father’s army affiliation; mentioned as a strategist)
• Bismarck (disciple and practitioner; Chancellor of Prussia)
• Wilhelm I (mentioned in the context of initiating the 1914 war)
• Wilhelm II (mentioned in contrast to Bismarck; portrayed as a poor strategist)
• Guillaume (named in the conversation; likely an interviewer/another participant)
• Henri Kissinger (mentioned as influenced by Clausewitz)
• Lenin and Mao (mentioned as authors not recommended by the speaker)
• Saint Augustine (cited regarding “just wars”)

Books / publishers cited

• Clausewitz: Vom Kriege (On War)—published posthumously in 1832 by his wife
• Frédéric Anel: World War Will Not Take Place (Odile Jacob)
• Frédéric Anel: The Art of War by Example (Flamarion)