Abstenção induzida

Summary

The presenter argues that possible election interference should be investigated at the analog stages surrounding Brazil’s digital voting process: before voters reach the electronic ballot box and after they leave it. He emphasizes that his account is a hypothesis, not a proven explanation. Without relevant data from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), he says, neither his theory nor assurances that everything was normal can be verified.

Abstentions and access to voting

The presenter points to 33.4 million abstentions, or about 21.08% of the electorate. He also cites:

• 4.3 million justifications submitted on election day
• 8.6 million digital voter-document issuances
• More than 22 million polling-place inquiries, with delays in data transmission

He suggests that voters without smartphones or data access, or who could not use the e-Título app, may have faced difficulties that would not appear in these figures but could contribute to abstention. In his view, people who went to polling places but left unable to vote should not simply be described as disillusioned with democracy.

Possible forms of interference

The presenter questions whether a reported decline in disinformation complaints rules out interference. He proposes that targeted, local misinformation could go unreported if recipients did not realize they had been misled.

He identifies three possible mechanisms:

1. Voter behavior could be mapped geographically.
2. Polling-place relocations may have affected voters who rely on digital tools for updates.
3. Some voters may have received assistance getting to their polling tables.

He cites reports that 60 polling places in Rio changed addresses, affecting more than 200,000 voters. He also says he saw groups of evangelical voters being led to their tables with numbered slips.

Illustrative numerical scenario

The presenter offers a numerical scenario to argue that even a small number of impeded voters could matter if the effect fell disproportionately on one candidate’s supporters. Assuming that seven Lula voters were deterred for every three Bolsonaro voters, he says an average of 12 voters per polling table could shift the result by roughly two percentage points—enough, in his calculation, to account for the 1.87-point gap between Lula and Bolsonaro in the first round.

This is an illustrative calculation, not evidence that such a process occurred.

Polls and practical barriers

The presenter suggests that this theory could help explain why polls showed a larger lead for Lula than the final result. He distinguishes between people’s willingness to vote and their practical ability to do so, arguing that polls may capture the former while missing barriers that affect the latter.

He concludes by urging the TSE to release the relevant data as soon as possible.

Presenter: Fernando Horta