IISS Manama Dialogue 2026 | Maritime Security at an Inflection Point

Summary

The session examined how disruptions to major maritime chokepoints have made maritime security a global concern. Speakers agreed that instability at sea affects far more than shipping: it can raise energy and insurance costs, threaten food security and supply chains, and endanger seafarers and coastal livelihoods. They argued that no country can secure these routes alone, and that cooperation must uphold international law and freedom of navigation.

• Saudi Arabia described the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden as vital arteries for trade, energy, and connectivity. Attacks on commercial shipping since 2023, alongside uncertainty around passage through Hormuz, demonstrate the wider consequences of maritime threats. Saudi Arabia’s proposed multilateral initiative is intended to improve coordination, intelligence sharing, and protection for ships and ports. The speaker stressed that military force cannot replace law: straits should not be used as instruments of pressure, and disagreements should be addressed through cooperation and de-escalation.

• India argued that maritime security is inseparable from economic and human security. Disruptions affect developing economies and ordinary people, while merchant seafarers—civilians doing legitimate work—face attack, detention, and death. India’s approach rests on five areas: maritime information sharing and awareness; training and professional exchanges; support for countries’ monitoring capacity; operational coordination, such as patrols and rescue efforts; and clear public communication during crises. India also emphasized the importance of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, inclusive regional arrangements, and diplomatic solutions to political disputes.

• Singapore warned that global trade’s ability to adapt to disruption should not be mistaken for security: the costs are borne by businesses and seafarers, and repeated disruption risks becoming normalized. It argued that geography and mutual economic dependence do not, by themselves, guarantee security or trust. Countries should share information, build relationships before crises, and cooperate to protect infrastructure as well as shipping. In response to questions about undersea cables and manpower, Singapore pointed to technologies such as underwater drones and the need to work with private-sector infrastructure providers. It also said that law-enforcement measures are relevant to illicit shipping in its waters.

• France described the sharp fall in commercial traffic through Hormuz since late February and the resulting effects on energy prices, insurance, food security, and supply chains. France said it is not a party to the conflict and maintains a defensive posture while remaining engaged in regional security. The admiral cited multinational efforts, including the Combined Maritime Forces and EU naval missions, as well as regional information-sharing centers. He also outlined a French–UK-supported defensive maritime initiative, developed in consultation with relevant states and separate from other military campaigns. Its purpose is to protect and reassure shipping, not to confront; deployment would depend on political conditions and a manageable threat. France’s central message was that maritime security requires international cooperation, but lasting solutions depend on diplomacy.

Discussion and responses

Audience questions covered the possibility of a Saudi-led standing naval force; the membership, assets, and duration of the French–UK initiative; India’s possible role in mediation between Iran and the United States; China’s contribution to regional security; protection of undersea cables; regional security frameworks; the role of BRICS; the use of data and artificial intelligence; illicit “dark ship” activity; and whether growing commercial fleets alongside uneven naval expansion represent a new strategic imbalance.

France said that the proposed initiative’s deployment conditions were principally political, and that many missions compete for a limited number of ships. It described the effort as international, with partners represented in its staff, and said exercises were being planned.

India said it would be willing to contribute diplomatically where it could add value, but did not see itself joining an active conflict. It supported the principles behind multilateral proposals and said security discussions were being added to the India–France–UAE trilateral mechanism. India identified predictable, safe maritime commerce and a return to diplomacy as measures of success. It added that BRICS is not currently a framework for defense cooperation, while describing existing Indian Ocean information-sharing arrangements and a regional maritime-awareness initiative.

Singapore highlighted the potential for technology and cooperation with infrastructure providers to help monitor undersea cables, while noting that enforcement questions around illicit shipping require law-enforcement responses. Several audience questions received only brief or no substantive answers.

Presenters and contributors

• Moderator: Bastian (surname unclear in the subtitles)
• Vice Admiral Abdullah Ali (name uncertain in the subtitles), Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces
• Vikram Misri, Foreign Secretary of India
• Zaqy Mohamad, Acting Minister-in-Charge of Muslim Affairs and Senior Minister of State for Defence, Singapore
• Rear Admiral Yann Busu (surname spelling uncertain in the subtitles), Joint Commander of the French Forces in the Indian Ocean

Audience members also contributed questions; their names were not consistently clear in the subtitles. They included participants identified with the UK, India, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and a young leaders group.