Ulus Devletler Geri mi Dönüyor?

Summary

The video asks whether nation-states are returning or whether globalization is ending. Its central distinction is that globalization is unlikely to disappear, but states are regaining authority and importance.

The speakers differ somewhat on whether this amounts to a revival of the nation-state itself. One emphasizes a nationalist backlash, while the other argues that it is primarily the state—and its demand for sovereignty and security—that is strengthening.

What is the difference between a modern state and a nation-state?

• A modern state is a territorial authority with recognized sovereignty, laws, a bureaucracy and, typically, an army.
• A nation-state combines those institutions with a national identity: people are connected not only by legal rights and duties, but also by a shared account of history, culture, language or belonging.
• A state may officially be a nation-state while containing many ethnic, religious or linguistic groups. Russia and India are discussed as examples in which national identity is also actively constructed.
• Saudi Arabia is presented as a case where the leadership is trying to build a stronger national identity around an existing monarchy.

How nation-states emerged and spread

The speakers describe two broad paths to nation-building:

• France: A strong, centralized state helped create a shared French identity. This model is relatively civic and assimilationist: people can become French by joining the political community.
• Germany: A shared language and cultural identity helped inspire political unification. This model is presented as more ethnically defined and exclusionary.
• Türkiye: Described as closer to the French civic model, though its national narratives also contain tensions and influences from both approaches.

Nation-states spread, the speakers argue, because they proved effective at mobilizing people and resources. They could organize armies, administer territory, support industrialization and manage the demands of growing cities more efficiently than older imperial arrangements.

Why the nation-state was effective

Several forces helped make the nation-state successful:

• A source of shared meaning: As religious authority and traditional dynastic legitimacy weakened, national belonging offered people a collective identity and a sense of purpose.
• Capitalism and the bourgeoisie: National markets, secure property rights and political participation suited commercial and industrial interests. The speakers contrast this with empires, which they associate more with aristocracy and agrarian power.
• Industrialization and education: A shared language and education system could support a trained workforce and greater administrative coordination.
• Shared communication and stories: Print, newspapers and common historical narratives helped people imagine themselves as part of one community.
• State capacity and war: National identity could make large-scale mobilization more cohesive, particularly in wartime.

The speakers also stress that nationalism is not only an ideology of conflict. Historically, it was connected to modern political participation and public institutions, even though its association with fascism and twentieth-century wars later made it suspect in much liberal thought.

Why globalization appeared to weaken states

From the 1980s and 1990s onward, several developments limited governments’ economic and political room to maneuver:

• Production could move abroad, while financial capital became more mobile.
• The Washington Consensus promoted reduced state involvement in the economy and greater market liberalization.
• Governments became more dependent on investors, lenders and credit ratings. Those seeking finance could face pressure to follow policies favored by international markets.
• International institutions and agreements—including the IMF, WTO and EU—could constrain national policy choices.
• Daniel Rodrik’s “impossible trilemma” is used to explain the trade-off between deep integration into the global economy, national sovereignty and democracy: a country cannot fully maximize all three at once.
• The internet weakened states’ ability to shape a common information environment. People increasingly encounter stories and cultural influences from beyond their own country, making national narratives less exclusive.

These changes occurred during a period of liberal hegemony, when a relatively open, interconnected world was often presented as reducing the importance of borders, nationalism and the state.

Why states and nationalism are gaining ground again

The speakers identify several shocks that exposed the limits of that vision:

• The 2008 financial crisis weakened confidence in the global economic model and left many workers and communities feeling that they had borne its costs.
• The Arab Spring and subsequent conflicts and migration intensified political disputes over borders, identity and social cohesion.
• Covid-19 showed that states still had to make urgent decisions about borders, supplies and public health.
• The Israel–Palestine conflict and other recent crises have, in the speakers’ view, highlighted the weakness of international institutions and the difficulty of enforcing international rules.
• US actions and the rise of China have raised doubts about the credibility of a rules-based order and the durability of US-led global dominance.

Migration is described as especially consequential: the presence of outsiders can strengthen an “us” identity, even as digital culture and individualism may weaken older forms of national solidarity. The speakers also note that people who migrate abroad may become more conscious of their national identity through their experience of being seen as outsiders.

What might come next?

The speakers do not predict a simple end to globalization. They suggest that it may become more regional or divided into competing spheres of influence, while trade, communication and technology remain deeply interconnected.

• One speaker anticipates a multipolar world with rival regional or civilizational spheres and greater competition over technology, payments, communications and security.
• The other cautions that globalization is difficult to reverse and argues that the stronger trend may be the return of the state, rather than a complete return of the nation-state.
• Both expect states to place greater emphasis on sovereignty, borders and security. They discuss the possibility that surveillance technology will substantially increase state capacity, while disagreeing over how far this could lead toward authoritarian rule.
• They also suggest that national narratives may change. Shared traditions and history may matter less to some people than territorial boundaries, economic concerns and a sharper distinction between citizens and outsiders.
• The closing forecast contrasts renewed nation-states in the West with “civilizational states” in parts of the East, where governments may invoke a broader civilizational identity to justify their influence.

Overall lesson: The debate is not simply “globalization versus nation-states.” Economic and technological globalization continues, but crises have strengthened demands for political authority and security. The state appears to be returning; how much this also revives national identity remains contested.

Speakers and sources mentioned

Speakers

• Ömer — one of the two discussion participants.
• Yaşar — the other participant; the subtitles do not provide fuller names.

Thinkers and concepts cited

• Benedict Anderson — imagined communities, print media and national identity.
• Ernest Gellner — nationalism, industrialization and the creation of national identity.
• Daniel Rodrik — the “impossible trilemma” of globalization, sovereignty and democracy.
• E. P. Thompson — British working-class culture.
• Friedrich Nietzsche — the phrase “God is dead,” discussed in relation to the crisis of meaning.
• Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel — identity and recognition by others.
• Daron Acemoglu — the “narrow corridor” and state–society relations.
• Samuel Huntington — the “clash of civilizations.”

Institutions and frameworks discussed

The IMF, World Bank, WTO, European Union, NAFTA, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Washington Consensus.