Ini Alasan 90% Bisnis di Indonesia STUCK, Bersama Prof. Ningrum | Unfiltered E137

Business competition, regulation, and why many Indonesian businesses get “stuck”

The guest argues that Indonesia’s “stuckness” is tied to:

• Weak or unclear competition policy enforcement
• Regulatory mismatch, especially when markets shift quickly (e.g., digital/infrastructure-based competition)

A central theme is that although Indonesia has improved competition behavior over roughly 25 years, behavior change remains slow, and this still produces unfair market outcomes.

The Business Competition Supervisory Commission (KPPU) is presented as the key institution to maintain fairness—however, the legal and procedural details (due process, rules, coordination) matter greatly.

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Frameworks / concepts / playbooks highlighted

Competition law outcomes

The discussion frames competition as improving:

• Efficiency
• Product availability
• Distribution
• Responsiveness to consumer demand

It also emphasizes that fair competition accepts that not everyone can win. Firms that lose should innovate, rather than depend on protection.

Cartel enforcement evidence models (OECD-style)

The summary references the OECD-style approach from “Prosecuting Cartels Without Direct Evidence” (Paris, 2002–2006 timeframe).

Key indirect evidence types mentioned include:

• Communication evidence (e.g., messages or contacts among cartel members)

• Economic evidence (e.g., abnormal pricing and market behavior consistent with collusion)

A timeline claim is included:

• KPPU adopted these ideas around 2006
• Broader procedural use is described as becoming part of procedural law around 2021

Due process as the “danger zone”

A repeated warning is that when an institution has major authority, due process of law must be strict to prevent:

• Abuse of power
• Unfair proceedings

Prevention-first approach (regulatory “do and don’t”)

Enforcement should be preceded by:

• Clear rules of the game
• Soft warnings, literacy, and compliance education
• Escalation to trial only if violations persist

State action doctrine / inter-agency alignment

For cases involving regulators or associations, enforcement should:

• Clearly establish the governmental role under the state action doctrine
• Ensure proper supervision and alignment across institutions

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Key concrete examples / case studies

1. Digital / digital-market competition regulatory gap

The claim is that KPPU (and/or the broader enforcement framework) lacks sufficiently clear regulations for digital competition cases, including how hearings should be conducted.

2. Cartel / tender collusion (Article 22)

KPPU’s Article 22 is repeatedly described as a major enforcement pillar against:

• Horizontal collusion (competing actors coordinating)
• Vertical collusion (coordination reaching project owners / tender authorities—e.g., up to PPK / project owner level)

Impacts mentioned include a general claim that:

• Colluded tenders can keep prices higher
• Prices may become cheaper after cartel breaks in some cases

3. Online lending / “smart” lending cartel allegation (Pindar / Pinjol context)

A highlighted case includes:

• 97 companies (members of an association)
• Total fines: IDR 755 billion
• Allegation: cartel setting ceilings on interest rates

Downstream regulatory action mentioned:

• OJK issued interest-cap guidance, referenced around 0.5% per day, with discussion including possible levels down to 0.4% per day.

The professor’s concern:

• The case could threaten industry sustainability (players may exit or go bankrupt)
• This could push borrowers toward illegal loan sharks

4. Trade / industry associations as a double-edged tool

Associations can function as:

• Positive
  • Educating members on regulations
  • Providing certification
  • Acting as a government “bridge”
• Negative
  • Becoming meeting points for cartel behavior

A legal/anomaly concern is raised:

• In some situations, associations may require KPPU-issued “do’s/don’ts” to prevent anti-competitive behavior.
• Even though freedom of association exists constitutionally (Article 28), enforcement conflicts can arise without clear competition safeguards.

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Actionable recommendations / “what should be done”

• KPPU and regulators should prioritize prevention

  • Publish and enforce clear do’s/don’ts
  • Use soft warnings and compliance education before relying on trial-heavy punishment

• Require stronger coordination and communication across institutions

  • The guest criticizes inter-agency arrogance and lack of communication (e.g., BI/OJK/PPATK/KPK/KPPU operating separately)
  • Suggested solution: formal joint processes such as joint decrees / joint proceedings where policies overlap

• Tighten due process

  • Ensure investigations and case initiation align with internal regulations (e.g., study requirements when cases start without formal reports)
  • Increase transparency where possible, including academic reviewability

• Fix the regulatory vacuum for fast-changing markets

  • Competition policy should account for modern realities like:
    • access to infrastructure
    • capabilities
    • capital
  • Not only classic metrics like market share/power

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Metrics and KPIs explicitly mentioned

• KPPU enforcement volume

  • “More than 500 decisions” across the service period (ascribed to the guest’s tenure)
  • Approx. 80% of decisions associated with Article 22 (tender collusion / bid rigging)

• Online lending cartel case

  • 97 companies
  • Total fines: IDR 755 billion
  • Interest cap guidance mentioned: ~0.5% per day, discussed as potentially down to 0.4% per day

• Macro intent / targets

  • Not presented as formal KPIs, but referenced goals include:
    • financial inclusion
    • legal certainty
    • behavior change in the industry (more than “spectacular fine numbers”)

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Business execution implications (for entrepreneurs and operators)

• Assume compliance risk is rising

  • The historical belief that “being close to authorities = safe” may no longer hold.

• Associations must function as compliance platforms

  • Not as cartel meeting points
  • Otherwise, associations increase enforcement exposure for members.

• Avoid punishment without measuring sustainability impact

  • If legal providers collapse, demand for credit may persist
  • Borrowers may shift toward illegal or unsafe alternatives

• Regulatory clarity is a competitive advantage

  • The discussion links inconsistent enforcement and overlapping/unclear regulation to weaker:
    • investment climate
    • legal certainty concerns

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Presenters / sources mentioned

• Presenter / Host: Den Virter (with guests referenced alongside “Vincent cave / Tirta cave” in the intro segment)

• Primary guest/source: Prof. Ningrum Professor specialized in business competition/anti-trust; served at KPPU for ~25 years

• Other people mentioned:

  • Prof. Renald / Prof. Reenald (referenced as an expert for a later call/chat)
  • Adi Satria Suryo Sulisto (Deputy Chairman, Commission 6, DPR)
  • Rosan (referred to as Minister of Investment; also CEO of Danantara)

• Institutions referenced:

  • KPPU, OJK, BI, PPATK, KPK
  • KPK / Corruption Court
  • KPK’s justice collaborator concept (used as an analogy)