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🔥БЫКОВ. Слит тайный план войны Путина?! Москва на ушах! Ад в Крыму! Побег Собчак! Расправа в Кремле!

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Overview

The video is a dialogue between host Alexander Demchenko and guest Dmitry Bykov, where Bykov speculates about the future trajectory of Russia’s war in Ukraine, internal repression, elite infighting, and potential succession scenarios—framing it all as part of a coming period of internal “turmoil” within Russia.

War timeline, fatigue, and internal repression

  • Bykov argues that the war’s “last summer” is plausibly approaching, not because the regime is succeeding, but because both Russia and the rest of the world are becoming increasingly worn down.
  • He claims fear and depression do not grow as much among Ukrainians—allegedly because they are hardened by living “in extreme mode”—while Russia experiences mounting fatigue under ongoing coercive control.
  • He expects repression and purges to intensify, describing the war as powered not only by external conflict, but by “mutual hatred and mutual extermination,” alongside escalating internal repression.

Possible sabotage and the “information system” shift

  • Bykov suggests that as official narratives lose credibility, alternative information channels will strengthen.
  • He predicts the emergence of trusted “internal observers/motivators,” potentially from:
    • Z-linked circles,
    • war correspondents,
    • or disillusioned insiders.
  • He anticipates a rise of a more resolute Russian opposition figure—someone he compares to potentially becoming a “new Navalny,” but harsher and less compromising.
  • At the same time, he notes there’s no expectation that major parts of the Putin elite will betray him.

Succession concept: “transition committee,” not a true successor

  • Bykov argues that any internal opposition uprising inside Russia would not be positioned to replace Putin as a successor.
  • Instead, it would be more like a “battering ram.”
  • He claims Putin’s role is structurally unique: in Russia’s system, “the place Putin occupies can only be occupied by Putin.”
  • Therefore, the most plausible change would require an elite-backed temporary transitional mechanism—short-lived and radical—followed by removal, rather than a stable new regime installed by an openly leading opposition figure.

“Two-component” future force

Bykov suggests a future force would likely combine:

  1. Insiders/traitors to Putin (“Khrushchevites”-like figures) who aim to prevent the system from collapsing entirely with him (he mentions Kiriyenko as a possible example).
  2. Pragmatic economic stabilizers from the “border” of the regime (he cites Khodorkovsky or economists around him).

He emphasizes that these actors likely would not lead from the surface. Instead, a publicly visible “servant of the people” figure—such as a doctor/teacher/military-type—would appear as the face behind which planners operate.

Putin’s fears: energy strikes and potential nuclear escalation

  • Asked what Putin’s main fear is, Bykov points to Ukrainian strikes, especially those reportedly targeting nuclear-related infrastructure.
  • He argues Russia could be pushed into a scenario where part of Russia becomes like a “detonable bomb.”
  • He speculates about behind-the-scenes negotiation attempts to limit escalation.
  • He also claims that only a small security unit has direct access to Putin.

Crimea as a “horcrux” and strategic trap

  • The discussion includes claims (via telegram channels and media) that Kerch is under Ukrainian control/under Ukrainian air control and that key Russian support units in the area have been destroyed.
  • Bykov strongly argues that “Putin is not losing Crimea” in a simple sense. Instead, Russia is “acquiring” a Crimea that is increasingly unmanageable:
    • impossible to detach,
    • yet too costly to hold.
  • He frames Crimea as a repeating source of geopolitical catastrophes for Russia, referencing patterns such as:
    • the Crimean War,
    • post-Soviet catastrophe dynamics,
    • and Crimea as a “mine” that keeps destabilizing outcomes.
  • Regarding exit for Russians, he says people will likely still be able to leave, but only under more restrictive conditions, such as:
    • tighter mobilization constraints,
    • greater difficulty leaving,
    • possible bureaucratic controls (e.g., exit visas).
    • He notes timing is uncertain and could worsen.

Internal unrest and Moscow autumn fears

  • Bykov rejects the expectation that Ukraine will directly shell Moscow in “copycat” style.
  • However, he argues strikes on decision-making centers are plausible.
  • He suggests an elite figure might be positioned as a “cosmetic successor”, and names Sobyanin as an expected candidate.

Ksenia Sobchak, leaks, and “who survives”

  • The conversation turns to the risks stemming from correspondence leaks.
  • Bykov suggests Sobchak’s public political role is likely over, even if she may be personally protected enough to avoid arrest.
  • He believes her media holding/journalism space may end and speculates she could leave Russia and grant interviews abroad.

Broader outlook: a “Time of Troubles” level turmoil

  • Bykov’s overall thesis is that Russia entered a storm already in motion.
  • He compares it to historical upheavals and suggests a long period of instability could follow if the system cracks.
  • He argues reforms in the current state are unlikely; the system is seen as beyond reform and prone to collapse-level transformation.

Military mutiny scenario (and why it’s unlikely)

  • On whether the army might mutiny against Moscow/St. Petersburg, Bykov says an army-led rebellion is not impossible in principle.
  • Still, he doubts it would originate from Rostov, and he notes the army’s “subjectivity” in Russian history has generally been low.
  • He also says he doesn’t currently see a charismatic general or authority figure capable of driving a successful mutiny.

“Horcrux” metaphor and conspiracy around TV propaganda

  • In a stylized metaphor, Bykov claims Putin has “four horcruxes,” citing Crimea and other symbolic entities/people.
  • He suggests Solovyov is a major conspiratorial force whose position could be threatened.

Presenters / contributors

  • Dmitry Lvovich Bykov (guest)
  • Alexander Demchenko (host; speaks as “Sasha”)

Original video