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Executive summary

Ivan Nazarov and Alexey Bely explain that they are ending their course-selling infobusiness, not disappearing from media altogether. They plan to shift their time and attention to physical products and FMCG, where they believe the business can scale beyond the founders’ personal capacity. They intend to keep publishing content and maintain their community, but less regularly and under a new identity.

Their account is a three-year retrospective: a costly first launch, growth through YouTube and Telegram, increasingly structured course operations, a major launch reportedly reaching ₽100 million, and eventual burnout. Their main conclusion is that infobusiness can be profitable and satisfying, but for them it demanded too much founder time and had a lower growth ceiling than their product business.

Strategy, processes and playbooks

• Build around complementary founder strengths. The partners described themselves as a strong fit: one brought marketplace, product and production experience; the other contributed marketing expertise. They believed combining those capabilities could create more value than pursuing separate projects.
• Use content as both proof and a sales asset. Their approach was to publish long-form YouTube videos—such as product and business breakdowns—to demonstrate expertise, then direct interested viewers to Telegram. They initially used Telegram advertising and straightforward sales posts rather than a complex funnel.
• Make sales explicit. Early on, they were comfortable sharing useful information but reluctant to sell. Working with producer Pasha Algazin helped them accept that a good product still needs a clear offer and direct calls to buy.
• Prioritize product quality and the student experience. The founders said they wrote their own course content and organized in-person events. Their playbook included onboarding, frequent broadcasts, student feedback, practical work and graduation events. They treated the community and peer network as lasting value beyond the course itself.
• Create repeatable operations. As the business matured, offline events and course schedules were standardized, and the team took on clearer roles. The founders said they eventually worried less about delivery because the team knew the process.
• Treat founder attention as a constraint. They concluded that their personal time was central to course content, delivery and sales, making the model hard to scale. In their product businesses, they expected to delegate more execution to employees.
• Differentiate deliberately. They argued that avoiding constant appearances at the same industry conferences helped them feel less ubiquitous, and that higher-priced offers could encourage students to engage more seriously. These were their observations, not universal rules.
• Use transparent storytelling in marketing. They openly told their audience about Alexey’s dream of owning a Rolls-Royce. They said this honesty helped make their marketing feel personal and memorable. Later, a car giveaway was used as part of a course experience and to encourage students to complete the program.

Metrics and targets

Figures below are approximate recollections from the presenters:

• Project duration: About three years in infobusiness.
• First launch: Roughly ₽3 million spent and about ₽300,000 earned. They described spending around ₽2 million on Telegram promotion and ₽1 million on YouTube production; the subtitles also mention spending on goods, so the exact allocation is not fully clear.
• Early audience: About 2,000 organic YouTube subscribers; an early analysis video reportedly received around 15,000 views.
• Major launch: They describe a later launch at approximately ₽100 million, which they treated as a major achievement in their market.
• Course participation and completion: Early in-person groups reportedly had around 30–50 attendees. They estimated that roughly 80–90% of students completed courses, and recalled about 10 refunds over three years, mostly associated with cheaper offers.
• Delivery workload: At one point, they ran about five broadcasts per week. One intensive involved four groups of roughly 20 students, with analyses lasting up to 12 hours.
• Advertising-control example: A campaign for an underwear project spent ₽2 million in one week against a planned budget of about ₽1 million, prompting a dispute and tighter limits on who could change campaigns.
• Next-stage target: Aim for ₽10 billion in product sales turnover within two years. They estimated that this could translate to roughly ₽6–7 billion in recognized revenue after marketplace deductions; no net-profit target was specified.
• Infobusiness market ceiling: The founders’ own estimate was that even a leading Russian project might reach around ₽1 billion annually, with further growth constrained by market size and founder capacity. This was their judgment, not an independently verified market measure.
• Timeline: They said they had no training launches planned for the next year. For at least the next six months, they expected to focus on large events rather than paid courses.

Examples and lessons

• The first launch showed the cost of untested assumptions. Despite substantial spending and growing attention, the first launch brought in only about ₽300,000. The founders then worked with a producer to improve their selling process and offer.
• YouTube worked as a credibility channel. They used long videos to show their expertise and warm up prospective students, while Telegram handled the direct offer. Their reported early viewership exceeded what some producers had predicted.
• Overbuilding delivery can cause burnout. The founders described long broadcasts, intensive student support, event preparation and repeated course launches as emotionally demanding. Alexey’s burnout and personal difficulties also strained the partnership.
• Operational controls matter. The unexpected overspend on the underwear campaign highlighted the risks of unclear advertising authority and weak budget checks. They responded by restricting who could edit campaigns.
• The course community became an asset. Some students later became curators, collaborators or business contacts. The founders said they wanted to preserve this network even after stopping regular courses.
• The pivot reflects opportunity cost. They believed their product businesses could grow faster if they received the founders’ full attention. They planned to focus on existing product lines and develop better-known consumer brands.
• Concrete recommendation from their experience: Validate the economics early, make sales part of the launch plan, systematize delivery as the cohort grows, monitor ad spend closely, and reassess whether a founder-dependent model is still the best use of time.

Presenters and sources mentioned

Presenters: Ivan Nazarov and Alexey Bely.

People and organizations referenced: Pasha Algazin (launch producer), Pasha Shevchenko and the Tuzlyam training program, Lisa (strategic producer), Maria (operations), Rustam (sales), Natalia (psychologist), Leo Shevchenko, MPStats, Wildberries, and their former students and team.