Video summary
What Happens When You Name a Folder Wrong on Windows — Rémi Gascou - Hackers On The Rocks Podcast
Main summary
Key takeaways
Main topic
The episode investigates a quirky Windows security flaw where folder name character/parameter injection can break how PowerShell interprets the command created by the built-in “Shift + Right Click → Open PowerShell here” context-menu action. It combines:
- Windows folder/file naming
- Character set / delimiter abuse (notably spaces and quotes)
- PowerShell command-line parsing
- Windows Registry context-menu configuration
Core technical findings (what goes wrong)
- On Windows 10/11, naming a folder with specific payload-like text can cause the PowerShell command that Windows builds for “Open PowerShell here” to be parsed incorrectly.
- The resulting PowerShell errors indicate argument/parameter parsing confusion, where injected text makes the command treat parts of the folder name as command/parameter structure rather than as a literal path.
- The speaker emphasizes that the vulnerability stems from how PowerShell parses positional arguments/parameters, and how folder names can accidentally (or intentionally) inject syntactic meaning.
Exploitation approach (how this becomes usable)
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Initial primitive (needs user interaction)
- The injection triggers only when a user opens PowerShell via the Shift + Right Click menu on a directory whose name contains the malicious payload.
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Making it stealthier / more realistic
- Instead of putting the payload directly on the visible folder, the research places the payload folder deeper in the path or elsewhere and uses shortcuts so the user right-clicks something that looks benign.
- The payload may be hidden in parent/ancestor path elements, while Windows Explorer may display only truncated paths (e.g., with “…”), reducing visibility.
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Using network shares
- The speaker notes it can be easier when the payload can be created on a share accessible to the target, and then the target is induced to use a shortcut that leads to the payload directory.
Registry + context menu angle
- Windows Registry is described as the configuration store for OS and third-party integrations, including context menu entries.
- Because the registry can be modified by sufficiently privileged attackers, the research discusses manipulating what right-click context-menu actions do—e.g., installing or altering entries such as “Open in PowerShell” or similar launcher behaviors.
Observability / detection notes
- When exploitation works, the resulting command injection happens inside PowerShell, so spawned processes are child processes of PowerShell.
- Therefore, defenders can likely observe activity with process inspection tools (e.g., PowerShell/command-line visibility), though the user-facing execution can be masked by the shortcut strategy.
“AI poisoning” / LLM angle (analysis & motivation)
The episode claims the issue has been present for years and that modern AI/LLM systems used for coding assistance can be “poisoned” indirectly:
- LLMs trained on scraped data (including registry snippets/configs posted online) may generate registry/configuration templates that contain vulnerable command-line patterns.
The speaker’s intent is framed less as “attack AI directly” and more as demonstrating that LLMs can replicate insecure/vulnerable patterns when they appear in training data—especially for third-party context menu integrations that invoke PowerShell.
Disclosure & response (product/security process)
- The researcher reports:
- Microsoft denied a CVE and bounty/credit, even though the issue was allegedly fixed silently afterward.
- The reasoning given was that it wasn’t considered remote and/or was dismissed as too dependent on social engineering (requiring user clicks and a shift+right-click sequence).
- The emotional takeaway is frustration that the fix occurred, but credit/standard disclosure wasn’t granted.
Related controversy mentioned
- The episode briefly discusses “Nightmare Eclipse”, described as a Twitter-based researcher who publicly claimed a series of Windows zero-day reports to MSRC and disputes over how MSRC handled them (denied responses/bounties/CVEs), followed by public proof/PR conflict.
Practical “guides/tutorials” called out in the episode
There isn’t a step-by-step defensive tutorial, but the speaker provides a conceptual “how it’s exploited” workflow:
- Create/select a folder name that injects into PowerShell parsing (payload in name)
- Use shortcuts or shares to make the interaction socially plausible
- Optionally rely on path truncation in Explorer to reduce user notice
- If registry context-menu entries are controllable, modify or rely on context-menu behaviors to reach the vulnerable PowerShell invocation
Main speakers / sources
- Rémi Gascou (guest researcher) — primary source of the technical findings and disclosure story.
- Hackers on the Rocks hosts (interviewer[s], unnamed in the subtitles) — ask questions about command injection, registry/context menus, observability, and disclosure.